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Introduction
Our country is in the midst of profound economic restructuring.
Information industries have become the center of national growth
and opportunity, employing more people than the manufacturing
sector, generating more of our gross national product, and expanding
at a rate double the economy as a whole. Information has become
the number one American export,2 and other countries are looking to
compete. The European Commission is committed to making Europe
the leader in the global e-commerce.' Japan's MITI has an active
Electronic Commerce Promotion Council to do the same for Japan.4
American competitiveness in the twenty-first century will
depend in no small part on how well the American legal system
supports the emerging information economy. At the outset, this
means recognizing that information is qualitatively different from
goods The policies behind its creation and exploitation differ
1. Stephen E. Siwek & Gale Mosteller, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy:
The 1999 Report (1998). This report was prepared by Economists Incorporated for the
International Intellectual Property Alliance (available at <http://www.iipa.com/html/
reports-by-issue.html>) (accessed May 15, 2000).
2. Id. For a discussion of the emerging possibilities for global e-commerce, see
Lorin Brennan, Through the Telescope: Article 2B and the Future of E-Commerce, 37 UCC
Bulletin, Rel. 3 (Apr.-May 1999); Through the Telescope II: The Meaning of UCITA, 39
UCC Bulletin, Rel. 43 (Jan.-Feb. 2000).
3. See It's a Revolution: Electronic Commerce (available at <http://europ.eu.int/
ISPO/ecommerce/>) (accessed Sept. 5, 2000):
Electronic commerce is a revolution that is sweeping across the world,
changing the way we do business, the way we shop and even the way we
think. And at the forefront of the revolution is the European
Commission's electronic commerce unit. We've been supporting research
and development in technologies you take for granted now and the
technologies that will become the norms tomorrow. We've been helping
business in the European Community become more competitive and
we're involved in exciting new technologies like mobile e-commerce,
smart cards, ubiquitous Internet, digital TV and more.
The Commission has promulgated an E-Commerce Directive mandating recognition of
"click-on" and on-line contracts. See Eur-Lex: Legislation under Prepraration (available
at <http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/dat/1999/en599PCO427.html>) (accessed Sept. 5,
2000).
4. See The Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan (available at
<http://www.ecom.or.jp/qecom/ecom-e/index.html>) (accessed Sept. 5, 2000).
5. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA
Say about the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 255 (2000);
Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 Duq. L. Rev.
459 (2000); Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law - What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Michael L. Rustad, Commercial
Law Infrastructure for the Age of Information, 16 J. John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.
255 (1997).
sharply from those for the manufacture and sale of industrial
commodities. State commercial law, long attuned to supporting the
industrial sector, must restructure itself to fit the very different
policies necessary to build markets in information.
One area in urgent need of restructuring is secured financing
law. In the new information economy, intellectual property financing
has assumed growing importance.6 The federal information statutes,
as drafted by Congress, provide an efficient system for perfecting
security interests in federal information. The drafters of original
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 understood this. Grant
Gilmore, the Reporter for Article 9, was emphatic that security
interests in federal information could only be perfected under the
relevant federal statutes
Unfortunately, the straight-forward congressional mandate has
been confused by errant court decisions. Several commercial law
commentators have added to the melee, complaining that the federal
information statutes are not suited to what they call the "modern"
financing methods under Article 9. By far, the most serious problem,
however, is the recent revision of Article 9 commonly called
"Revised Article 9" or simply "Revised 9." ' It is a radical departure
from the original; one that now sets state commercial finance law on
a collision course with federal information law. The fundamental
purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage new creations. It
does this by allowing creators to collect royalties as a reward for
creativity. The goal of Revised Article 9, however, is allow financiers
of remote licensees to seize creators' royalties without restraint. The
result is a statute at odds with the basic policies underlying
intellectual property law.
Explaining how Revised 9 runs astray requires a detailed look at
two interwoven but distinct subjects. The first is how intellectual
6. See Melvin Simensky & Lanning G. Bryer, The New Role of Intellectual Property
in Commercial Transactions § 8.4(a), 300 (J. Wiley & Sons 1994).
7. See Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.8 674-675
["Gilmore"] ("Security interests in copyrights and patents (which are 'general
intangibles') would have to be perfected under the relevant filing system and not Article
9."). Although information financing has been discussed in several law reviews and
treatises, among the commentators Gilmore still towers over all. His opus remains the
definitive text, notably for doing what many others have not: he read intellectual property
law. After exhaustive review, he insisted repeatedly that federal law governed perfection
of security interests. Id. at § 1.14, 15-16; § 13.3, 415; § 19.9, 544-545.
8. Revised Article 9 was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws at its 1998 Annual Meeting and promulgated to the state
legislatures in 1999. As of this writing, 20 states have adopted Revised 9. For a useful
compendium, see The New Article 9, prepared by the ABA Business Law Section.
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property can and should be financed under federal law. The second
involves an analysis of Revised 9 itself. For convenience of
exposition, I have divided this study into two articles. This one,
Financing Intellectual Property under Federal Law: A National
Imperative, discusses how intellectual property could and should be
financed under the federal copyright, patent and trademark statutes.
The companion article, Financing Intellectual Property under Revised
Article 9: National and International Conflicts,9 undertakes a detailed
analysis of Revised 9. Together they fully explain the magnitude of
the issues raised by Revised 9 and the necessary solutions.
Much of the recent commentary about intellectual property
financing falls into two camps. One camp consists of intellectual
property lawyers who argue that security interests in patents,
copyright and trademarks should be perfected under the federal
information statutes."0 These articles have usually appealed to federal
preemption to make their case. They have not proven persuasive to
the commercial law bar because they have not coherently explained
why federal filing makes better commercial sense than filing under
Article 9. The other camp involves commercial finance practitioners
9. See Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9:
National and International Conflicts, 23 Comm/Ent 2 (2001).
10. See e.g. Ara A. Babaian, Comment, Striving for Perfection: The Reform
Proposals for Copyright-Secured Lending, 33 Loy. L. Rev. 1205 (2000); Peter L. Choate,
Comment, Belts, Suspenders, and the Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights: The
Undressing of the Contemporary Creditor, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1415 (1998); Shubha
Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual Property
Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J.
99, 172 (1997); Shawn K. Baldwin, "To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts:" A Role for Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property as Collateral, 143 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1701 (1995); Robert H. Rotstein, Paul Heald's "Resolving Priority Disputes in
Intellectual Property Collateral:" A Comment, 1 Ga. J. Intell. Prop. L., 167, 175-177
(1993); Schuyler M. Moore, Entertainment Bankruptcies: The Copyright Act Meets the
Bankruptcy Code, 48 Bus. Law. 567 (1993); Harold R. Weinberg and William J.
Woodward, Jr., Legislative Process and Commercial Law: Lessons from the Copyright Act
of 1976 and the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Bus. Law. 437 (1993); Harold R. Weinberg
and William J. Woodward, Jr., Easing Transfer and Security Interest Transactions in
Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform, 79 Ky. L.J. 61 (1990); Melvin Simensky,
Enforcing Creditor's Rights Against Trademarks, 79 Trademark Reporter 569 (1989);
Note, Perfection of Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Federal Statutes Preempt
Article 9, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 135 (1988); Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A.
Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Information Property Rights 2 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 195
(1987); Note, Transfers of Copyright for Security under the New Copyright Act, 88 Yale
L.J. 125 (1978); Gary 0. Concoff, Motion Picture Secured Transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Problems in Perfection, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 1214 (1966). For intellectual
property financing internationally, see Melvin Simensky, Lanning Bryer & Neil J. Wilkof,
Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace (2d ed., J. Wiley & Sons 1999.). This is the
second edition of Simensky, supra n. 6. The leading treatise on United States law remains,
in this author's opinion, Gilmore, supra n. 7.
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who argue that intellectual property should be financed under Article9. l They complain that it is too difficult to understand the federal
statutes, and therefore information should be treated as another type
of industrial good and shoehorned into the familiar structures. of
Article 9. They have been unable, however, to give a coherent answer
the most basic question of commercial finance: who owns the
intellectual property when the secured creditor forecloses - the state
filing secured creditor, or a later bona fide purchaser who records
federally? As explained below, either the state security interest is
commercially worthless (i.e. the bona fide purchaser prevails) or it is
a fraud on creditors (i.e. the secured creditor prevails). Neither one
makes commercial sense.
Both sets of commentators have proved unconvincing because
they make the same incorrect assumption: that intellectual property
could or should fit within the financing constructs in Article 9. In fact,
it is simply not possible to finance intellectual property effectively
using the priority concepts in Article 9. As the federal courts have
been saying for more than a century, intellectual property must be
financed like real property; in essence, one must finance information
like an office building, not like a used car. In every information
financing transaction, there are potentially four separate interests in
which a lender needs to perfect. Article 9 is incapable of
accommodating all four interests in a commercially efficient manner.
The federal information statutes can.
This article explains how federal information statutes can and
11. See e.g. Steven 0. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised
Article 9, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1077, 1089, 1093-1094 (1999); Aimee A. Watterberg,
Comment, Perfecting a Security Interest in Computer Software Copyrights: Getting It
Right, 15 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 855 (1997); Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity
Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
1645, 1658-1659 (1996); William A. Dornbos, Structuring, Financing and Preserving
Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 113 Banking L.J. 656 (1996); Patrick R. Barry,
Software Copyrights as Loan Collateral: Evaluating the Reform Proposals, 46 Hastings
L.J. 581 (1995); Paul Heald, Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral,
1 Ga. J. Intell. Prop. L. 135 (1993); Note, Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights:
The Peregrine Effect on the Orion Pictures Plan of Reorganization, 11 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 959 (1993); Proto, The Scope of U.C.C. Article 9: Is Filing under Article 9
Sufficient to Perfect a Security Interest in a Patent or Trademark?, 93 Commercial L.J. 384
(1988); Robert Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral - Patents, Trade Secrets,
Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 Bus. Law. 1567 (1981). For treatises in this area see e.g.
Peter F. Coogan, William E. Hogan, Detlev F. Vagts & Jullian B. McDonnell, Secured
Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code § 25.08, 1C, Security Interests in
Intellectual Property (Bender 1999) ["Coogan"]; William C. Hillman, Documenting
Secured Transactions 2-19 to 2-20 (Practicing Law Institute 1998); Eldon H. Reiley,
Guidebook to Security Interests in Personal Property § 16.11, 16-20 (3d ed., C. Boardman
Co. 1999).
[23:195
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should provide the basis for financing information. Part I provides
an executive summary of how intellectual property financing works
and why it is more efficient to utilize the federal information statutes.
Part III then contains a detailed description of the law supporting this
understanding. This section reviews the evolution of intellectual
property financing under the pre-code financing systems, including
the examination of the critical concept of chain of title - why
statutorily, it does not exist for tangible personal property, but why it
is essential for intellectual property. It also discusses the crucial
concepts for the bona fide purchaser and lien creditor, and why the
latter does not exist for intellectual property. These concepts are
particularly important in case of bankruptcy, a matter examined in
detail. Part III concludes with a comparison of the inconsistent case
law interpreting the parallel language in the Copyright Act, the
Patent Act and the Lanham Act. Finally, Part IV suggests the needed
clarifications in federal law to rectify the confusion in the case law
and the commentary.
I
Executive Summary
This section provides an executive overview of what information
collateral involves, the four factors in any information financing
transaction, and a brief review of why using the federal system is a
more efficient financing scheme. The purpose is to provide a
conceptual structure to address the more detailed discussions to
follow.
A. An Information Primer
The term "intellectual property" encompasses a wide variety of
interests. These are typically statutory, and are usually classified by
the enabling legislation, e.g., patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade
secrets, etc. The scope of protection for varying types of intellectual
property is not the subject of this article. Instead, the focus is on how
intellectual property interests can be transferred for security. In
keeping with the modern approach, "information" will sometimes be
used as a convenient substitute for "intellectual property."' 2
For analytic convenience, we can divide information into two
areas:
. Federal Information: This includes federal intellectual
12. For a general discussion of information rights, see Ramond T. Nimmer,
Information Law (2d ed., Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1998).
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property interests under the Copyright Act,13 the Patent
Act14 and the Lanham Act. 5
0 State Information: These are the purely state interests,
such as state trademarks and related franchise rights, 6
trade secrets, 7 rights of publicity," pre-1972 sound
recordings, 9 rights to ideas,2° droit de suite2 and the like.
The reason for this classification is the different filing
requirements for these classes of information.
Information interests are transferred either by assignment or
license. Broadly speaking, an "assignment" is an ownership transfer
and a "license" is a use privilege.22 In modern practices, licenses are
further divided into "exclusive," meaning the licensor can not make
another transfer within the same scope, and "nonexclusive," meaning
the licensor can.23 Transfers can be limited in time. place or effect.
Whether a limited transfer is an ownership transfer or a use privilege
depends on whether the statutory rights are treated as indivisible.
The three patent rights to make, use and vend must be assigned as a
unit. The assignment can be limited in time or place, e.g. for the
Western United States for 10 years, in which case it is a "partial
assignment" or "grant., 24 An assignment of some, but not all, of the
three patent rights, is a license.25 The reason has to do with standing
13. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1996). To avoid needless detail, this article will not
discuss mask works, rights in digital sound recordings, or vessel hull designs.
14. 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1984). Similarly, a discussion of design patents is omitted.
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1005 (West 1997).
16. See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, The Law of Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, ch. 18 (2000 ed., M. Bender).
17. See generally Roger J. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets, ch. 2 (2000 ed.).
18. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Right of Publicity (2d ed., publisher 2000); see also
Harold Orenstein & David E. Guinn, Entertainment Law and Business, ch. 2 (1997 ed.).
19. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8C.03
(Bender 2000).
20. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, § 16.01; see also Orenstein & Guinn, supra
n. 18, ch. 1A.
21. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, § 8C.04; Liliane de Perredon-Fawcett, The
Droit de Suite in Literary and Artistic Property (Louise-Martin-Valiquette trans.,
Columbia U. School of Law 1991).
22. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy's Desk Encyclopedia of Intellectual Property
(Bureau of National Affairs 1991) (definitions of "assignment" and "license").
23. See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 775, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A]n exclusive
license is leave to do a thing, and a contract not to give leave to anyone else to do the
same thing.").
24. The Patent Act calls such partial assignments "grants." See Preload Enter., Inc. v.
Pac. Bridge Co., 86 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Del. 1949).
25. An exclusive license of all three patent rights is treated as an assignment. Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc. 52 F.3d 1026, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Vaupel
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [23:195
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to sue. Only an owner has standing, preventing a multiplicity of suits
against an alleged infringer. The Copyright Act has eliminated this
"indivisibility doctrine" for copyrights, meaning that the exclusive
rights can be owned and licensed separately." For copyrights, an
exclusive license is an ownership transfer akin to a partial assignment
that confers standing on the licensee.27 For convenience, we will refer
to both of these as "transfers," sometimes using "ownership transfer"
to refer to an assignment and, as applicable, exclusive license, and
''use privilege" otherwise.
In information transfers rights flow "down" to the transferee,
and money or other consideration flows back "up" to the transferor.
Both the information interest and the payments can be transferred
for security, either together or separately. Information financing can
thus involve transfers for security of intellectual property interests
("rights") or monetary entitlements ("royalties") of either a
transferor or transferee arising under an ownership transfer or a use
privilege for different types of information. The following chart
outlines the various factors:
Information Type , Party Source of Interest Interest Type
Federal Information Transferor Ownership Interest Rights
State Information Transferee Use Privilege Royalties
Information Financing Factors
Information collateral can arise from a combination of any
factor from each column, e.g. royalties from a transferor's ownership
of federal information or rights under a transferee's license of state
information. Discussing every nuance for every possible transaction
will lead to a discussion of considerable detail, blurring the main
points. For manageability this article will focus primarily on security
transfers of federal information interests, with some asides on related
state information. Although similar principles apply throughout, the
alert reader should keep in mind possible differences in detail arising
from the particular mix of the factors identified above.
Textilmaschinen v. Meccanica Euro Italia, 944 F.2d 870, 873-874 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
26. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(d)(2) (West 1996); see Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19,
§ 10.02[A].
27. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(d)(2) (West 1996).
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B. The Four Interests in Information Financing
In every information financing transaction there are four
different interests to consider:
* The transferor's interest in the information;
* The transferor's royalty income payable from transferees;
* The transferee's interest in the information; and
* The transferee's income from which royalties are due.
For discussion purposes, we can assume that the borrower is the
transferor. A secured lender then needs to consider perfecting its
security interest all four interests.
Transferor's information interest: This is often an ownership
interest, either because the transferor was the original creator or due
to an ownership transfer, although it can also be an interest under a
nonexclusive license. The lender's goal is to ensure that it is perfected
in this interest, since this is the source from which the other interests
spring. Unlike tangible personal property, but just like real property,
intellectual property has a chain of title. This means that that there
are often prior interests in the information. If any of these prior
interests is terminated, such as by foreclosure of a prior recorded
mortgage, it can wipe out the transferor's interest.25 This is why it is
critical to search the chain of title for each item of information
collateral so that lender can obtain any necessary quiet enjoyment
agreements ("non-disturbers") from prior parties 9
Transferor's right to royalties: This interest encompasses the
royalties a transferor collects from its transferees. The lender's goal
here is to ensure that it can collect the royalties ahead of any other
creditors of the transferor, including the bankruptcy trustee. Under
original Article 9, royalties are not "accounts." An account is a right
28. See infra n. 210 and accompanying text.
29. These operate like a "Non-Disturber and Attornment Agreement" common in
commercial leases. A senior mortgagor agrees that on foreclosure of its interest it will
allow a junior interest to continue under its license provided that the junior interest
acknowledges ("attorns to") the senior interest (in real estate practice, creating privity of
estate). In exchange, the junior interest and agrees to make all future royalty ("rent")
payments to the senior interest (in real estate practice, creating privity of contract) after
foreclosure. The ability of a senior mortgagee against the property to wipe out junior
leases who do not attorn is essential to prevent a practice known as "mortgage milking."
During the Depression, some borrowers would mortgage the property, and then offer
leases on below-market long-term rates with large up-front payments. Dishonest
borrowers would take the up-front payments and head to points unknown, leaving the
lender with property encumbered by long-term, low rent leases. For a discussion of the
"mortgage milking" cases, see Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 14.7. It is the same for information.
A foreclosing senior mortgagor wipes out junior licensees who have not attorned, thus
controlling "mortgage milking."
[23:195
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to payment arising from goods sold or services rendered, which does
not include a license of information. 30 Thus security assignments of
royalties are financed under the law of assignment, not by filing a
financing statement under Article 9. Under common law, a lender
generally perfects in royalties by giving notice to the transferees of
the assignment. This can be a burden where there are many
transferees. In re Peregrine3 held that since royalties arise form
exploiting a copyright, a lender could perfect in royalties by
recording in the Copyright Office. This is eminently sensible,
allowing a lender to perfect in a transferor's royalties with the same
instrument that perfects in the transferor's rights, rather than through
extensive notification to transferees. 2
Transferee's information interest: This involves the informational
rights granted to each transferee. These rights can also be ownership
interests or use privileges. The lender's goal here is to ensure that on
foreclosure of its security interest against a transferor, it can take the
information free of any of these transfers to which it did not consent.
This obviously gives the lender comfort that the transferor has not
made improvident transfers that reduce the collateral value. If chain
of title is the "look up" problem of ensuring no prior conflicting
transfers, then this is the "look down" problem of ensuring priority
over later transferees. Unlike personal property, intellectual property
does not recognize an "ordinary course" exception to a prior security
interest.33 Infringement is a strict liability tort. Any licensee can be
held liable if its licensor's interest is terminated, regardless of any
belief, reasonable or otherwise, that it had a valid license. This means
each transferee has the burden of finding prior interests and
obtaining necessary consents. Again, this is just like real property. A
major tenant, knowing its lease can be wiped out by foreclosure of a
prior mortgage, often insists~on a non-disturber agreement. Such an
agreement assures the tenant that its lease will not be wiped out by
foreclosure of a senior mortgage on the property, while the ability of
a senior mortgagee to foreclose on non-attorning junior leases
30. U.C.C. § 9-106 (West 1996); In re SSE Intl. Corp., 198 B.R. 667, 670 n. 3 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1996). See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.D.3(b).
31. In re Peregrine Enter., Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
32. Under original Article 9-306(2), a security interest in proceeds is perfected if the
security interest in the original collateral was perfected, but under § 9-306(3) it becomes
unpeifected within 10 days of receipt unless the filing in the original location was
sufficient to perfect in the proceeds as well. See U.C.C., Art. 9 (West 1997). Thanks to
Peregrine, a single filing in the Copyright Office perfects in the copyright and the royalties
under Article 9-306. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 203.
33. See discussion in Brennan, supra n. 9, § 111.1.
protects the mortgagee from mortgage milking.
Transferee's royalty income: A transferee can be expected to
exploit the information itself, usually through further sublicensing,
and will often owe a share of its income to its transferor as a royalty.
The lender's goal here is to ensure that it is perfected in the share of
the transferee's income earmarked as royalties ahead of other
creditors of the transferee. One way to do this is to treat the royalties
as separate from the rights and look to the state law of assignment to
perfect. Some cases say that a security interest against a transferee's
rights filed after the transfer was made would be subject to the
obligation to pay royalties. Another approach would look to filing in
the federal system to determine relative priorities. Thus, a federally
filed instrument disclosing a reserved royalty should have priority
over a later filed security interest against the transferee. In addition,
under intellectual property law, nonexclusive licenses are not
assignable without consent of the transferor. This means that a
transferor, acting on behalf of its lender, must consent to a security
transfer of rights and resulting royalties of the transferee's rights
under a non-exclusive license, or the transferee's security interest is
ineffective. Ownership transfers, however, are considered assignable
absent contractual prohibitions.
C. The Commercial Efficiency of Federal Filing
Securing a creditor's rights in all four information interests is far
more efficient using the single, national federal filing systems than
the scattered state filing rules under Article 9. A lender financing
information takes an interest somewhere in the chain of title. In some
cases, it may finance the creator, i.e, the first transferor. But more
often than not the lender must be concerned about both prior and
subsequent interests in the information.-
Consider the borrower's (transferor's) information interest. The
creditor must make sure that the debtor owns the information, or
there is no asset to generate income. This is just like real estate; a
mortgage lender must order a title report to verify that the debtor
owns the real property and appurtenant office building. Many
commercial lenders believe it is only necessary to search the
immediate debtor-transferor. This is incorrect. Unless the debtor is
the original creator, then will be prior transferors. Later in the text
we discuss searching the chain of title for Terminator 3, a
hypothetical movie based on the popular Terminator movies. There
are 94 prior transferors to search. Searching for prior security
interests using only state UCC filing system would cost more than
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$45,000. Including judgment liens would raise the costs to a
staggering $27,000,000. Compare this to a single search in the
Copyright Office, costing only a few hundred dollars.
Turning to the transferor's right to royalties, using just state law
procedures, a secured creditor would need to give notice to each
transferee every time a license is made in order to perfect, an
enormous burden. For accounts - and royalties are not accounts -
original Article 9 allows perfection by filing a financing statement
against the debtor. But the same rule for royalties would not be cost
effective. First, the creditor still has the "look-up" problem of finding
financing statements filed against prior transferors which may trump
its filing. Second, every time the debtor changes its location to a new
state the creditor would need to make a new filing.34 A single federal
filing that covers both rights and royalties is far more commercially
efficient.
Looking at the transferee's interest, it must be remembered that
intellectual property can be exploited anywhere nation wide. Using
Article 9, a lender would be required to file a new financing
statement against each transferee in every new state. This turns
information financing economics on its head. Intellectual property
policy fosters new creations by allowing "upstream"
creators/licensors to collect royalties from "downstream" licensees.
The burden is on "downstream" parties to manage their assets by
searching chain of title. This is undoubtedly more difficult for
"downstream" transferees when they acquire the information, but it
is not the policy of intellectual property law to make life easier for
them. The policy is to help creators collect royalties, and a single
filing in the federal registers does just that. The transferees get the
benefit when they in turn transfer to others. Again, this is just like
real estate. A tenant has the obligation of investigating title to find
prior mortgages, not the other way around, but gets the benefit
against subtenants.
Finally, a lender financing a transferor often wants priority in it's
the transferor's share of exploitation income (royalty share) ahead of
other creditors of the transferee. Any seller of purchase money
collateral wants that. If a federal filing gives priority over the
property, i.e. the transferee's intellectual property interest, it should
also give priority in the proceeds derived from disposition of that
property, i.e., the share of exploitation income payable as royalties.
34. See generally Mellon Bank v. Metro Commun., Inc., 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991);
see also Barkley Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial
Code, $ 10.04[3] (2d ed., Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1993).
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Of course, there is no reason why a transferor cannot be an
unsecured creditor of its transferee. But if the transferor does want a
security position, the most commercially efficient approach is to
indicate the transferor's reserved royalty in the instrument that was
filed indicating the transferee's grant.
Some commercial law commentators claim nonetheless that it is
"too difficult" to finance intellectual property under federal law. The
argue that a creditor should be able to use a floating lien with the
catch-all phrase "all general intangibles and intellectual property now
owned or later acquired." Filing a financing statement for such a
floating lien, they say, should perfect the lender's security interest in
any intellectual property against all prior transferors as well as
subsequent transferees. It should definitely give the transferee's
floating lienor priority over any royalties due to the transferor. It
works for industrial goods, why not for information?
I suggest that these floating lienors are not entitled to such
priority because they are not really financing the intellectual
property. How could they be? They never conducted a chain of title
search to determine whether their transferee-debtor owned the
information. If Joe Swindle says he owns an office building in
downtown Manhattan, a bank that loans him money without ordering
a title report is not really loaning against building. It is loaning
against Joe Swindle's representation, and taking the risk whether it is
accurate. A lender who does not determine whether the information
held by its debtor is subject to prior encumbrances, royalty
obligations or transfer restrictions does not include the real value of
the information in the collateral base, only, at best, the represented
value. Such a loan is secured by air, not assets. For industrial goods,
notorious possession gives an apparent ownership, reducing the need
to search chain of title. There is no apparent ownership rule for
intellectual property.
And what happens when the debtor transfers the information to
earn royalties? If the transferees record in the appropriate federal
filing offices,35 they qualify as bona fide transferees that take free of
the lender's floating lien since it was not recorded federally. What
happens if a creditor obtains a judgment against the debtor and
proceeds to judicial sale? The judgment creditor can also record
federally and likewise become a subsequent transferee who takes free
of a floating lien not recorded in the information tract registers. In
35. It is a bit more complicated. The Copyright Act allows recording of all transfers,
including licenses. The Patent Act and Lanham Act are limited to assignments. See infra
n. 461 and accompanying text.
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other words, it is easy to dispose of the information collateral free of
the floating lien. If collateral can be transferred free of the security
interest, the lender is not perfected. Some commentators try to get
around this obvious problem by saying an ownership transfer is
somehow different from a security interest, at least with regard to
filing rules. This distinction is specious. A security interest means
nothing unless the secured creditor on default can take the debtor's
ownership interest in the property. That, after all, is what secured
financing is all about.
By failing to conduct a chain of title search and file federally, a
floating lienor has failed to secure its interest in the debtor's
information against prior interests in the information and against
subsequent transferees without notice. Such a floating lienor is in
reality saying two things: "I don't care if the debtor owns the
information, since I have not conducted customary due diligence to
find out." And, "I don't care if the debtor transfers the information
free of my interest, since I haven't bothered to take the steps
necessary to prevent it." There is a term for those who advance funds
based solely an appearance of solvency, caring not what the debtor
owns or disposes of - general creditors.
The paramount goal of intellectual property law is to benefit the
public by encouraging new creations.36 It does this by facilitating the
ability of creators and "upstream" transferors, and their lender, to
collect royalties from "downstream" transferees. It is time we
examined how.
II
How Intellectual Property Financing Works
Intellectual property financing law developed over an extended
period, in interaction with and reaction to developments in the more
general currents of personal property financing law. One cannot
understand where we are without some understanding of whence we
came. As Gilmore said, "An understanding of the historical
development of the pre-Code security devices is basic to an
understanding of what Article 9 sought to accomplish and why it was
drafted the way it was."' Those who find the study of history an
indispensable tool for avoiding past mistakes will, it is hoped,
appreciate the need for detail.
36. See discussion in Brennan, supra n. 9, § II.A.
37. Gilmore, supra n. 7, at Introduction to Part II.
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A. Secured Financing Origins
1. The Evolution of Filing Systems
Secured financing is about using property as collateral for a debt.
If the debt is unpaid, the creditor looks to take the debtor's property
in satisfaction. The law, however, has long exhibited deep suspicion
of secret liens that do not put third parties on reasonable notice of
the financing. The fear is that such devices would allow a debtor to
induce innocent persons to purchase the collateral or extend false
credit on the strength of the apparent ownership.38 The earliest
personal property financing arrangements therefore required actual
delivery of the collateral to the creditor.39 Gradually, various forms of
nonpossessory security devices were recognized.0  With rare
exceptions, a public filing was required as a condition of protecting
the creditor against fraudulent conveyance attack.4' The filing rules in
Article 9 can be seen as exceptions to the background policy against
fraudulent conveyances."
38. See Julian B. McDonnell, Article 9 and the Security Controversy § 1.01 in Coogan,
supra n. 11: "For centuries, courts suppressed security arrangements (except for the
pledge, where the creditor took possession of the collateral) as fraudulent conveyances.
They feared that third parties would be misled by the debtor's ostensible ownership of
assets that had been encumbered and that security devices would be used to shield the
debtors assets from the claims of unsecured creditors."
39. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 14.1, at 438:
The requirement that a secured party take possession of his collateral
- or at least effectively remove it from his debtor's possession and
control - in order to perfect his interest dates from the beginning of
legal history. . . . The basic idea is that the secured creditor must do
something to give effective public notice of his interest; if he leaves
the property in the debtor's possession and under his apparent control,
the debtor will be given a false credit and will be enabled to sell the
property to innocent purchasers or to induce innocent persons to lend
money to him on the strength of the apparent unencumbered asset....
The antagonism to the 'secret lien' runs through our law of sales and
security transactions alike. (Footnotes omitted).
40. Prof. Gilmore sums the long history thus: "Ultimately, the financial community
had its way and personal property, both tangible and intangible, became available for
security without a change of possession. The process, however, took the best part of a
century, during which the law of personal property security transactions came to resemble
the obscure wood in which Dante once discovered the gates of hell." Gilmore, supra n. 7,
§ 2.2, at 27.
41. Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 15.1. A rare exception is the validation statutes
discussed at n. 101, infra.
42. See Peter Alces, The Law of Fraudulent Transactions, I 5.01[4][b] (Warren,
Gorham & Lamont 1989): "[Ijt would be a mistake to assume that... the perfection of a
security interest in scrupulous compliance with Article 9 would necessarily be immune
from attack under the [Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act], the [Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act] or the Bankruptcy Code."
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The first filing system appeared for real property. The Statute of
Enrollments, enacted 1535 during the English enclosure period,
established a registry system that required a notice filing of the
existence of the deed but not all its terms.43 The American States
adopted the principle but not the practice, instead opting for
recording acts that required public filing of the entire deed."
Although several variations developed45, they all required, and still
require, timely recording to protect against a subsequent "bona fide
purchaser" of the property.46
Personal property financing started differently. In 1601, Twyne's
Case7 held that a transfer of personal property without delivery of
possession was a fraudulent conveyance, void against subsequent
purchasers and creditors without notice. This principle entered our
common law as the Statute of 13 Elizabeth or Fraudulent
Conveyances. It continues today in the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act.4'9 Twyne's Case established an important notion for
tangible personal property: apparent ownership. Under this principle,
notorious possession of tangible personal property gives an apparent
ownership that prevails against undisclosed security interests. This
principle, however, does not apply either to real property or
intellectual property.0
Due to Twyne's Case, the only method of financing personal
property at common law was the pledge. It required the creditor to
43. In 1535, the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10, authorized transfer of real
property by deed of bargain and sale. The Statute of Enrollments, 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16,
made the deed void unless registered in Westminster within six months. See Rufford G.
Patton & Carroll G. Patton, Patton on Titles, ch. 1 (1957 ed.).
44. See Patton & Patton, supra n. 43, at § 6.
45. The four different types are pure notice, pure race, race-notice, and race-grace.
See In re Walker, 67 B.R. 811 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); see also Patton & Patton, supra n.
43, at §§ 7-10. The race-grace system has disappeared for state real property systems, but
is still used for the federal intellectual property acts. Original Article 9 adopted a race
notice system, but the 1972 revision changed it to a pure race system. See Barkley Clark,
The Law of Secured Transactions under theUniform Commercial Code, I 3.08[1][a].
46. Patton & Patton, supra n. 43, at § 7 (Whether a recording act extends to other
parties, particularly judgment creditors, depends on the terms of the statute.).
47. 13 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). For the historical
context, see Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 1.02.
48. It was also known as the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. See Coogan, Coogan, supra n.
11, at § 1.02, describing the history. See also Garrad Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and
Preferences (Rev ed., Baker, Voorhis 1940).
49. NCCUSL has promulgated two uniform laws on the subject, the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act in 1918 and the revised Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act
in 1984. See Alces, supra n. 42, at App. A & B (copies).
50. See infra n. 208 and accompanying text.
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take possession of the collateral, at least before default. 1 While the
pledge made sense in the agrarian society of the seventeenth century,
it proved inadequate for the onslaught of Industrial Revolution in the
Nineteenth. Factory equipment, railroad rolling stock and merchant's
wares could not be pledged, since they were clearly needed for the
borrower's business, yet they represented a burgeoning ocean of
excellent assets.52 The solution came with the chattel mortgage. This
was an exclusively legislative device, derived by analogy to the real
property recording acts.53 The typical statute validated chattel
mortgages with a change of possession, but made one without
delivery of possession void against bona fide purchasers, and often
general creditors too, unless the mortgage was recorded in a local
filing office.54 This meant that a secured creditor could take
possession of the collateral and use the common law pledge, or leave
the debtor in possession and instead rely on the filing provisions of a
chattel mortgage act. It was of course possible to make a chattel
mortgage and take possession,55 but the real benefit came for
nonpossessory security devices.
2. The "Title" and "Lien" Theories
For more than a century a vitriolic debate raged on the proper
classification of a mortgage. 6 At common law, a mortgage
transferred the whole legal title to the creditor, liable to defeat on
condition subsequent by paying the debt. 7 This meant that if the
debtor defaulted, the creditor, as title-holder, was entitled to any
increased value in the collateral. To protect against forfeiture, the
equity courts began to recognize a right of redemption allowing a
debtor to recover the collateral by repaying the debt and attendant
51. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, at §§ 1.1, 2.1; Coogan, Coogan, supra n. 11, at ch. 1; 14
C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 5 (1997) (Apparently, from this practice we get the maxim
"possession is nine-tenths of the law.").
52. Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 2.1.
53. Id. at § 2.2.
54. See e.g. Robinson v. Elliott, 89 U.S. 513 (1875); Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 2.2;
Glenn, supra n. 48, at § 495 (recording provisions essential to remove chattel mortgages
from the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances).
55. This led to refined distinctions between a pledge and a possessory chattel
mortgage which are now only of historical interest. See Garrard Glenn, The Pledge as
Security Device, 24 Va. L. Rev. 365, 368-377 (1938).
56. An extensive annotation of the debate can be found in 14 C.J.S. Chattel
Mortgages § 1. The footnotes contain lengthy excerpts of courts throwing bric-a-bracs at
each other as they disagree on the proper approach. The theories are analyzed in Glenn,
supra n. 48, at §§ 498, 499.
57. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 2.b (1998).
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costs after breach of the mortgage obligations. 8 Eventually, the
equitable right was converted to a legal right, first through the
judicial device of categorizing of the transaction as a lien, and later
statutorily.59 The concepts carried over from land to chattel
mortgages. In lien theory states, a chattel mortgage was analogized to
a common law pledge, giving the mortgagee a "special property
interest" - a lien - that only vested title on condition broken (non-
payment) and foreclosure under statutory rules.'
The distinction was not academic. A California case illustrates
why.61 A creditor seized furniture subject to a chattel mortgage and
sold it without complying with statutory requirements. The court
noted that in title theory states, a chattel mortgage gave the creditor
full legal title to the chattel, subject only to an equitable right of
redemption. In those states, upon an invalid sale, the debtor's only
recourse for wrongful foreclosure was a bill in equity to have the fair
value of the property applied to the debt.62 But California was then a
lien theory state, in which the chattel mortgage merely gave the
creditor a special property interest with legal title remaining in the
mortgagor. Foreclosure without compliance with the statutory
formalities was wrongful against the debtor's title, canceling the debt
and eliminating any deficiency.63
The substantive difference between the title and lien theories
was never about the validity of the creditor's title. Both theories
vested title in the creditor relating back to the record priority date
after default and proper foreclosure.' The real difference was in the
debtor's rights.65 "Title" was merely a device - the legal realists would
58. Id. at § 911.c.
59. Id. at § 911.b, § 911.c.
60. See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 577 (1997).
61. See Metheny v. Davis, 107 Cal. App. 137,290 (1930).
62. See 11 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 577.
63. Metheny, 107 Cal. App. at 139; see also 11 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgage § 525 (1991);
Author, Chattel mortgagee's failure to pursue proper course as effecting mortgagee, 47 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 582 (Date).
64. See, e.g. Rust v. Elec. Light Co., 124 Ala. 202 (1899); Capital City Bank v.
Hodgin, 24 F. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1885); 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 392 n. 64 (1991) (citing
cases from both camps).
65. The effect of noncompliance on the right to a deficiency was always the money
question in the title-lien debate. Original Article 9-507 took an ambiguous position,
providing that wrongful foreclosure gave the debtor "the right to recover from the
secured party any loss caused by failure to comply" with statutory requirements. This led
to three different approaches. One line of cases held noncompliance was an absolute bar
to a deficiency. A second created a rebuttable presumption that compliance with
statutory formalities would have yielded enough to satisfy the debt, placing the burden on
the creditor to prove otherwise. A third line of cases placed the burden of proving loss
say subterfuge - for dealing with the substantive issues. By the early
twentieth century 17 states, primarily on the Eastern seaboard, still
clung to the title theory of chattel mortgages, while 23 others, mostly
in the South and West, had embraced the lien theory.66 One may
speculate this was because the title theory was less forgiving to
debtors, and Easterners were then lenders to rest of the country.
The title-lien debate was never satisfactorily resolved and was
perhaps incapable of definitive resolution.67 Original Article 9 did not
end the debate so much as moot it.6" It replaced the substantive
differences between the title and lien theories in the right of
redemption and liability for deficiency with a single unified construct
that accorded the same rights and remedies regardless of whether
title was in the secured party or in the debtor.6 9 One would have
thought that this put an end to the title-lien debate, but curiously, for
some commercial law commentators it remains alive and well for
information security transfers, as we will see.7°
3. The Bona Fide Purchaser
The real property recording acts and the chattel mortgage acts
protected against a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the collateral.
Gilmore rhapsodized that "[t]he triumph of the good faith purchaser
has been one of the most dramatic episodes in our legal history. 71
Essentially, a bona fide purchaser is a person who takes an interest in
property in good faith, for value and without notice of a prior
transfer.72 The bona fide purchaser is one of the principle parties
from noncompliance on the debtor. See Clark, supra n. 45, at 4.12[5]. Prof. Gilmore
argued that creditors should lose the right to collect a deficiency as a sanction for
misbehavior. Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 44.9, at 1263-1264. The Drafters of Revised 9 opted
instead for the "rebuttable presumption" rule for commercial foreclosures, and a "let the
court decide" rule in consumer loans. Their reasoning is described in Donald J. Rapson,
Default and Enforcement of Security Interests under Revised Article 9, 74 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 893, 937-940 (1999).
66. See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 1 (1991), listing the states in the footnotes.
67. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 1.1 at 8-9.
68. Id. at § 11.9.
69. See U.C.C. § 9-202 (West 1999); see also Clark, supra n. 45, at 1.02[1] (stating
that the "mystical location of 'title' no longer determinative").
70. Infra n. 177 and following text
71. See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale
L.J. 1057 (1954); but see Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform
Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 627 (1981)
(Upon reconsideration, noting that many of the concepts in Article 9 with regard to
intangible financing, including repudiation of .Benedict v. Radner, may well have been
mistaken).
72. The details of all three ingredients are beyond the scope of this article. For
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protected by the policy against secret liens.
The term "bona fide purchaser" is a legal term of art that is not
limited to a "buyer."" It also embraces mortgagees,74 pledgees
holding liens," and interests under chattel mortgages.76 Under the
UCC, by definition a "purchaser" includes a creditor under a
mortgage, pledge or lien," including of course a security interest."
The term does not include general, attaching or lien creditors.79
However, judicial creditors who purchase at their own execution
sales do qualify for bona fide purchaser status." The distinction
between a bona fide purchaser and a judicial lien creditor is a matter
of utmost importance which we will address repeatedly.
B. Intangible Financing
1. Origins
By the middle of the nineteenth century, real and personal
property had developed roughly parallel financing systems in the
recording acts and the chattel mortgage acts. Unfortunately, there
was a gap - intangible financing. Intangibles encompass a variety of
legal interests, including accounts receivable, contract rights, and of
course intellectual property. How could they be financed, in a
manner consistent with the policy against fraudulent conveyances?
The chattel mortgage acts were limited to tangible property, and
further discussion, see Pattton & Patton, supra n. 43, at § 13 (describing the elements
under real property recording acts); Brian A. Blum, Notice To Holders in Due Course,
and Other Bona Fide Purchasers under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 B.C. L. Rev.
203 (1981); Grant Gilmore, supra n. 71.
73. See Ronald A. Anderson & Lary Lawrence, Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code § 1-201:428 et seq. (1999 Rev. ed.).
74. See e.g. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal. App. 4th 337, 343 (1997)
(holding that a bona fide purchaser includes mortgagee or holder of deed of trust); Patton
& Patton, supra n. 43, at § 12 n. 53 (collecting cases).
75. See e.g. Ironside v. Levi, 278 Mass. 18 (1932); Famous Furniture Co. v. J. Fishman
& Son, 22 N.J. Misc. 368; (1944); 49 C.J. Pledge § 64 (Date).
76. See e.g. People v. One 1941 Buick Coup, 72 Cal. App. 2d 593 (1946) (chattel
mortgagor); Pac. Fin. Co. v. Hendley, 103 Cal. App. 335, 338 (1930) (chattel mortgagee);
Central Trust Co. v. Stepanek, 138 Iowa 131 (1908) (assignee of chattel mortgagee).
77. U.C.C. § 1-201(32) - (33) (defining "purchase" and "purchaser") (West 1998).
78. Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colo. Springs Natl. Bank, 184 Colo. 166 (Colo. 1974);
see also Anderson, supra n. 73, at § 1-201:434 and cases cited.
79. Green v. Hanover Ins. Co., 700 S. 2d 1354, 1357 (Ala. 1997) (judgment creditors
are not bona fide purchasers); Patton & Patton, supra n. 43, § 12 n. 44 (collecting cases).
80. See e.g. McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493, 498-499
(3d Cir. 1943) (patents); Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363, 377 (1859) (real property); also 35
C.J.S. Judicial Sales § 128 (1997); Patton, supra n. 43, at § 12, fn. 55.
therefore were unavailable.8' Certain types of intangibles represented
by a writing, such as negotiable instruments, corporate securities,
documents of title and the like, were eventually allowed financing by
pledge through the mechanism of turning the document over to the
creditor. 2 However, many intangibles, including intellectual property,
could not be so pledged. Periodically certain intangibles were
separated out, made the subject of a recording act, and thus allowed
an effective method of financing. s3 This happened for federal patents
and copyrights in 1870 and trademarks in 1905. Before turning to how
this worked, let us briefly finish the story of intangible financing up to
the general enactment of the UCC, since it will have a bearing on the
story later on.
In strict legal theory, "pure" intangibles outside the negotiable
instrument variety would need to be financed under the law of
assignment.' At early common law, intangibles -choses in action -
could not be assigned at all. 5 Gradually, through a complex dance
between the law and equity courts, assignments of intangibles were
recognized, including security transfers or "collateral assignments.
86
The basic difference between a "true" assignment and a "collateral"
assignment was that the latter accorded the debtor a right of
redemption while the former did not.' The courts evidently could
have developed a refined law of the difference between a collateral
assignment and a mortgage, but never seemed inclined to do so.8
81. Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 2.8 at 55; 11 C.J. Chattel Mortgages § 204. It appears that
early on a few chattel mortgage acts could have covered intangibles, but after a few
bumps settled down to only tangible property.
82. Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 7.1 ("It is in general true that if intangible property can be
pledged, it must be pledged; that is to say, no perfected security interest can be created in
such property except by its physical delivery to the creditor.").
83. Id. (certain contract rights financed under Uniform Trust Receipts Act, etc.)
84. Id. at § 2.8, at 55-56.
85. Id. at § 7.3, at 200. At common law, patents, trademarks and copyrights were
classified as choses in action. See W.R. Warren, Choses in Action 2 (Street & Maxwell
1899)
86. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, at §§ 7.3-7.5, at 200-210 (describing the process).
87. See Sheldon v. McFee, 216 N.Y. 618 (1916) ("The right to redeem is the essential
characteristic of a mortgage"); compare 6A C.J.S. Assignment § 6 (1975) (assignment not
a mortgage because no right of redemption) with 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 2 (1991)
(distinguishing mortgage from assignment).
88. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 2.8, at 58 -60:
Many of the cases which talk about mortgages of intangibles use
language which wobbles from mortgage to pledge to assignment, in
situations where the applicability of the chattel mortgage act is not in
any way involved.... The approach of the New York Court of
Appeals has been to state expressly that security transfers of
intangibles do not fall within the chattel mortgage acts for any
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Instead, they simply treated a collateral assignment as a type of
mortgage, albeit one not subject to the filing rules under the chattel
mortgage acts. Basically, they were saying that when an intangible
was assigned for security, the debtor would be accorded the same
right of redemption as a mortgagor under the prevalent title or lien
theory under applicable state law.
2. Account Financing
An important type of intangible financing involved accounts
receivable. 9 Revised Article 9 has now defined royalties due under
information licenses as "accounts." Thus, it is important to
understand pre-Code systems for ac6ount financing as a prelude to
understanding what Revised 9 does to royalties under information
licenses.
By the twentieth century, accounts receivable financing had
become big business.' The earliest method was "factoring." This
involved an unconditional assignment or "sale" of accounts to the
factor.91 The account debtor would be instructed to make payment to
the factor, after which the factor took the credit risk of default by the
account debtor, but also the upside of any increase in value." Later
on, "accounts receivable" or "non-notification" financing came into
vogue. In this scheme the financier loaned money against a changing
pool of accounts.93 The financier did not notify the account debtors of
the financing unless the debtor defaulted. Instead, the debtor was
purpose. Other courts reached what was for all practical purposes the
same result by saying that while security transfers of intangibles were
mortgages, they were not subject to the filing provisions of the chattel
mortgage acts. Theoretically, this type of holding could have led to the
development of involved distinctions between the rights of transferees
who were 'mortgagee's and the rights of those who were 'assignees."
There has never been enough litigation of this sort, however, to
nourish the growth of such refinements.
89. Id. at §§ 8.1 et seq.
90. See Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a
Proposal for Reform, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1061 (1992); and Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows
and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper under the U. C.C. and the Effects
of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 397 (1994).
91. Factors were originally agents who sold goods for manufacturers to distant
customers. They began by guaranteeing the creditworthiness of their customers, a
practice that gradually evolved into buying the receivables directly. See Plank, supra n. 90,
at 407-408.
92. Coenen, supra n. 90, at 1067. Factors could also buy the accounts "with recourse"
and take the credit risk, or "without recourse" leaving the debtor with the obligation to
buy-back defaulting accounts.
93. Plank, supra n. 90, at 408.
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required to keep sufficient accounts to secure the loan, typically
taking the credit risk of a non-paying account. 94
Typically, an "account": is a fully matured right to payment. A
seller delivers the goods, the buyer pays the price, and an "account"
arises. The payment is now property of the seller, and the trick for
the lender is to ensure priority in this payment over other creditors of
the seller. Since accounts were financed under the law of assignment,
there was no filing system, and priority issues were left to the courts
to sort out. Three different rules emerged. Under the "American
rule," the first security assignment in time prevailed under the nemo
dat principle." Under the "English rule," in case of competing
security assignments, the first to give notice to the account debtor
prevailed.96 Finally, Massachusetts adopted a complicated four-factor
test from the Restatement of Contracts that became known as the
"four horsemen" rule. 97 For factoring, this caused little problem, since
the account debtor was given notice of the assignment, a technique
sufficient to perfect under all three rules.
Non-notification account financing was another matter. It came
under attack in Benedict v. Ratner.98 The case involved a non-
notification account financing in which the debtor was allowed
unfettered ability to control collections. This was a variant on the
debtor in possession, raising all the hackles about secret liens.
Benedict held that the failure of the, creditor to exercise dominion
over the accounts and so provide notice to third parties of its interest
was a "fraud in law" void against the bankruptcy trustee. This
holding did not make non-notification account financing impossible,
but did confine it to specialists who would exercise appropriate
control.99
If Benedict allowed non-notification financing, at least by the
finance companies, there was still a question of how perfection
worked. The Supreme Court addressed that in Corn Exchange
National Bank and Trust C. v. Klauder.1° It held that in an English
rule state, the ability of a second assignee to defeat the first assignee
94. Id.; Coenen, supra n. 90, at 1068.
95. Coenen, supra n. 90, at 1069; Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 8.7. New York was a
tenacious proponent of this rule until its enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code.
96. Coenen, supra n. 90, at 1069; Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 8.7. The rule originated in
Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1 (Ch. 1828). Pennsylvania and California followed this approach.
97. See Coenen, supra n. 90, at 1069; Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 8.7.
98. 268 U.S. 353 (1924).
99. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, ch. 8.
100. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
[23:195
2001] FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 219
by notice meant that the transfer was not deemed made until
perfected against a good faith purchaser for value. Thus, the
bankruptcy trustee, who was then treated as a bona fide purchaser for
voidable preferences, could set aside an account assignment
unaccompanied by notice to the account debtor.' This led to a flurry
of state "validation" statutes, the bulk of which codified the
American first in time rule.'Y
Original Article 9 dealt this situation in a several ways. First,
after contentious debate, the drafters decided that the statute would
cover both the sale ("factoring") and financing of accounts on the
theory that there was often little practical difference."3 Second, the
statute abrogated Benedict's dominion rule by allowing account
financing, even though the debtor retained the ability to control and
collect."° Finally, it reversed the validation statutes by requiring a
filing to perfect both for a sale and a financing of accounts.'5 One
may think that Benedict and the validation statutes are now ancient
history. Under Revised 9, think again. For intellectual property
Revised Article 9 has evidently reanimated the. corpse of Benedict's
dominion practice and revived the "secret lien" regime under the
validation statutes as well. °6
3. Royalty Financing
A close cousin to account financing is royalty financing. Related
though they may be, there is a distinct difference. Accounts typically
arise from a fully matured right to payment and royalties from
executory contracts. This led to different treatment under original
Article 9107
The starting point for royalty financing is how to perfect in the
underlying asset that gives to the royalty, i.e. the debtor's information
rights. Curiously, Benedict dealt with that. In support of its fraud in
101. Coenen, supra n. 90 at 1071; Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 8.7.
102. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 8.7 and Coenen, supra n. 90 at 1071-1073 (discussing
Klauder and the subsequent validation statutes).
103. For a detailed history of the debate, see Plank, supra n. 90, at 410 et seq.
104. Article 9-205; see Gilmore supra n. 7, '§ 11.6; see also Clark, supra n. 45,
110.01[4].
105. Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 8.7.
106. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.A - § III.K (reviving validation statutes and
Benedict policing requirements).
107. Under original Article 9, executory payment rights were treated as "contract
rights." See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 12.5, at 380. The 1972 revision subsumed "contract
rights" under "accounts" by re-defining an account as a right to payment whether or not it
has been earned by performance. See Clark, supra n. 45, 11.01[1].
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law rule, Benedict cited' 8 In Re Leslie-Judge Co.'°9 The case dealt with
a chattel mortgage, duly filed under the New York chattel mortgage
act, which covered both a federal copyright and trademark. Under
the Copyright Act of 1909110 and the Trademark Act of 1905111 it
would seem such a mortgage would only be effective against third
parties if filed federally. Leslie Judge, albeit in summary language,
agreed.'12 Due its approval in Benedict, Leslie-Judge emerged as a
leading pre-Code authority for the rule that a federal filing was the
only way to perfect a security transfer in federal information."3
Although Article 9 abrogated Benedict's dominion rule for financing
accounts under state law, it could not change federal law. Thus,
Benedict's endorsement of Leslie Judge should remain good law on
the necessity of a federal filing to perfect in federal information. This
was Gilmore's reading of the situation."4
The next issue involves how to prefect in the royalties. More
curiously still, Klauder effected that. Some of the state validation
statutes enacted in response to Klauder covered general intangibles
as well as accounts. California's did."5 Indeed, for more than a decade
California's version of Article 9 contained a non-uniform provision
expressly providing that between bona fide assignees of a right to
payment under a general intangible, the first one to give notice to the
account debtor prevailed."6 The section was eventually removed from
108. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 353 n. 2.
109. In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 886 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied; Green v. Felder, 256
U.S. 704 (1921).
110. See infra n. 407 and accompanying text.
111. See infra n. 458 and accompanying text.
112. Prof. Gilmore excuses Leslie-Judge's summary invalidation because the chattel
mortgage was a "dead duck" on so many grounds. He n.s that, putting aside the federal
filing requirement, under state law it would have been possible to finance the Leslie-Judge
copyright under the New York law of assignment, which did not require a filing for
intangibles. Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 13.3, at 415.
113. Patents would also be included since the Patent Act had identical recording rules.
See infra n. 445 and accompanying text.
114. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 13.3, at 415.
115. Cal. Civ. Code § 3019 [former], repealed Stat. 1963 c. 819, at 1997 § 2; see also
California Chattel Security and Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 UCLA L.
Rev. 806, 878 (1961).
116. Under California's non-uniform addition of Article 9-302(1)(g), between bona
fide assignees of a right to payment under a general intangible, the first one to give notice
to the account debtor prevailed. The reason given was that "money is often loaned, for
example, against a pledge of uncopyrighted literary property or the rights of performance
under a contract for a person to appear in a motion picture or television show. No filing or
recordation is now required in these transactions, and the Advisory committee believes
that because of the peculiar nature of the collateral filing is not necessary to protect
subsequent transferees or lenders." Report by the California State Bar Committee on the
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Article 917 and left in the state Civil Code where it belonged.' This is
because original Article 9 only covers security interests and "sales of
accounts" (factoring)."9 An account is a right to payment arising from
goods sold or services rendered; royalties from information are not
accounts.20 Thus, even after adoption of original Article 9, royalties
continued to be financed under the state law of assignment,'21 just like
pre-Code account financing. One could well distinguish a "sale"
assignment or factoring of royalties from a "collateral" or security
assignment, putting the royalty "factoring" outside Article 9 but
leaving the security financing in. The case law has not seemed
particularly interested in this distinction. It treats any assignment of a
fully matured right to royalties, whether a "sale" or for security, as
outside Article 9.122
When the royalty has been fully earned by performance, it is
relatively easy to strip off the royalty from the informational rights
and finance it separately. This is similar to what happens with
accounts when they appear as matured rights to payment after the
goods are sold.' 23 However there is another way to look at the
situation, especially where the royalty obligation is still executory.
Some of the commentary argues, reasonably enough, that royalties
could be treated as "proceeds" under original Article 9-306(1) since
Uniform Commercial Code, 37 J. St. B. Cal. 119, 211 (1962). By "uncopyrighted" the
committee obviously meant works for which federal statutory copyright had not been
secured, i.e. common law copyrights, since Leslie-Judge required a federal filing for
statutory copyrights. This section mirrored California Civil Code 955.1 [1965]. For
discussion of the California approach see Peter F. Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1021-1031 (1964).
117. California repealed Article 9-302(1)(g) in 1974. Cal. Stats. 1974, c. 997 § 14101.
118. Cal. Civ. Code § 955.1 (1965). This section has been amended effective July 1,
2001 due to California's adoption of Revised Article 9.
119. Original Article 9-102(1).
120. Original Article 9-106; In re SSE Intl. Corp., 198 B.R. 667, 670 n.3 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1996).
121. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.D.3(b).
122. Compare e.g. Morrison v. Helms, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 172 (Tenn. App. 1979)
(absolute assignment of royalties under music contract outside Article 9) with Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 1997) (collateral assignment for security of
royalties under music contract outside Article 9).
123. See Am. Natl. Bank v. Cloud, 201 Cal. App. 3d 766 (1988) (holding that proceeds
from the sale of raisins became an account in which the bank was perfected since its was
perfected in the original collateral.). Current Article 9-318(2) allows an assignor and
account debtor to modify an assigned contract only so far as the right to payment "has not
already become an account." The idea is that once goods are sold or services rendered,
i.e. the payment is earned by performance, the assignee's rights vest. See Gilmore, supra
n. 7, § 41.10, at 1114.
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they arise from "disposition" of the information.'2 1 In that case,
Article 9 would cover the transaction, subject, of course, to relevant
federal law. Under original Article 9-306(2), a security interest
remains perfected in proceeds if the security interest in the original
collateral was perfected and the financing statement covering the
collateral was filed in the same place one would file to perfect in the
proceeds. The copyright cases, led by In re Peregrine, have held that
one can perfect a security interest in "copyright receivables," i.e.
royalty proceeds, by filing in the Copyright Office,'25 a quite sensible
approach. But what if the federal filing conflicts with the state law
assignment? Under federal preemption, one would expect the federal
filing to prevail. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch,'26 addressed this
problem in a conflict between an IRS lien, which was deemed
recorded in the Copyright Office, and an earlier unrecorded
assignment of royalties from a non-exclusive music performance
license. Distinguishing Peregrine, the BMI court said that a party
does not finance royalties by filing in the Copyright Office, but under
the law of assignment. The reasoning is suspect. The royalties arose
from a written nonexclusive license, which under Section 205(f) of
the Copyright Act would have had priority over the IRS tax lien even
without a recording. In other words, relying on federal law would
have given the same result as the court eventually reached using the
state law of assignment, and a far better result for financiers of
information royalties as well.
4. Anti-assignment Issues
Another piece of the puzzle deals with ensuring priority over
124. See Clark, supra n. 45, 10.01[2][d].
125. See infra n. 422 and accompanying tex;. MCEG v. Phillips Nizer Benjamin Krim,
646 N.Y.S'2d 778 (1996) (involving a malpractice action against a law firm for failing to
file in the Copyright Office to perfect a security interest in royalty payments under
exclusive television distribution agreements. The court said that since Peregrine had not
been decided when the loans were documented, there was no malpractice in failing to
anticipate its "novel theory"). Peregrine's holding is hardly novel, infra n. 422. Moreover,
the MCEG court's reasoning is questionable. First Bank had a loan against the copyrights
in various movies, duly registered in the Copyright Office. The lender in question, Credit
du Nord, was in second position. An Interparty Agreement executed by First Bank
retained its security interest in the copyright but excluded the television contracts that
formed Credit du Nord's collateral. The court held that since First Bank had retained the
copyright, that Credit du Nord had no interest in the copyright, only in the royalties.
However, under Section 201(d) of the Copyright Act, the exclusive television distribution
contracts certainly were copyright ownership interests, and Credit du Nord should have
filed in the Copyright Office to perfect its security interest in royalty "proceeds" derived
from them
126. 104 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 1997); see infra n. 438 and accompanying text.
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creditors of the transferee. In factoring, the account is a fully matured
right to payment, and the risk of intervening claims by a creditor of
the account debtor is slight.127 Non-notification financing may involve
somewhat greater risk, and financing accounts yet to be earned by
performance, as allowed by the 1972 revision to Article 9, would be
riskier still. 28 In royalty financing, however, the license often has
multiple on-going obligations on both sides, and is squarely in the
area of financing executory contracts. It is therefore quite possible
that other creditors of the transferees will have claims against the
transferees, including the earnings realized from exploitation of the
information, in addition to the transferor.
With regard to the information rights, filing in the appropriate
federal register would give the transferor's lender priority over
subsequent ownership transferees.129 The Copryight Act filing system
applies both to ownership transfers (assignments, mortgages and
exclusive licenses) and non-exclusive licenses °, and so
accommodates filing for all transfers. The Patent Act and Lanham
Act, however, only apply to ownership transfers (assignments, grants
and, as this article maintains for trademarks, mortgages), not licenses.
How a secured creditor perfects a security interest in a patent or
trademark license therefore depends, for now, on state law.
How does a transferor establish priority in its right to royalties
earned by a transferee ahead of a security interest filed against the
transferee? In Septembertide Publishing, B.V. v. Stein and Day, Inc.,'31
an author granted an exclusive copyright license to book publisher
while reserving a large royalty. The publisher subsequently granted a
security interest in all "contract rights and rights to payment of
moneys" it held. The author's royalty was not recorded, and the
secured creditor claimed it had priority in advances collected from
licensees that were otherwise payable to the author as royalties. The
Court looked to Article 9-318(1)(a), which provides that the rights of
an assignee are subject to "all the terms of the contact between the
account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim arising
therefrom." It concluded that the publisher's lender could only take
127. The risk, however, is not entirely non-existent. See Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v.
Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993); Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.B.
128. See Clark, supra n. 45, at $ 11.01[1].
129. See infra n. 207 and following text.
130. 17 U.S.C.A. § 205 (West 1996). Section 205(a) refers to transfers, not merely
transfers of ownership, and thus allows the filing of nonexclusive licenses. This is
confirmed by Section 205(f). N. that 205(f) gives a limited priority to unrecorded
nonexclusive licenses over transfers of ownership.
131. 884 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1989).
what that publisher had, which was a contract for net collections after
the royalty. The court was influenced by the fact that the security
interest was taken after the author made the contract, so there was no
way for the author to discover it. It was therefore incumbent on the
lender to investigate the contract rights it was financing.
An influential commentator, while acknowledging that
Septembertide makes sense in terms of basic fairness, nevertheless
argues the author should have been a mere unsecured creditor with
regard to the advances, and hence junior to the secured creditor.'32
This argument, however, in effect, views the copyright license as no
more than a "sale of goods" in which the author lost all residual
interest in the rights once the license was signed and thereafter only
had an account for royalties due. From an intellectual property
perspective, things look quite different. A licensor who has
transferred a copyright interest in exchange for royalties retains a
beneficial ownership in the rights for royalties due, giving immediate
standing to sue for infringement if the transferee does not act.'33 One
could therefore view the right to royalties as a beneficial copyright
interest that the publisher did not own, so the security interest never
attached to it in the first place. Alternatively, one could view the
reservation of royalties as an assignment back to author, which, not
being an account, would not need a filing to perfect.'34
A basic question raised by Septembertide is finding prior
interests. Granted, a secured creditor loaning against information
must check chain of title. The question is where. Septembertide says,
132. Clark, supra n. 45, at T 11.04[3][b] at 11-22. Prof. McDonnell argues that the
expanded definition of "account" in Revised Article 9-102(a)(2) has now adopted this
view and reversed Septembertide, requiring the author to file to perfect against the
publisher, "[a] result which might well surprise authors of the world." Coogan, supra n.
11, § 2B.07[5], at 2B-50.
133. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (West 1994); H.R. Rpt. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976); Wildlife
Intl., Inc. v. Clements, 591 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19,
at § 12.02[C].
134. An assignment of rights under an executory contract does delegate duties so as to
make the assignee liable for their performance except where the assignee assumes the
obligations expressly or by implication. Such an implication occurs where the contract is
fully executed and the assignee takes the benefits of the contract. See e.g. Fanning v.
Yoland Productions, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 2d 444 (1957) (assignee of actor's contract bound
to pay guaranteed compensation despite agreement with assignor, unknown to actor,
relieving assignor of liability, since actor had rendered full performance to assignee and
assignee had the benefits of the contract); Pecarovich v. Becker, 113 Cal. App. 2d 309
(1952) (assignee of football coach's contract liable). Under this rule, it is arguable that a
collateral assignee, i.e. a creditor under a security interest, of a licensee's rights under a
license fully executed by the licensor would take subject to the obligation to pay the
licensor's royalties.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [23:195
2001] FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 225
in effect, that a secured lender to a transferee takes subject to a
royalty obligation in the transferee's transfer agreement, whether or
not recorded. An alternative approach would be to follow Peregrine
and view the royalties as proceeds of an intellectual property license,
making the transferee's lender subject only to a royalty obligation
disclosed in a properly recorded instrument, at least to the extent of
the preemptive filing rules in federal law. Another commentator,
familiar with the nuances of intellectual property law, advocates this
approach.135  Technically, Septembertide and Peregrine can be
reconciled on the ground that Septembertide was considering a
reservation of royalties, which could be classified as a "true"
assignment outside Article 9, while Peregrine was speaking of a
security assignment of royalties, which would need to be filed for
perfection in the Copyright Office.
Other case law is mixed. South Bay Entertainment v. Miranda
Bay Petroleum'36 held that an inventor's right to royalties under an
unfiled technology license prevailed against creditors of the licensee
with a writ of execution returned unsatisfied. Recorded Picture Co. v.
Nelson Entertainment, Inc.'37 held that a sublicensee was not liable for
royalties its sublicensor owed to its licensor because a sublicensee is
not an assignee, and the obligation was not properly disclosed.138 In re
135. See Moore, supra n. 10, at 589-594 (arguing that priorities should be determined
based on recording in the Copyright Office). The author conceptualizes the licensor's
interest as a termination right allowing the licensor to terminate the license for breach.
Where the license is silent, this termination right would arise where the obligation to pay
royalties was material. Id. at 59, n. 159. This is similar to categorizing the licensor's rights
as a beneficial ownership interest giving the licensor standing to sue for unpaid royalties,
where the failure to pay is so material as to terminate the licensee's rights and thus make
continued use an infringement. Id.
136. S. Bay Enter. v. Miranda Bay Petroleum, 957 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. App. 1997). For
further discussion see Brennan, supra n. 9, at § III.C.3(a).
137. 53 Cal. App. 4th 350 (1997).
138. Recorded Picture Co. ("Recorded"), the producer of The Last Emperor, licensed
exclusive video rights to Hemdale, reserving a royalty of 70% of gross receipts and
obligating Hemdale to require sublicensees to make payments directly to Recorded.
Hemdale sublicensed to Nelson for 50% of net proceeds, not disclosing Recorded's
interest. Id. Hemdale declared bankruptcy, and Recorded. sued Nelson, claiming it was
bound by the terms in the Recorded-Hemdale contract. Id. Although an assignee of rights
under a contract becomes liable for its obligations when the contract is fully executed and
the assignee takes the benefits, the court concluded that Nelson was a licensee, not an
assignee, so this rule was inapplicable. Id..
Hemdale had taken a protective security interest against Recorded, filing a UCC-1
and a Copyright Mortgage. Id. Although both referenced the Recorded Hemdale license,
neither one disclosed the payment obligation. Id. This was insufficient to place Nelson on
notice, since "[a]bsent suspicious or other circumstances warranting a reasonable
investigation, a recorded document does not put a potential purchaser on notice of the
content of a referenced, unrecorded document." Id. at 366. Instead, looking by analogy to
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
DAK Industries, Inc.3 9 held that pre-petition royalty payments under
a nonexclusive software license were junior to secured creditors of a
bankrupt licensee. This result is unreliable, however, because the
court categorized the license as a "sale of goods," in effect treating
the royalties as an "account" requiring filing a financing statement to
perfect.14°
Can a transferor simply prohibit the transferee from assigning its
rights for security at all? This requires a somewhat detailed review of
the law of assignment that is better conducted in the context of
Revised 9.141 Summarizing briefly, pre-Code case law was mixed on
the enforceability of restrictions on assigning payment rights. 142 The
drafters of original Article 9 opted in favor of limited assignability in
Article 9-318(4), which invalidates any term prohibiting "the creation
of a security interest in a general intangible for money due or to
become due.' 43
Under Article 9-318(4), a transferor of information could not
prohibit the transferee's creation of a security interest in its exclusive
rights "for money due or to become due."'" Such a security interest
could take priority over the transferor's royalties even under Article
9 if the transferee's security interest were properly perfected first.
Septembertide would arguably be inapplicable because, in that case,
the security interest was perfected after the transfer was made. A
real estate law, the court found no liability because
[b]etween [the landlord] and... [the] sublessees there was neither
privity of estate nor privity of contract.... [The landlord], therefore,
could not sue the undertenants upon the original lessee's covenant to
pay the rent, unless the undertenants had assumed the lease, nor could
an action be maintained for the use and occupation of the premises,
unless there had been an agreement for the use of the premises
express or implied between the lessor and the sublessee.
Id. at 365. In the Digital Millenium Copyright Act 28 U.S.C. § 1040, Congress created a
limited statutory privity in providing that a transferee of U.S. rights in a motion picture
produced under a collective bargaining agreement takes subject to certain obligations to
pay residuals under such labor agreement, subject to various qualifications.
139. 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995).
140. Id. at 1093. "Microsoft did not perfect a security interest in any of DAK's
property, which might have protected it against DAK's failure to pay the entire minimum
commitment in the event of bankruptcy." Brennan, supra n. 5 at 558-560 (questioning the
reasoning in DAK).
141. See Brennan, supra n. 9, at § III.F(3)(a).
142. Compare Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Co., 303 N.Y. 446 (1952) (enforcing an anti-
assignment clause) with Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395 (1957)
(holding that where conduct demonstrated waiver, and anti-assignment will not be
enforced).
143.
144.
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pre-existing floating lien against the transferee would not do the job,
however, since the federal system does not recognize floating liens
because they do not specifically identify the work, patent or mark.
The transferor, or its lender, could thus assure priority by federally
recording an instrument covering the reserved royalty with respect to
the specific item of information before the transferee's lender did so.
However, nonexclusive patent and copyright licenses are non-
assignable without consent of the licensor as a matter of federal law,
preempting state law rules. 45 All federal trademark licenses are not
assignable without consent of the trademark owner under federal
law.14 A right to receive royalties is an essential part of the rights
accorded by intellectual property law.'47 It seems that federal law
would also prevent a transferee's grant of a security interest "for
money due or to become" under a nonexclusive license,
notwithstanding Article 9-318(4). Revised 9, however, attempts to
change this result.48
This concludes the discussion of information financing under the
common law of assignment. We now turn to financing under the
federal information acts.
C. The Early Federal Information Acts
1. Origins and Operation
In the 1830s, Congress enacted laws to deal with the assignment
of patents and copyrights.19 They did not mention security transfers
as such, perhaps an understandable omission at the time. By the
middle of the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court had
145. In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing nonassignability of
non-exclusive patent licenses); Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th
Cir. 1984) (discussing non-assignability of non-exclusive copyright licenses).
146. Super. Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
147. See e.g. Chemical Found., Inc. v. EL. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 29 F.2d 597,
600 (D.C. Del. 1928) affd. sub nom. Farberke Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v.
Chem. Found., Inc., 283 U.S. 152 (1930) ("Royalties to accrue and damages and profits
for future infringement are incident to and accompany the patent unless separated by
express reservation"); Crom v. Cement Gun Co., 46 F. Supp. 402, 405 (D. Del. 1942).
148. See Brennan, supra n. 9, at § III.F.
149. Section 6 of the Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436, required that assignments of
statutory copyright be in writing, but did not mention mortgages. The Patent Act of 1836,
5 Stat. 117, eliminated state law patents and created the national Patent Office. Section 11
made every patent assignable by an instrument in writing and required their recording in
the Patent Office, but mortgages also were not mentioned. The purpose was to protect
subsequent assignees without knowledge. Gibson v. Cook, 10 Fed. Cas. 314, 315 (Cir. C.
N.Y. 1850).
faced a series of cases asking how parties could lien a patent or
copyright.5 They highlighted the need for an effective national
system for financing federal intellectual property.
In 1870, Congress enacted a comprehensive overhaul of the
patent and copyright acts, finally bringing security transfers explicitly
within their scope.' The Act of 1870 required federal recording for a
prior "assignment" (copyright) or "assignment, grant or conveyance"
(patent) to prevail against "any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
for a valuable consideration, without notice." The language of the
Act of 1870 continues to this day in the Patent Act. The substance
also continues in the Copyright Act, albeit with a change in language
for technical reasons discussed below. In 1905, Congress followed suit
with a modern trademark act that followed the same pattern as the
copyright and patent acts."'
We will return to the modern details of these acts in a later
section. For now, we need merely note that, from their inception the
federal intellectual property acts, like the early chattel mortgage acts,
have operated like real property recording acts. As we will see, this
leads to significant differences with the financing model later adopted
in original Article 9, including where to file, whom filing effects, and
the role of the bankruptcy trustee. Early on, the Court of Claims
articulated the crucial differences involved:
This new form of property, the mind-work of the inventor, though
its constitutional existence is now well night a century old, is still a
novelty in the law. The wisdom of the common law give neither
maxims nor precedents to guide, and the American cases which
deal with it, though numerous enough, run in a narrow, statutory
groove. Thought the most intangible form of property, it still, in
many characteristics, is closer in analogy to real than to personal
estate. Unlike personal property, it cannot be lost or found; it is not
liable to casualty or destruction; it cannot pass by manual delivery.
Like real property, it may be disposed of, territorially, by metes or
bounds; it has its system of conveyancing by deed and registration;
estates may be created in it, such as for years and in remainder; and
the statutory action for infringement bears a much closer relation to
an action of trespass than to an action in trover and replevin. It has,
too, what the law of real property has, a system of user by license. 53
More recently, the Federal Circuit observed:
150. See infra nn. 249-254 and accompanying text.
151. The Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198 § 36 (patents), 203 § 89 (copyrights).
152. See infra nn. 458-484 and accompanying text.
153. A.S. Solomons v. U.S., 21 Ct. CI. 479, 483 (1886), affd 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
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Section 261 [of the Patent Act]... adopts the principle of the real
property recording acts, and provides that a bona fide purchaser for
value cuts off the rights of a prior assignee who has failed to record
the prior assignment in the Patent and Trademark Office by the
dates specified in the statute. Although the statute does not
expressly so say, it is clear that the statute is intended to cut off
prior legal interests, which the common law rule did not."'
For nearly two centuries the federal courts have been fairly
shouting to all who would listen that the federal intellectual property
statutes must be treated like real property recording acts."' This
makes sense, since, like real property, the federal statutes cover both
ownership and security transfers, whereas state personal property
filing systems are limited to security transfers.
Prof. Gilmore was adamant that the, filing system in original
Article 9 was incompatible with federal filing requirements:
[I]t seems to be generally assumed that the federal filing systems
[for copyrights and patents] are exclusive, and it is surely desirable
that they should be; no useful purpose would be served and much
confusion would result if it were held to be within the power of a
state to require a state filing in addition to the federal filing."'
This brings us to the seminal decision for intellectual property
financing.
2. The Waterman Case
The Supreme Court's decision in Waterman v. MacKenzie57 is
important on several grounds, not the least of which is its continued
misinterpretation by some commercial law commentators. The facts
are straightforward. Lewis Waterman obtained a patent on pens,
which he assigned to his wife. She granted back an exclusive license
to make and vend, but not to use, the patent. She then assigned the
patent to Shipman as security for a debt; he, in turn, assigned the
patent to Mackenzie. When Mackenzie began manufacturing pens,
the Watermans sued for patent infringement. Mackenzie pled lack of
standing. The question was whether the Watermans had standing
under either instrument.
The Court started with the license. In analyzing this grant, the
154. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1991) reh'g
denied, 988 F.2d 129. See also Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 4.5.3.4 (2d ed. 1996) (copyright
system operates like "real property recording acts").
155. See Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach, 145 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(patents); Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1573-74 (patents); In re AEG Acquisition Corp., 127
B.R. 34, fn. 8 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (copyrights); Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 200 (copyright);
Secombe v. Campbell, 2 F. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1880) (patent).
156. Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 19.9, at 544-545.
157. 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
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Court declared what came to be known as the "indivisibility
doctrine":
[The patent laws grant the patentee] the exclusive right to make,
use and vend the invention or discovery throughout the United
States and the Territories thereof.... The monopoly thus granted is
one entire thing, and cannot be divided into parts, except as
authorized by those laws., The patentee or his assigns may, by
instrument in writing, assign grant and convey either (1st) the
whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use and vend
the invention throughout the United States; or (2d) an undivided
part or share of that exclusive right; or (3d) the exclusive right
under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the
United States. A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests
is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee a title
in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers... An
assignment or transfer short of one of these is a mere license, giving
the licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his
own name for infringement.
58
Since the license only granted, the exclusive rights to make and
use, but not to vend, the patented invention, it was a license, not an
assignment; therefore, Lewis Waterman did not have standing."9
But there was still Mrs. Waterman to consider. She had granted'
an "assignment" of the patent as security for a debt. Did she have
standing under this instrument? This was a different matter, and the
Court treated it accordingly. The first step was to categorize the
instrument. The Court said that the assignment "being a conveyance
made to secure the payment of a debt.., was a mortgage in apt terms
and legal effect."' 6 The Court was merely saying what every lawyer
of the day understood: an assignment of a patent actually given as
security would operate under the mortgage rules, especially since the
Act of 1870 had validated patent "mortgages." As Gilmore observes,
"since the statute confers on patents 'the attributes of personal
property' and the recording provision makes an unrecorded
assignment void 'against any subsequent.., mortgagee,' there can be
no doubt that security transfers of patents are recognized.' 161
The next step was to determine who had standing under the
mortgage to protect the patent. The Court first noted that earlier
holdings had treated a chattel mortgage as a transfer of title.' 62 This
inclined towards MacKenzie. Then, it remarked that this
categorization was changing, with many mortgages being treated as
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 258.
161. Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 13.4, at 417.
162. Waterman, 138 U.S. 257.
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liens.163 This tilted towards Mrs. Waterman. The Court decided,
however, that resolution of the issue lay not in title but in
possession:1"
The right of action against a stranger for injury to goods mortgaged,
generally, thought not always, depends upon the right of
possession. When the right of possession is in the mortgagor, he is
usually the proper party to sue. [Citations.] ... And when the right
of possession, as well as the general right of property, is in the
mortgagee, the suit must be brought by the mortgagee."' 65
In other words, to find who has standing to protect the patent
under a mortgage, examine the instrument to determine who has
"possession.", Since Shipman under the terms of the security
assignment had title, and since the federal recording confirmed
possession, only Shipman could protect the patent. The pragmatic
reason for placing standing in one party was to avoid a multiplicity of
suits against an infringer.167 The Court pointedly refused to consider
when it would be necessary to join the mortgagor since "no such
question is presented on this record."'"
3. Post-Waterman Cases
In Waterman, the security assignment was a "title" mortgage.169
What would happen under a "lien" mortgage where the debtor
retained title and possession? The First Circuit faced that issue in
Ormsby v. Conners.7 ' A patent owner made a security transfer, duly
recorded in the Patent Office, while retaining the exclusive right to
manufacture, sell and license the invention. The court first said that
the patent owner had "transferred the patent as collateral security, or
as in the way of a mortgage; it makes no difference which." '171 It then
concluded that when Waterman said the "whole title" was in the
163. Id. at 258-259
164. Id. at 259-260
165. Id.
166. The common legal formulation of the time was that filing of a chattel mortgage
was "equivalent to a change of possession." Berson v. Nunan, 63 Cal. 550, 552 (1883).
This did not mean the creditor literally had physical control, but that the law deemed
"possession" sufficient to satisfy the apparent ownership requirement from Twyne's Case.
167. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 260-261. Judge Learned Hand, in A.L. Smith Iron Co. v.
Dickson, 141 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1944), identified avoidance of a multiplicity of suits as the
justification for denying standing to a licensee. See Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents
§ 21.03[2], 21-270-21-217 (2000 ed.).
168. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 261.
169. The case came up from New York, then the premier title theory state for chattel
mortgages. Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 1.1 at fn. 11.
170. 133 F. 548 (Cir. Mass. 1904).
171. Id. at 549.
mortgagee, it meant the debt instrument had transferred "the general
right of property as well as possession.', 7 2 However, when a
mortgagor retains possession the mortgagee does not have the
"whole title." Thus, "as far as the question of title is concerned, the
suit may be maintained."'73 In other words, where the mortgage
instrument left "title" in the mortgagor - the situation under a lien -
the mortgagor had standing to sue. Other decisions consistently
confirmed the validity of lien patent mortgages leaving title and
standing in the mortgagor. 114
As far as intellectual property secured financing goes, Waterman
and its progeny are, or should be, essentially unremarkable. They
hold that patent security transfers, and by extension copyright and
trademark security transfers, are valid and recordable in the
appropriate federal filing offices. The question of title or lien -
current assignment subject to defeasance on paying the debt or
conditional assignment subject to forfeiture on condition broken -
affects standing to sue, not recording. Gilmore reads Waterman this
way"' as have the patent commentators since the case Was decided.'76
172. Id.
173. Id. at 550. After trial, the invention was held unpatentable. See Connors v.
Ormsby, 148 F. 13 (1st Cir. 1906).
174. See e.g. Transducer Patents Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 492 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that a patent "lien" a valid security interest leaving title in debtor); Charles Holt
v. U.S., 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 336 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that a patent "pledge" was valid
under usual "substance over form" rule); Western Battery & Supply Co. v. Hazelett
Storage Battery Co., 61 F.2d 220, 231 (8th Cir 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 608 (1933)
("one who has transferred a patent by way of pledge, as distinguished from mortgage...
has been held not to have thereby disabled himself completely from dealing with the
patent"); Westmoreland Specialty Co. v. Hogan, 167 F. 327 (3d Cir. 1909) (holding that
there was an absolute assignment for security that was a "temporary pledge" that did not
transfer "title"); E.F. Hauserman Co. v. Wright Metal, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 43 (W.D.N.Y. 1932)
(holding that an assignor of patent for benefit of creditors retained sufficient interest to
sue); Curtis et. al. v. U.S., 75 Ct. Cl. 286, 307 (1932) (mortgagor in possession could sue
because patent mortgage effects an assignment "unless otherwise provided in the
mortgage"); Tuttle v. Blow, 176 Mo. 158 (1903) (mortgage on patent and trademark
validly recorded in PTO). The "pledge" statements in Holt, Western Battery and
Westmoreland are obviously loose language, since a patent, as an intangible, could not be
pledged. Western Battery arose from Missouri, then a lien theory state, so the slip is
understandable, especially in light of the earlier decision of the Missouri Supreme Court
in Tuttle recognizing a patent "lien" mortgage. 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 1 n. 3 (1991).
Westmoreland categorized an "absolute assignment" for security as no more than a lien,
which left "title" - standing- in the patentee. The point is that a patent security transfer
need not entail an immediate assignment of title to be effective or recordable in the PTO.
See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 13.4, at 6.
175. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 13.4
176. For example, William Edward Baldwin, Baldwin's Digest, Patent, Copyright
Trade Mark Cases 151 (Banks-Baldwin Co. 1936), discusses Waterman extensively in
"Chapter XVI Infringement, Actions" under the heading "4.b. Who may maintain action"
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Recently, however, a few commercial commentators, 77 and courts,"'
have made the remarkable claim that Waterman held only patent
"title" mortgages are recordable in the PTO. A patent security
interest, they say, not being an immediate "assignment of title," is
perfected by a state UCC filing. This claim is stunningly wrong both
as a matter of patent law and Article 9. Since Revised 9 was crafted
for federal information generally, let us dispose of it here.
Let us begin with patent law. The argument is that a security
interest, since it is neither an "immediate transfer of title," nor an
"assignment," does not need to be recorded federally. This reasoning
is fallacious. Waterman held that an immediate assignment for
security was a mortgage. It did not hold the converse that every
mortgage had to be an immediate assignment. All men are human
beings; this does not mean that all human beings are men. The
authorities have repeatedly confirmed that patent security transfers
leaving title in the debtor subject to forfeiture on condition broken -
liens - are valid and recordable in the PTO. In Littlefield v. Perry 19
the Supreme Court upheld the validity and recordability of a patent
assignment that reserved a lien to cover unpaid royalties while
leaving title in the assignee-debtor.8 ' In Ormsby, a security transfer
that left title in the mortgagor was valid and recordable in the Patent
but not at all in "Chapter XVII, Transfer of Patent Rights, Sale Conveyance and license."
Arthur M. Smith, Patent Law, Cases, Comments and Materials, 786 (Overbeck Co. 1954)
(digests Waterman under "Chapter VII - Remedies (B) Who May Sue," but not under
"Chapter IX - Property and Contract Interests in Patents (C) Assignments."). Prof.
Chisum, a leading patent authority today, still digests Waterman solely under standing to
sue. Chisum, supra n. 167, at § 21.03[1][j]. For a perceptive analysis of the patent
authorities, see Ball v. Coker, 168 F. 304 (C.C.S. Car. 1909).
177. See e.g. William C. Hillman, Documenting Secured Transactions 2-19 to 2-20
(1998): "A security interest is not an 'assignment, grant or conveyance' of a patent. Patent
law adheres to strict concepts of title, in order to protect the ownership of new inventions.
It therefore distinguishes 'assignments' of patents (of which 'grants' and 'conveyances'
are specific types) from all other transfers (which are called 'licenses)." This article
suggests that Prof. Hillman has misread the patent cases.
178. See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1988); In re Transp. Design & Tech. Inc., 48 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985); see also
infra nn. 447-455 and accompanying text.
179. 88 U.S. 205 (1874).
180. Id. In Littlefield, the patent assignment reserved a royalty that for "the non-
payment or other non performance a forfeiture might be enforced as for condition
broken." Id. at 579. A reservation of a right of forfeiture on condition broken was the
Nineteenth Century formula for creating a lien. 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 4 (1991).
The Court held nonetheless that the instrument, which was duly recorded, was a valid
transfer leaving title to the assignee-debtor. See accord Boesch v. Graft, 133 U.S. 679
(1890) (patent assigned subject to reversion on condition broken by non-payment
recordable with title in assignee-debtor).
Office. 8' The Patent Office has recorded voluntary patent liens for
more than a century.' 82 Rule 313 of the current Manual of Patent
Examining Procedures says patent security interests are "recorded in
the public interest in order to give third parties notification of
equitable interests or other matters relevant to the ownership of a
patent or other application.' 83. That patent security transfers are
routinely filed in the PTO is easily verified.'9
The most dramatic affirmation that lien patent mortgages were
recordable is In Re Leslie-Judge. It invalidated a copyright chattel
mortgage not recorded federally, a result that applied by extension to
patents because they had the same statutory filing language. At the
time, in 23 states the only way to create a chattel mortgage was by
lien. If lien patent mortgages could not be recorded federally, then
Leslie-Judge would have invalidated patent financing in nearly half
the country since, without a federal recording, there was no place to
record a lien mortgage to defeat a fraudulent conveyance attack. 5
No court ever invalidated a lien patent mortgage on this ground, for
the simple reason that such mortgages are and have been recordable
federally.
Let us now turn to Article 9. It assembled all the pre-Code
181. 133 F. at 549; see also Tuttle v. Blow, 176 Mo. 158 (1903) (mortgage on patent
and trademark validly recorded in PTO). In Tuttle, the chattel mortgage in question was
made in Missouri, which was then a lien theory state. See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 1,
n. 3 (1991).
182. In Ex parte Church etal., 1898 C.D. 35, 82 (1898) (involving an instrument signed
by a receiver for an insolvent patentee), Commissioner Duell said:
When an instrument [of the type referred to in Section 261 of the
Patent Act] is offered for record and the fees for the recording are
paid, it becomes the duty of the Patent Office to record the same. Such
duty is a ministerial one. If in the judgment of the Commissioner of
Patents the instruments so offered amount to an assignment, grant,
mortgage, lien, incumbrance or license, or affects the title to a patent
or invention which is properly identified and accompanied by the
proper fee, it should be recorded. (See Rule 199 of the Rules of
Practice.)
This reasoning was long embodied in the patent office rules. See e.g. Ridsdale Ellis, Patent
Assignments and Licenses § 296, at 297 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1943).
183. U.S. Dept. of Comm., Manual of Patent Examining Procedures, Patent and
Trademark Office, Rule 313 (Feb. 1, 2000).
184. See <http://www.uspto.gov/> (accessed May 11, 2001).
185. Recall that the chattel mortgage acts did not apply to intangibles. See Glenn,
supra n. 48, at § 503: "Title or lien theory to the contrary notwithstanding, the underlying
rule is that an unrecorded chattel mortgage is nothing as against the mortgagor's
creditors.... Both are security devices." It is no answer that a lien patent mortgage could
have been recorded voluntarily, because if adocument need not be recorded its recording
is ineffective. Am. Solid Leather Button Co. v. Empire St. Nail Co., 47 F. 741, 743
(S.D.N.Y. 1891) (equitable patent assignment).
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security devices into a single construct, the security agreement.'16 This
included both title and lien theory chattel mortgages. If both a title
patent mortgage with an immediate transfer of title and a lien patent
mortgage without an immediate transfer were recordable federally
before Article 9, then a patent security interest that accommodates
both structures is certainly recordable in the PTO today."7 Gilmore,
naturally, reads the statute this way. 8
Indeed, to claim that a security interest does not effect patent
ownership because it is not an "immediate transfer of title" reverts to
the now discredited title4ien distinction. But the substantive
differences between title and lien theories have always concerned the
debtor's rights, not the creditor's title.9 Article 9 eliminated these
differences by applying the same rights, obligations and remedies,
regardless of whether title is in the secured party or the debtor."9
Security instruments, like lien collateral assignments before them,
most definitely effect title since they allow the creditor to take
ownership after default - just like a title mortgage. 9' This is precisely
why the definition of "purchaser" in UCC 1-201(32) - the same
"purchaser" identified in the Patent Act - includes a secured
creditor.'" Gilmore, ever elegant, puts it thus:
A security assignment may be made conditionally - that is to take
effect on the happening some event, such as the institution of
insolvency proceedings against the assignor, his default in
performing the contact, his failure to repay the loan and the like. It
186. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (West 1997) (providing that Article 9 applies "to any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property", whether a "pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage ... other lien or title
retention contract ... intended as security"). -
187. Transducer Patents, relying on Littlefield, held that a patent "lien" leaving title in
the debtor was a valid security interest. 492 F.2d 247. Transducer Patents does not say
whether the patent lien in issue was recorded in the PTO. Id. However, the opinion
follows the language in Littlefield upholding the validity of a patent assignment leaving
"title" in the debtor, and in Littlefield the assignment was recordable. Id. at 252.
188. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 13.4, at 421 ("Mackenzie establishes that patents can
be assigned for security and the instrument of assignment recorded under 35 U.S.C. §
261."); see also id. at § 13.3, at 415 ("The phrase 'may be mortgaged' in 17 U.S.C. § 28
[the precursor to current 17 U.S.C. § 205] should be read as equivalent to 'may be
transferred for security.' There is nothing, in the legislative history or common sense, to
recommend the idea that the 'mortgage' language means that while copyright mortgages
must be recorded with the Copyright Office, other security transfers of copyrights need
not be so recorded.").
189. See supra n. 64 and accompanying text.
190. See U.C.C. § 9-202 (West 1997).
191. Id. at § 9-504(4) (disposition of the collateral after default "transfers to a
purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein); see Clark, supra n. 45, at 4.09[1].
192. Anderson, supra n. 73, at § 1-201:434 and cases cited.
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seems unnecessary to think of such arrangements as 'conditional' -
any more than security transfers of chattels by mortgage or
conditional sale are conditional. The mortgagee or conditional
vendor is entitled to resort to his security only if the borrower
defaults, but no one has ever thought that the security right,
because it is in that sense conditional on the happening of a future
event, does not attach when the loan is made or that the security
agreement remains in some sense imperfect until the condition
(default) has occurred.... [T]he 'condition' is merely a way of
expressing the normal understanding that the assignee is not to
enforce the assignment until there has been a default.1
93
The Patent Act records transfers that effect patent ownership. A
security interest effects title because on foreclosure the debtor's
ownership interest - "title" - is transferred to the creditor free of
later interests.'94 This is why a creditor takes property for security
interest in the first place. To claim a security interest that does not
effect ownership demonstrates an embarrassing misunderstanding of
what secured financing is all about.
In summary, we can say that Congress authorized security
transfers of federal copyrights and patents in the Act of 1870 and
trademarks in the Act of 1905. This insulated copyrights and patents
from fraudulent conveyance attack by using national recording
systems that operate like real property recording acts, covering both
ownership and security transfers. They remain in place to this day,
necessarily preempting state filing systems. We now turn to how
original Article 9 rewrote the rules for the rest of personal property
financing.
D. The Different Financing Models
1. Article 9 "Horizontal" Financing
By the middle of the twentieth century the commercial law
structures inherited from the nineteenth century were fraying at the
edges. The drafters of the original Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") set out to change them. The story of their struggle to
"unhorse" sales law and its impact on intellectual property licensing
is covered elsewhere.'95 Here, we concentrate on secured financing
law.
The drafters of the original Article 9 faced a number of
problems. The nineteenth century had bequeathed a bewildering
193. Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 7.5, at 209.
194. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (West 1999).
195. Brennan, supra n. 5.
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array of often overlapping security devices, along with little sympathy
for the secured creditor who inadvertently used the wrong one. Many
of these devices were wrapped around formalistic concepts of "title"
which the drafters felt obscured the real issues involved, something
the title-lien debate demonstrated all too clearly. Finally, a chattel
mortgage, like its real property analog, was considered "good against
the world," meaning, a validly recorded chattel mortgage would take
precedence over any later interest in or transfer of the collateral,
regardless how remote."' These devices worked, more or less, when
the debtor's assets consisted of heavy machinery and fixed assets that
could be readily identified. However, they were ill suited to financing
changeable inventory, requiring elaborate mechanisms for identifying
and releasing the secured collateral.197
The drafters of Article 9 decided that they need a new concept,
the "floating lien." As one commentator describes its evolution:
The floating lien has evolved as an accepted financing device
because the type of enterprise which is vital to our economic order
has changed. When the key enterprises are railroads or steel mills,
or even carpet manufacturers, one can get along without a floating
lien. These businesses will typically haveenough wealth invested in
fixed assets, land and equipment, to allow for financing to be tied to
specific assets. Once the car dealership, appliance wholesaler, and
photo processor became crucial enterprises, legal adaptation is
imperative. With these businesses, most of the wealth will be
embodied in inventory and receivables. Since the constituent
elements of these liquid assets will constantly be changing, an
efficient regime of chattel security law is possible only if the
creditor can take a lien which floats over the pool of assets of the
available collateral.9
Article 9 does not use the term "floating lien" per se. Instead, it
establishes five components essential to its effective operation: (i)
notice filing, (ii) after-acquired property, (iii) proceeds, (iv) future
advances, and (v) overruling Benedict v. Radner. 9
Notice filing allows the collateral to be described by category
rather than listing individual items, since inventory will change over
time. An after-acquired property clause allows the security interest to
attach automatically to new inventory as it comes into the debtor's
operation, alleviating the need for filing a new collateral description
every time that happens. Covering proceeds means that a security
interest perfected in inventory will also be perfected in the accounts
196. Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 11.1.
197. Id. at § 11.3.
198. Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7.02[2][b].
199. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 11.3; Clark, supra n. 45, at 1 10.01.
realized from its sale. A future advances provision allows a creditor
to provide on-going cash flow financing while still retaining its
priority position. Finally, overruling Benedict means an elimination of
the specialized policing required by prior law, opening up the lending
business to a greater pool of lenders, colorfully called the "country
banks."
In conceptual terms, we can envision the Article 9 floating lien
as a "horizontal" financing model illustrated as follows:
Pre- DEBTOR'S BUSINESS Post
Purchase Sale
Goods Inventory Inventory Goods
(Purchase Goods Goods (Buyer in the
Money Accounts Accounts Ordinary
Interest) Course)
Horizontal Financing Model
Under. this model, although individual items of collateral are
sometimes important, by and large what matters is the current stock
of the debtor's inventory and resulting receivables as it changes over
time. The lien floats "horizontally" over these assets. On default, the
creditor takes what is in effect a "snapshot" of the debtor's business
as it exists on the that date. In this structure, what counts are the on-
going operations of the debtor, not particular items of changeable
inventory, and the security interest is accordingly filed against the
debtor.
The floating lien requires mechanisms to deal with collateral
before it is owned and after it is sold.2" Article 9 handled this with
two "super priority" rules. On the pre-purchase side, there is the
''purchase money secured creditor." A factory may desire to finance
the purchase of a specific piece of machinery, but a financier may be
reluctant to extend credit if it knows that its security interest in the
machinery becomes subordinate to the debtor's pre-existing floating
lien. To solve this, original Article 9 allows a purchase money
security interest to become superior to a pre-existing floating lien by
compliance with statutory rules.0' On the post-sale side, a buyer
would not readily purchase goods if the buyer thought a foreclosing
creditor of the seller could repossess them. Article 9 therefore
200. See Clark, supra n. 45, at 10.06.
201. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (West 1999); see also Clark, supra n. 45, at 10.06[2].
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recognizes a super priority in a "buyer in the ordinary course" who
takes, free of a prior security interest, even if the buyer is fully aware
of it.
2°2
2. Information "Vertical" Financing
Article 9's adoption of the floating lien makes sense where the
assets are tangible goods being bought and sold. A different calculus
arises for intellectual property. It requires a "vertical" financing
model focused on the asset, not the debtor. Think of an office
building that can have many space leases that pay rent (royalties).
The owner-operator of the building can use actual or expected rents
(royalties) to finance initial construction and on-going operations.
For this financing to work, the mortgage lender needs to know that
filing against the underlying property also gives it priority over
subsequent leases and a consequent right to claim rent payments. It is
the same for intellectual property. The work, invention or mark can
be subject to multiple licenses. A secured lender wants to ensure that
filing against the intellectual property gives priority as to subsequent
licensees and the royalty payments due. Like the developer of an
office building, the creator of new information needs to give such
assurances to obtain financing to create the asset in the first place.
We might visualize this "vertical financing" as follows:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
License A: All U.S. Rights Some, Term
Sublicense Al: Sublicense A2:
Some Rights Other Rights
Limited Term Later Term
License B: License C:
Some Rights, Other Rights,
Later Term Later Term
Vertical Financing Model
In this model, by filing against any larger box, the secured lender
gains priority over all included ("junior") boxes. Therefore, a secured
creditor loaning against Sublicense A2 needs to determine whether
202. U.C.C. § 9-307(l); see als Clark, supra n. 45, at 10.02[l].
there is a recorded filing for each prior transferee, i.e. against License
A or the creator of the Intellectual Property. This relies on the rule
that a properly perfected security transfer is "good against the
world." Intellectual property has some subtleties in the licensing
practice. Subsequent licenses can be exclusive (akin to real estate
leases) or non-exclusive (akin to real estate licenses). These require
some special handling in the priority rules. However, the basic
models are the same. Information is financed on the vertical
financing model, like an office building, not on the horizontal model,
like a used car.
3. Chain of Title
It should be apparent that the horizontal financing model used in
Article 9 for tangible goods and the vertical financing model used for
intangible information are not reconcilable. The most obvious
illustration is the need to search chain of title.
For tangible goods, a searcher needs only search the immediate
debtor. This is because UCC Article 2-401(1) provides flatly that
"[a]ny retention or reservation of by the seller of title in the goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to reservation of
a security interest."2 3 Even if the parties intend to reserve title in the
seller, and the agreement so provides, the seller cannot prevent the
passage of title to the buyer upon delivery of the goods.2" Any title
interest retained by the seller is thus converted to a security
interest.0 5 This means that a financier seeking security in inventory
need only search the immediate debtor. Anyone with a prior
purported title interest has a security interest which, if it is not
recorded against the seller-debtor, is ineffective against a later
perfected security interest under Article 9's "first to file or perfect"
rule.2' Even if its is recorded, it is ineffective against a "buyer in the
ordinary course" in any case.
The situation is just the opposite for intellectual property. A
creditor must search every prior transferor in the chain of title, not
203. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (West 1999).
204. O'Donnell v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 622 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Ind. App. 1993)
("[Article] 2-401(1) ... restricts the parties' contractual freedom to delay passage of title
by agreement [and] negates any attempt.., to forestall passage of title beyond the
moment of final delivery."); see also Meinhard-Commercial Corp. v. Hargo Woolen Mills,
300 A.2d 321 (N.H. 1972) (parties' intent does not govern question of passage of title
under 2-401); Anderson, supra n. 73, at § 2-401:182.
205. See O'Donnell, 622 N.E.2d at 575; Anderson, supra n. 73, at § 2-401:182.
206. Revised 9-322(1); current Article § 9-312(5), see Clark, supra n. 45, at 4.09[1].
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just the immediate borrower." This is because "in patent, trademark,
literary property and copyright infringement cases, any member of
the distribution chain can be sued as an alleged joint tortfeasor."2 °8
For intellectual property, like real property, termination of a senior
license anywhere in the chain of -title terminates all sublicenses
deriving from it, making further exploitation by the sublicensee aninfringement."9
207. For discussion of the need to search chain of title as required due diligence step
in evaluating intellectual property, see e.g. Simensky, supra n. 10, at ch. 7: Proactive
Auditing (describing in detail necessary auditing procedures including checking chain of
title); also Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer, 1 International Copyright Law and
Practice, Introduction § 6[3] (determining copyright chain of title worldwide) (2000 ed);
Simensky, supra n. 6, at § 8.03 (addressing the need to search chain of title when taking
intellectual property as security); McCarthy, supra n. 16, at § 18.15 ("To acquire title to a
trademark and to prove priority of use to an earlier user in the chain of title, a person or
company must be able to prove a chain of title extending back to the original user of the
mark."); Moore, supra n. 10, at 588-595; Harold R. Weinberg & William J. Woodward,
Jr., Easing Transfer and Security Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda
for Reform, 79 Kentucky L.J. 61, 88-91 (1990); Robert G. Weiss and Alan G. Benjamin,
Feature Film Secured Financing, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 201 (1983).
208. Stabilissierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser, Inc., 647 F.2d 200, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
209. For copyrights, see Stewart v. Abend, 497 U.S. 207 (1990) (holding that upon
termination of license for original work further exploitation of derivative work an
infringement); U.S. v. King Features Enter., 843 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
where an original license is invalid, a sublicensee is an infringer as well); Fitzgerald Publg.
Co., Inc. v. Baylor Pubg. Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a
sublicensee's reliance on the terms of its license is ineffective where its licensor commits a
material breach; intent or knowledge is not an element of infringement); Costello Publg.
Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that if a main license is
terminated, the sublicensee is also liable for infringement; ignorance is no defense);
Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that a sublicensee's editing
of Monty Python programs is an infringement, since editing was a material breach of
license from show creators to BBC); The Walt Disney Co. v. Video 47, Inc., 972 F. Supp.
595 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that a rental of counterfeit cassettes was an infringement
despite purchase of a copy); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 11.02[B][1][b], § 13.08
and cases cited.
For patents, see Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938) (holding
that where supplier of patented. invention breached its license, purchaser from supplier is
also an infringer); Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Kull, 24 F. Supp. 771 (D. Idaho 1938)
(stating that a buyer of patented devices from licensee after its license is terminated is an
infringer); Chisum, supra n. 167, at § 21.03[3] and cases cited.
For trademark, see Stabilissierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser, Inc., 647 F.2d 200, 207 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (holding that in patent, trademark, literary property and copyright
infringement cases, any member of the distribution chain can be sued as an alleged joint
tortfeasor); Major League Baseball Promotion v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1035
(D.N.J. 1990) (finding that where a sublicense is not authorized by license from the
trademark owner, the sublicensee is an infringer); Grocers Baking Co. v. Sigler, 132 F.2d
498, 502 (6th Cir. 1942) (holding that a distributor that infringed common law trademark
is jointly liable with its supplier, since the trademark owner is entitled to protection
against innocent as well as malicious infringers); McCarthy, supra n. 16, at § 25:30 and
cases cited.
For example, in 1950, Cornell Woolrich wrote a short story
called It had to be Murder. In 1954, Universal Pictures licensed the
story as the basis for Alfred Hitchcock's thriller, Rear Window.
Woolrich died before the copyright 'renewal term vested, ending the
license. When the picture was re-released Woolrich's successor sued
for copyright infringement. In Stewart v. Abend21" the Supreme Court
agreed that exploitation of the derivative work (the motion picture)
during the renewal term without a license for the underlying work
(the short story) was an infringement. The result would have been
the same had the license from Woolrich to Universal terminated
because of foreclosure of a prior copyright mortgage on the short
story.11 A financier lending Universal money to produce the picture
could not rely on merely conducting a search against Universal; it
would need to search Woolrich's interest as well. 12
For intellectual property, a diligent lender must check all prior
ownership transfers, no matter how remote, for possible mortgages
whose foreclosure could wipe out the existing interest. Many in the
commercial bar complain that it is too difficult to conduct a search in
the Copyright Office or the PTO when financing intellectual
property. They say a lender should be able to conduct a single search
against the immediate debtor, just like for personal property. But
unless they are seeking wholesale repeal of the intellectual property
laws, a search of the entire chain of title is essential to ensure that the
lender does not become an infringer.
4. A Searching Example
For example, assume a producer wants to finance a hypothetical
new movie, Terminator 3, based on the popular Terminator and
Terminator 2 pictures.213 Since Terminator 3 will be derived from
210. 497 U.S. 207 (1990).
211. 17 U.S.C.A. § 205(d) (West 1996).
212. Section 203(b)(1) of the Copyright Act now provides that the exercise of the
statutory termination right will not terminate the right to utilize a derivative work
prepared in accordance with the grant.
213. During the past decade, there have been several proposals in Congress to subject
intellectual property security interests to state filing systems. I have appeared repeatedly
in opposition on behalf of the American Film Marketing Association (AFMA), the trade
association for major financial institutions and independent producers engaged in motion
picture financing. I have been joined by the Motion Picture Association of America, the
Directors Guild of America, the Writers Guild of America and the Screen Actors Guild.
For details of AFMA's testimony against the abortive Copyright Reform Act of 1992, see
Rotstein, supra n. 10, at 175-177. The example in the text is based my testimony before
the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee
in opposition to H.R. 4351, the so-called "Security Interests in Copyrights Financing
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several prior screenplays and movies, a production lender certainly
wants to know about all security interests against these works since
they would be superior to its lien. Just as for Rear Window, a
mortgage foreclosure that terminates any of these prior transfers
could make exploitation of Terminator 3 infringing.
Under current practice, a lender can find prior transfers and
mortgages with a single search in the Copyright Office. A search is
available from private sources for about $250, free from the
Copyright Office. Assume that copyright mortgages are only filed at
the state level. We can assume that the Copyright Report lists all the
ownership transfers. For Terminator 3, I can represent that the
Copyright Report will show that, ignoring duplicate entries and
transfers that may not affect the new production, there are 94
separate entities to search.1
Here are the steps a searcher must undertake to ensure finding
all prior liens that might effect the hypothetical Terminator 3
production loan using only the state filing systems:
Step 1 - Order a Copyright Report: We still need the Copyright
Report to identify the prior parties who need to be searched. Cost:
$250.
Step 2 - Locate the Parties: The Copyright Report only identifies
who the parties are, not where they are located. So the next step is to
determine in what state to search. Of the entities listed, 90 are
corporations, and four are individuals (the screenwriters). That
means we must search the Secretary of State offices in all fifty states,
Puerto Rico, Guam and the District of Columbia to determine where
the corporations are located. One major search firm charges $365 for
a national-wide search. (Maybe we can do this cheaper searching the
Internet by hand, but that means paying someone an hourly rate to
do so.) The cost is 90 parties x $365 each = $32,850. To find the
individuals, we must use a skip-tracer, for additional fees. Let's
assume $500 each. (Some search firms are cheaper if we know the
social security numbers or a past address, which the Copyright
Report, alas, does not reveal.)
Step 3 - Search the Parties: Now that we know where each party
Preservation Act." A copy is available on-line at <http://www.us.gov/judiciary/
bren0624.htm>. For the deficiencies in the "dual filing' scheme in H.R. 4351, see
Brennan, supra n. 9; Babaian, supra n. 10 (commenting on the hearings).
214. Several transfers list multiple transferring parties. For example, a transfer from
Hemdale Communications Corp. will include close to 20 subsidiary corporations. Unider
Article 9, a financing statement must be filed separately for each subsidiary. See LeFlore
v. Grass Harp Prod., Inc., 57 Cal. App. 4th 824 (1997). Since any one of them could be a
debtor due to an inter-company transfer, we must search them all.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
is located, we must search the local UCC filings. For a general
intangible, currently twenty-six states only require filing in the
Secretary of State, while fourteen others also require an additional
county filing.215 Since Revised Article 9 eliminates dual state-county
filings, let's assume we only need to conduct a single state search.
Searching fees vary per state. In California, a UCC search costs $34.
If all of these companies are headquartered in California, and all the
individuals are domiciled there, then we must conduct ninety-four
UCC searches at a cost of $34 x 94 = $3,196.
Step 4 - Order Copies of All UCC-ls: A UCC search only
discloses UCC-ls filed against the debtor, not against the copyright in
Terminator or Terminator 2. One transferor alone, Carolco Pictures
Inc., had more than 1,000 UCC-1 filed against it. (Each time it
produced a picture, the lenders filed a UCC-1 to cover the physical
materials. If information security interests were to be covered only by
state filings, companies with large libraries would have thousands of
filings. How many UCC-ls do you estimate could be filed against
Microsoft, or Viacom, or IBM or Procter & Gamble?) To find out
which UCC-ls apply to Terminator or Terminator 2 we must examine
them all. In California copies cost $1.25 per page. If we make the
conservative assumption that each UCC-1 is only 1 page, and that for
all 94 debtors there are only 2,400 UCC-ls in total, this means an
additional cost of $1.25 x 2,400 = $3,000.
Step 5 - Read All UCC-ls: Now somebody has to read all 2,400
UCC-ls to determine which ones apply to Terminator or Terminator
2. If a legal professional could read one UCC-1 a minute, it would
still take 40 hours to read them all. If were only charged $100 per
hour, that is an additional 40 x $100 = $4,000.
Step 6 - Search for Judgment Liens: What about judgment liens?
This article maintains a judgment creditor should not be able to
obtain an involuntary judicial lien on a copyright, federal trademark
or patent by levy or attachment, 1 6 so that we should not need to
search for them. However, the inevitable result of this approach is
that the only way to trump the bankruptcy trustee is by filing in the
federal registers. Let us see what it would take to search for them."7
215. See William D. Hawkland, Hawkland, Lord & Lewis UCC Series §§ 9-401 et seq.
(1997 ed.).
216. See infra n. 249 and accompanying text.
217. Even if judgment liens were allowed, they would constitute a "transfer" and
hence under Section 205(d) of the Copyright Act would have no effect against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser unless recorded in the Copyright Office. Thus, the
Copyright Report would be sufficient to disclose all prior judgment liens. The same would
not apply, unfortunately, for patents or trademarks, not due to statutory language, but
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Copyrights, as intangibles, have no fixed situs. An action can be filed
against a copyright owner anywhere a creditor can obtain in
personam jurisdiction.2 '8 Thus, a judgment and resulting lien could be
filed in any local courthouse nationwide. 9 Since any such pre-
existing lien would trump a copyright security interest under Article
9-301(1)(a), all locations must be searched. One search firm estimates
there are 6,400 local filing locations; another more than 8,000. There
is no central filing system; most local courthouses must be searched
by hand. This requires examining all 94 parties in at least 6,400
locations at $49 per search - for the staggering sum of $29,478,400.
The following table compares the estimated costs of finding all
prior security interests and liens that might apply to a Terminator 3
production loan by searching in the Copyright Office and under the
state UCC filing systems.
due to judicial misinterpretations.
218. See e.g. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (holding that a New
York resident could obtain personal jurisdiction against an Ohio corporate defendant for
libel suit filed in New Hampshire, based on distribution of magazine there). "[The
defendant] produces a national publication aimed at a nationwide audience. There is no
unfairness in calling it to answer for the contents of the publication where ever a
substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed." Id. See generally Nimmer
& Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 12.01[C]; McCarthy, supra n. 16, at § 32:38.
219. In re Cone, 11 B.R. 925, 929 (M.D. Fla. 1981), considered the identical problem
when a creditor maintained that a lien filed only with a local sheriff trumped a federally
recorded aircraft lien:
The whole purpose of systems of recordation of ownership and
security interests.., is to provide a ready means for prospective
financiers or purchasers of the property to search for competing
interests. The Florida judgment recordation provisions apply to
property located in the county in which the judgment or writ of
execution is recorded. Airplanes are uniquely mobile, and the Federal
Aviation Act provides for a uniform national means of registering
aircraft ownership and security interests. To fully protect itself under
Cooper's theory, Sun Bank would have to examine the execution
docket of every sheriff and marshal in the state where the plane might
be 'located,' not to mention other states.
Copyright Office State UCC Registers
Documents Cost Documents Cost
Federal Search 1 $250 1 $250
Corp. Location Searches 0 0 90 $32,850
Skip Tracer Reports 0 0 4 $2,000
State UCC Searches 0 0 94 $3,196
Copies of State UCC filings 0 0 2,400 $3,000
Review of UCC filings 0 0 $4,000
Judgment Lien Searches 0 0 601,600 $29,478,400
Total (w/o Judgment Liens) 1 $250 2,589 $45,296
Total (w/ Judgment Liens) 1 $250 604,189 $29,523,696
Search Cost Comparison for Terminator 3 (Estimates)
Of course, we could get lucky. We could find all necessary
information after searching only a few locations. But we cannot
guarantee it, and the law must anticipate worst-case scenarios. Since
copyrights, patents and trademarks are national assets, a remote
transferee must be prepared to search public records on a national
scale. For such a search, even without the judgment liens, the costs
can easily run in excess of $45,000 or 18,000% more than the cost of a
Copyright Search. Including judgment liens this brings the costs to
insane levels.
Commercial finance lawyers advocating the use of the state UCC
filing systems for federal information invariably assume it is only
necessary to make one search. They make claims like "[t]he
recordation [of a UCC-1] enables a prospective lender to search the
UCC files of any state by borrower name in order to see whether its
property is already encumbered by another party's security
interest.""22 This is tragically wrong. It only applies in the rare case
where the lender has absolute surety the debtor is the sole creator of
a stand-alone work, invention or mark. For the myriad of creations
built on pre-existing creations, and for all assignees and licensees,
professional due diligence demands searching the entire chain of title
220. Haemerli, supra n. 11, at 1658-1659; Healt, supra n. 11, at 135 (assuming only a
single search required); but see Rostein, supra n. 10, at 175-177 (criticizing this error).
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of the intellectual property.221 For nationwide assets like federal
information, the most efficient approach is a single search in the
federal filing offices.
E. Competing Creditors
1. The Lien Creditor
The previous sections have addressed how to file. This section
discusses from whom a filing protects. As discussed above, the
federal intellectual property systems, like the real property recording
acts, protect against later bona fide purchasers." Article 9, however,
protects against later lien creditors.223 A bona fide purchaser and a
lien creditor are not the same.2 ' It is crucial to understand why this
difference exists since Revised Article 9 now makes it the acid test
for determining where a creditor must file to perfect a security
interest.25
For tangible personal property, general creditors are ordinarily
subordinate to a secured party regardless of whether the security
interest is perfected.26 This follows from original Article 9-201, which
provides that a security interest is effective between the parties,
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors unless
otherwise provided in Article 9.227 This means a security interest need
not be perfected to take priority over a later general creditor.2 ' The
priority fight starts with the lien creditor. Under original Article 9-
301(3), a "lien creditor" means "a creditor who has acquired a lien on
the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an
assignee for the benefit of creditors from the time of the assignment,
221. See Simensky, supra n. 10, at § 15.3:
It is particularly important to investigate possible existing rights in a
trademark or trade name, copyrights, or patents before making a
substantial business investment in creating, using, or acquiring
intellectual property. This inquiry is comparable to the necessity of a
title search when dealing in real estate. The expense and possible
delay entailed is usually well worth the investment and may be
essential to ensure that rights can be lawfully created or acquired.
222. Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1573-74 (patents); In re AEG Acquisition Corp., 127
B.R. at 34, n. 8 (copyrights).
223. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (West 1999); Hawkland, supra n. 212, at § 9:301:4.
224. See generally Miller & Starr, California Real Estate Law 2d § 8:104 (1989).
225. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.C.
226. See Anderson, supra n. 73, at § 9-301:12 and cases cites.
227. Article 9-201; see 9 Anderson, supra n. 73, at § 9-201:5. Revised 9-201(a)
continues the rule.
228. Anderson supra, n. 73, at § 9-301:11.
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and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition
or a receiver in equity from the time of the appointment." The
definition continues unchanged in Revised 9-102(a)(52). Basically, a
lien creditor is a person with a money judgment who obtains a lien by
attaching or levying upon personal property of the debtor. 9 This
involves taking physical possession of the debtor's chattels. The
possession establishes an apparent ownership that prevails over an
unperfected security transfers under the policy against fraudulent
230
conveyances.
Article 9 does not define when and how a general creditor
becomes a lien creditor; it leaves that to state law. The mechanisms
for doing this are "complex and convoluted," varying from state to
state. 231 Not all mechanisms for enforcing a judgment create a lien;
not all parties who obtain a judicial lien are lien creditors; and not all
parties who become lien creditors do so at the same time. The
available mechanisms also differ depending on the type of property
involved. The crucial inquiries in each case are: (i) can the judgment
creditor get a lien on the particular property at all, (ii) if so, will the
judicial lien qualify the creditor as a lien creditor, and (iii) if so, at
what point will this happen? It is to state enforcement of judgment
law we must go to unmask the lien creditor for intellectual property.
2. Lien Enforcement Procedures
At common law, the entry of a money judgment did not itself
create a lien.232 The judgment creditor was required to execute on the
judgment by requesting the court to issue one of the common law
writs available for that purposef 3 The basic writ for executing on a
money judgment was the fieri facias, which ordered the sheriff to
seize and sell the debtoi's tangible personal property to the extent
needed to satisfy the judgment.3 Execution of the writ proceeded in
229. Id. at § 9-301:14.
230. See Glenn, supra n. 48, at § 18 ("Actual seizure, followed by continued
possession on the sheriff's part, is very necessary, because otherwise a man who purchases
the chattels from the judgment debtor, in good faith and without notice of the levy, will
get the title by estoppel which will prevail over the judgment creditor's rights."); see also
51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens § 21 ("The right to a common-law lien is based entirely on the idea
of possession, and it is indispensable that the one claiming it have an independent and
exclusive possession of the property. Such a lien arises only when possession is obtained,
and exists only so long as it is retained.").
231. See Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04.
232. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 361 (Year) and cases cited.
233. Id. at § 43. An "execution" means the formal document or "writ" issued by the
court authorizing the sheriff to levy upon the property of the judgment debtor.
234. Id. at § 14. A related writ of scire facias was used to enforce execution of some
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two steps, "the levy, or taking of property into the possession of the
sheriff for sale, and the [actual] execution sale itself., 235 An
"attachment" is similar to a levy, although it is available before the
judgment is entered; a "garnishment" is a related attachment
procedure for impounding debts due to a defendant pending
judgment."6
The states differ on when during the enforcement of judgment
process a lien arises. In some states a judgment lien arises when the
judgment is rendered;237 in others, by filing with the Secretary of
State; 18 in "order of delivery states," upon delivery of the writ to the
sheriff;29 and in "order of levy" states not until the sheriff actually
levies on the property. 20 The difference between the last two derives
from an ancient problem in issuance of the fieri facias. Initially, it
related back to the beginning of the court's term, a harsh result for
good faith transferees after the term began. The Statute of Frauds in
1676 alleviated this result, providing that the writ took effect on
delivery to the sheriff.241' The "order of delivery" states follow this
older approach. The "order of levy" states instead say no lien arises
until the sheriff takes possession by levy.2  Three "order of levy"
states allow a notice filing as an alternative to seizure for creating a
lien. 3
matter of record by giving notice to the defendant that the creditor sought to apply for an
execution. Id. at § 15. For other common law writs, see id. at § 58. See also Coogan, supra
n. 11, at § 7E.03[1].
235. 64 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 213.
236. 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 2.b (1980).
237. These states are Alabama, Georgia and Mississipi. See William J. Woodward, Jr.,
New Judgment Liens on Personal Property: Does "Efficient" Mean "Better"?, 27 Harv. J.
on Legis. 1, 4 n. 9 (1990).
238. See id. discussing procedures in California, Connecticut and Maine.
239. Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[1][d]. The editors of Collier identify the following
as order of delivery states: Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey and New York. Lawrence P. King, 5 Collier on
Bankruptcy 5.44.06, 544-11 n. 1 (15th rev. ed. 2000).
240. Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[1][b]. The editors of Collier identify the following
as the order of levy states: Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. King, supra n. 239,
5.44.06, at 544-11 n. 1.
241. See Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[1][a]; also D.E. Murray, Execution Lien
Creditors versus Bona Fide Purchasers, Lenders and Other Creditors: Charles II and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 85 Comm. L. J. 485 (1980) (extensive history of issue).
242. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 361; Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[1][a].
243. The states are New Hampshire, Vermont and Maine. See Coogan, supra n. 11, at
§ 7E.04[1][c].
Since Article 9 defines a lien creditor as someone who has
acquired a lien "by attachment, levy or the like," judgment creditors
who acquire a judgment lien merely upon docketing the judgment or
filing with the Secretary of State are not lien creditors. '" Similarly, in
"order of delivery states," a judgment creditor who merely delivers
the writ to the sheriff is not a lien creditor.245 Such a creditor has an
execution lien, to be sure, but not a lien by attachment, levy or the
like, which requires some seizure of the debtor's property. Delivery
of the writ only creates a general lien that remains inchoate until the
writ is returned. If the levy is successful, priority relates back to the
date of delivery; if unsuccessful, the lien expires unless revived by a
later writ. 6 The bottom line is that a judgment creditor must perfect
the lien by ensuring that the sheriff takes possession of personal
property, or the creditor will not become a lien creditor who prevails
against an unperfected security interest.24
3. Non-Lien Enforcement Procedures
Not all personal property is subject to these rules. At common
law, the fieri facias only reached tangible personal property.48 In
1852, the Supreme Court made the obvious point that since
intangibles are incapable of physical seizure, copyrights are not
subject to levy or attachment at law.249 Numerous decisions confirmed
that intellectual property interests were not subject to levy or
attachment at law.20 A recent confirmation was the millennial year
244. See id. at § 7E.03[2]. In Georgia filing a judgment in the general execution docket
creates a lien. But the judgment creditor does not become a lien creditor for purposes of
Article 9 until the creditor secures an attachment or levy. See Crossroads Bank of Ga. v.
Corim, Inc., 262 Ga. 364 n. 5 (1992); also Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.03[21 n. 8. Similarly,
in California a judgment creditor can lien tangible personal property by a filing in the
Secretary of State, but California Commercial Code § 9301(3) provides that a creditor so
doing is not a lien creditor. Cal. Comm. Code Ann. § 9301(3) (West 1990).
245. Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[1][d][ii].
246. See id. at § 7E.04[1][d][i].
247. E.g. In re Baird, 55 B.R. 316 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Wilson, 38 B.R. 940
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); 33 C.J.S. Executions § 145 ([T]he lien of an execution ceases on
return of the writ nulla bona or on return the return day of the writ unless there is an
actual levy); see also Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[1][d][iv].
248. 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 152 (Date); 53 C.J.S.
Liens §§ 31, 33 (1987) (levy liens only allowed on tangible property).
249. Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528 (1852).
250. For copyrights see Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447 (1855) (map); Dart v.
Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 (1879) (title abstracts); Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 94 (1859);
cf. Washington Bank of Walla Walla v. Fidelity Abstract & Sec. Co., 15 Wash. 487 (1896)
(common law copyright in title abstracts subject to judicial foreclosure of voluntary
chattel mortgage).
For patents see Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1882); Chem. Found. v. Gen. Aniline
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decision of the Virgina Supreme Court in Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Umbro International, Inc.251 It concluded that since intangibles were
not subject to levy, the right to a domain name was not subject to
garnishment. In procedural terms, this means the fieri facias (writ of
execution) is returned nulla bona (unsatisfied) 2  A return of the writ
unsatisfied extinguishes whatever lien there was in any case.
253
How could a judgment creditor reach intellectual property? In
Ager v. Murray254 the Supreme Court said the only way was through a
creditor's bill in equity after legal remedies were exhausted, i.e. after
a fieri facias was returned nulla bona.2 1' This basically required a
Works, Inc., 99 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 654 (1938) (mere conception
of an invention before patent applied for cannot be seized on execution); Rosenthal v.
Goldstein, 112 Misc. 606, 611 (1920) (or on supplemental proceeding); Jewett v. Atwood
Suspender Co., 100 F. 647 (C.C.D. Vt. 1900); Coldren v. Am. Milling Research & Dev. Co.,
177 Ind. App. 134 (1978); Rubens v. Bowers, 136 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1943) (Nev. law);
Newton v. Buck, 77 F. 614 (2d Cir. 1896) (N.Y. law); Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic
Fire Alarm Co., 149 Mass. 24 (1889); Barton v. White, 144 Mass. 281 (1887); Peterson v.
Sheriff, 115 Cal. 211 (1896). But see McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138
F.2d 493, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1943) which asserted that Pennsylvania had changed its statute
to allow a fieri facias to reach a patent by conferring on the judgment debtor "relief of the
same kind which he would have received under a creditor's bill." A stinging dissent
questioned the result in light of Ager v. Murray, asserting the judgment creditor should
have proceeded by equitable execution. Id. at 500.
For trademarks see Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1984) (N.Y. law); Jacobs, Bell
& Baumol v. Curtis, 232 N.J. Super. 155 (1989); Stutzman v. C.A. Nash & Son, Inc., 189
Va. 438, 466 (1949); Ward-Chandler Bld. Co. v. Caldwell, 8 Cal. App. 2d 375 (1935).
Although Ward states the general rule that a trademark is not subject to attachment or
levy at law, in-that case a receiver was appointed and the trademark assigned by equitable
proceeding. The assignment to the receiver was invalid because it was detached from the
goodwill of the business, not because it occurred through levy or attachment
For franchises see Gue v. The Tide Water Canal Co., 65 U.S. 257, 263 (1860) ("The
franchise, being an incorporeal hereditament, cannot, upon the settled principles of the
common law, be seized under a fieri facias."); Hart v. Seacoast Credit Corp., 115 N.J. 28,
169 (1933) affd. 116 N.J. Eg. 573 (1934); Gulf Refining Co. v. Cleveland Trust'Co., 166
Miss. 759 (1926) (corporate franchise);
For domain names see Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Intl., Inc., 259 Va. 759 (2000)
(domain name not subject to garnishment under Virginia law, citing Ager, Stevens and
Gue).
See generally 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 159 (patents and
copyrights), § 160 (trademarks), § 161 (franchises); 33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 28, 30 (1998).
251. Network Solutions, Inc., 259 Va. at 759.
252. 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 306.
253. See e.g. So. Bay Enter. v. Miranda Bay Petroleum, 957 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. App.
1997); Illi, Inc. v. Margolis, 296 A.2d 412 (Md. 1972); Baird, 55 B.R. 316; Wilson, 38 B.R.
940; 33 C.J.S. Executions § 145 (1998) ("[T]he lien of an execution ceases on return of the
writ nulla bona or on return the return day of the writ unless there is an actual levy.").
254. 105 U.S. 126 (1882). Ager relied on an earlier suggestion in Stevens v. Gladding,
58 U.S. 447, 452 (1855) that this was the only proper method for a judgment creditor to
reach a copyright. See accord Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520 (1881) (patent).
255. See generally Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[l][a] (describing procedure); see
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judgment creditor to petition a court in equity to appoint a receiver
to execute a transfer if the intellectual property owner refused to
act.256 Not all states recognized this procedure. In those that did not,
intellectual property was simply unavailable to a judgment creditor.257
In those that did, this was they only available execution vehicle.258 In
modern practice, some states now provide by statute that a writ of
execution can reach certain classes of intangible property, primarily
bank deposits and shares of corporate stock. But many continue the
common law rule that the writ does not reach intangibles, meaning
the creditor must resort to equitable proceedings.
A significant question is whether a judicial creditor resorting to a
creditor's bill is a lien creditor under Article 9. The answer is no. A
creditor's bill did give rise to what is loosely called a "lien," but this
did not create an apparent ownership effective against third parties.
It was merely an equitable lien to establish a priority among
competing judgment creditors based on diligence.259 It arose simply
by filing and not as a result of an attachment,26 ° and thus was subject
to all pre-existing legal and equitable interests.261 Although the
creditor's bill usually had no effect on later parties without notice of
the proceedings, where the bill described specific property, in some
cases it operated as a lis pendens which was effective against
also 21 Am. Jur. 2d Creditor's Bill § 61 ("The limited scope of the common-law writs of
execution created the need for the creditor's bill in equity, which is a lawsuit brought to
enforce the payment of a debt out of property of a debtor under circumstances which
impede or render impossible the collection of a debt by the ordinary process of
execution.").
256. See generally 21 Am. Jur. 2d Creditor's Bills § 2 (A creditor's bill "is an equitable
remedy available to a creditor who seeks to enforce the payments of debts our of assets
that cannot be reached by traditional means of execution on a judgment established in a
suit at law.").
257. See e.g. Coldren v. Am. Milling Research & Dev. Co., 378 N.E.2d 870 (patent
case, noting that Indiana did not recognize creditor's bill).
258. See e.g. Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., 149 Mass. 24 (1889)
(patent); Peterson v. Sheriff, 115 Cal. 211 (1896) (patent).
259. See Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[3][c][i]; see also Ex parte Roddey, 171 S.C.
489 (1934) (no specific lien arising from creditor's bill; it merely establishes priority
among competing judgment creditors); Right of Creditor Who Institutes Supplementary
Proceedings to Priority over Other Creditors in Respect of Property Disclosed Thereby, 92
A.L.R. 1435 (1935) (hereinafter "Right of Creditor").
260. Hull v. Vaughn, 107 S.W.2d 219 (1937); see also 21 C.J.S. Creditor and Debtor §
105 (1990).
261. N.M. Uri & Co. v. McCroskey, 205 S.W. 976 (1918) (lien of creditor's bill does
not take priority over prior bona fide lien, even if unrecorded); Colyear v. Super. Ct., 40
Cal. App. 462 (1919) (judgment creditor instituting supplemental proceeding could not
take priority over prior warehouseman's lien); 21 C.J.S. Creditor and Debtor § 105 (1990).
[23:195
2001] FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 253
subsequent interests. 262 However, perfecting the bill against prior
legal interests required appointment of receiver and a transfer to the
creditor. 263 An example is Adams Apple Distributing Co. v. Papeleras
Reunidas.2  A U.S. trademark licensee obtained a judgment against
its Spanish licensor, who was in bankruptcy in Spain.265 The court
affirmed imposing an equitable lien on the U.S. trademark since
without it, the debtor's tangible assets might be sold independently,
thus invalidating the mark. 266 However, the lien was only intended to
give the U.S. judgment debtor status as a creditor in the Spanish
bankruptcy court, not more favorable rights against other creditors in
Spain.
With the merger of law and equity, most states have replaced the
creditor's bill with the supplemental proceeding.2'6 This operates
differently. It is a summary proceeding directed at discovery of assets
and turning over those found.9  Whether the creditor must first
obtain an execution returned unsatisfied depends on the statute ,27
but resort to the proceeding invariably requires notice to the debtor
and a chance to be heard.271 Although in a few states a lien arises on
commencement of the procedure, in most states a supplemental
proceeding does not produce a lien at all. Instead, the remedy for
unauthorized transfer is a contempt citation against the debtor. 72
Where a lien is provided, the statutes usually provide that it has no
effect on a prior or subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice.273
Illinois is a good illustration. A fierce debate raged whether its
citation to discover assets procedure created a lien, the better view
262. See Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.0413][c][ii]. Prof. McDonnell argues that if the
judgment debtor conveyed to a secured party without notice of the creditor's bill, by
reason of Article 2-403(1) the secured party could also claim it was a "good faith
purchaser for value" who prevailed over any lien. Id.
263. See 33 C.J.S. Executions § 410 (1998) (service on the judgment debtor of an order
for examination can create an equitable lien on the assets of the debtor, but the lien is
inchoate and is not perfected until an order to deliver or pay over the property is made or
a receiver is appointed or such other steps are takes as required by the statutes).
264. 775 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1985).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 931.
267. Id. at 931-932.
268. See Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[3][c][i]; 23 C.J.S. Executions § 57 (1998).
269. See Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.0413][d]
270. 33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 957, 960 (1998).
271. Id. at §§ 361, 376.
272. Id. at §§ 379, 413.
273. See e.g. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Swartz, 18 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1994); 33
C.J.S. Executions § 411 (1998).
being it did not.274 The Illinois legislature eventually amended the
statute to provide that the procedure did create a lien but that it did
not effect bona fide purchasers without notice of proceedings. 275 The
next section contains a compendium of the state laws on this subject.
This procedural goo raises an important issue for security
interests in intellectual property. If the state follows the typical rule
that an intangible can only be reached in a supplemental proceeding,
and the supplemental proceeding does not create a lien, then a
judicial creditor pursuing supplemental proceedings is not a lien
creditor. That means that the secured creditor need not file to perfect
against a subsequent judicial creditor commencing supplemental
proceedings. Moreover, where the statute provides that a
supplemental proceeding does not effect a bona fide purchaser
without notice, since a secured creditor is by definition a "purchaser,"
a secured creditor need not file to perfect against a prior pending
supplemental proceeding of which it is unaware.276 In other words,
under Article 9-201 a lender typically need not file to perfect an
information security interest against a prior supplemental proceeding
of which it is unaware or any subsequent supplemental proceeding.
The problem arises when the judicial creditor perfects its interest
by obtaining a court ordered transfer. At that point, the judgment
creditor becomes a judicial sale purchaser entitled to the protection
of any applicable registry acts, the same as a bona fide purchaser.277
274. After a scholarly review of the conflicting case law, In re Jaffee, 111 B.R. 701
(Bankr. N.D. I11. 990), concluded that the citation procedure did not create a lien. Water
Tech. .Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 132. F.R.D. 670 (N.D. I11. 1990), followed Jaffee in a case
involving a citation issued with regard to a patent license.
275. The legislation is digested in Coogan, supra n. 11, at § 7E.04[3][c][ii].
276. See e.g. Farm Credit Bank, 18 F.3d at 413 (although Illinois amended its citation
procedure to provide lien, the lien does not effect a third party not served with citation);
see also Right of Creditor, supra n. 259, at 1435.
277. For real property see e.g. McNitt v. Turner, 83 U.S. 352 (1873) (land patent);
Riley v. Martinelli, 97'Cal. 575 (1893); Hansen v. G&G Trucking Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d
481, 496 (1965).
For personal property see LeFlore, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 834 (judicial' sale purchaser of film
negative took free of unperfected security interest); Teater v. Good Hope Dev. Corp., 55
Cal. App .2d 459 (1942) (chattel mortgage); M & J. Fin. Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 580
(1949) (chattel mortgage). See generally 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judicial Sales §§ 163, 241 (1995)
(although a judicial'sale is typically subject to caveat emptor, so that the purchaser only
takes the title of the debtor, a purchasing judgment creditor is nonetheless entitled to the
protection of any applicable registry acts, the same as a bona fide purchaser); 50A C.J.S.
Judicial Sales § 59 (1997) ("A purchaser at a judicial sale is a 'purchaser' within the
meaning of the registry acts and is entitled to their protection."); 5A Words & Phrases,
Bona Fide Purchaser and vol. 35A, Purchaser for Value. But see Natl. Shawmut Bank of
Boston v. Vera, 223 N.E. 2d 515 (Mass. 1967) (holding that a judgment creditor
purchasing an automobile from a consumer for personal use at an execution sale did not
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Under pre-Code law there was a split of authority whether release of
antecedent debt by bidding in the amount of the unpaid judgment
was good consideration for the purchase of a chattel.2 8 Under the
Code, it now definitely is." 9 This means that, where information is
concerned, an execution sale purchaser without notice can seek the
protection of the federal information acts to trump prior unrecorded
security interests. This is precisely what happened in CMS Industries,
Inc. v. L.P.S. International, Ltd.280 It held that an unrecorded patent
assignment was void against a purchasing judgement creditor without
knowledge under Section 261 of the Patent Act. 1 Similarly, under
Article 9-301(1)(d), a security interest in a general intangible must be
perfected to prevail against a later transferee for value and without
notice, including a judicial sale purchaser.
To sum up, under the enforcement of judgment laws in most
states, a creditor need not file to perfect a bona fide security interest
in intellectual property against a judicial creditor who merely
institutes supplemental proceedings of which the secured creditor has
no notice. Such a judicial creditor is neither a lien creditor nor a
transferee. Therefore, an unfiled security interest has priority against
such a creditor under original Article 9-201. A filing is required,
however, to perfect against a judicial creditor who completes the
become a buyer in the ordinary course sufficient to prime an unrecorded security interest
perfected without recording. Such standing was required for a consumer automobile
under the state automobile certificate of title statute. While there is some overlap, a
buyer in the ordinary course is different from, and has greater avoidance powers than, a
bonafide purchaser.). See Anderson, supra n. 73, at § 1:201.50.
278. See W.C. Crais III, Right to Follow Chattel into Hands of Purchaser Who Took in
Payment of Preexisting Debt, 11 A.L.R. 3d 1028 § 2b (West 2000). Two California courts
of appeal, 20th Century Plumbing Co. v. Sfregola, 126 Cal. App. 3d 851 (1981) (real
property), and City of Torrance v. Castner, 46 Cal. App. 3d 76, 82 (1975) (personal
property), have asserted that the credit bid of an execution purchaser is not "for value."
However, these cases confuse the holder of a judgment lien with a judicial sale purchaser,
and the results are unsound. Moreover, in 20th Century, the statements about credit bids
were gratuitous since the court relied on the prior recording of the deed of trust to defeat
bona fide purchaser status. Similarly in Castner, despite statements about the credit bid,
the court relied on the fact that the execution purchaser was not "without notice." Castner
cited Sargent v. Sturm, 23 Cal. 359 (1863), for the proposition that a credit bid is not "for
value" under the antecedent debt rule. But in Strum, the defendant evidently did not
release the antecedent debt; moreover, the property levied on was procured by fraud, and
a true owner could always prove the purchaser's title void due to fraud. Later cases in
California held that release of antecedent debt was valuable consideration. See e.g.
Adolph Ramish, Inc. v. Woodruff, 2 Cal.2d 190, 203 (1934); Duff v. Randall, 116 Cal. 226,
231 (1897) (real property); Va. Timber & Lumber Co. v. Glenwood Lumber Co., 5 Cal.
App. 256, 261 (1907) (chattel).
279. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(a) (West 1996).
280. 643 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981).
281. Id. at 292.
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proceedings and obtains a court ordered transfer. Such a creditor,
however, is not a lien creditor but is now a bona fide purchaser, and a
filing is now required to perfect under Article 9-301(1)(d) or
applicable federal law.
4. State Insolvency Representatives
The definition of lien creditor in current Article 9-301(3) is not
limited to judgment creditors by attachment or levy. It also includes
insolvency representatives: the bankruptcy trustee from the time the
petition is filed; a receiver in equity from the time of appointment;
and an assignee for the benefit of creditors from the time of the
assignment. There are really two issues buried in the definition: who
is a lien creditor and when does one become a lien creditor. To
understand how Article 9 deals insolvency representatives, we need
to have another look at pre-Code law.
In nineteenth century theory, an insolvency representative was
viewed as a mere successor to the debtor who only took the actual
title of the debtor, not the apparent interest. This meant, at least
initially, that title was subject to all existing security interests,
whether or not recorded.2" In case of a fraudulent conveyance,
however, the debtor was conceived as retaining an "equitable title"
allowing avoidance of such a conveyance, and the insolvency
representative, as successor to the debtor's "equitable tile," could use
that right to avoid a secret lien.283 Although this started as an
exception to the general rule, gradually the insolvency representative
was conceived more as a representative of creditors than a mere
successor to the debtor, and therefore was allowed to take advantage
of various statutory avoidance powers the law gave to creditors.
Congress gave the bankruptcy trustee a "strong arm" power equal to
the maximum lien avoidance power available to any creditor under
applicable non-bankruptcy law, a matter considered below. Here we
focus on state receivers and assignees for the benefit of creditors.
Receivers: A receiver is appointed by a court under either its
equitable powers or by virtue of statutory authority.2" A receiver is
now generally conceived as a representative of creditors, but not a
282. For bankruptcy trustee see infra, discussion in § III.F.(2). For receiver see 66 Am.
Jur. 2d Receivers § 160; 6A C.J.S. Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors § 63 (Dates).
283. See e.g. Credit Managers Assoc. v. Natl. Indep. Bus. Alliance, 162 Cal. App. 3d
1166, 1170-71 (1984) (assignee for benefit of creditors); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 143.
284. See generally Ralph Ewing Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers
(3d ed. 1959); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers §§ 1 etseq.
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bona fide purchaser. 5 A receiver only takes charge of property
directly involved in the litigation in which the receiver is appointed.28
Under the general rule that a receiver merely gets the debtor's title, a
receiver takes subject to all existing liens, whether or not recorded,
unless a statute provides otherwise .2  Pre-Code case law, under a
rainbow of theories, allowed receivers in various situations to set
aside an unrecorded chattel mortgage for the benefit of creditors.2"
Article 9-301(3) resolved the different approaches by giving a
receiver that same lien avoidance power as a levying creditor. Article
9-301(3) also resolved the issue of when the receiver's power arose by
deciding that it related back to the time of appointment. 28 9 The
receiver's power, of course, only applies for the benefit of other
creditors; as between the receiver and the debtor, the security
interest, even if unperfected, remains good.29
Although Article 9 establishes the avoidance power of a receiver
(the same as a levying creditor) and when it arises for priority
purposes (time of appointment) it does not decide how property
becomes subject to the receivership to begin with. State law does
that. "The general rule is that the appointment of a receiver does not
in itself operate to change any title, right, or interest, or to vest any
title or estate in the receiver; on the contrary, the title to the property
in receivership continues in the defendant, debtor, insolvent or other
person whose property is in receivership, until he is divested of it by
receiver's sale, or act of his own."29' Thus, the mere appointment of a
receiver did not in itself set aside a prior unrecorded chattel
mortgage; the receiver had merely an "equitable title" (lien
avoidance power), and the chattel mortgage remained good until the
receiver took action to set it aside.2" Put another way, the
285. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 139 (representative capacity); § 142 (but not a bona
fide purchaser).
286. Id. at § 155.
287. Id. at § 166.
288. See e.g. Shooters Island Shipyard Co. v. Howden, 293 F. 706, 716 (3rd Cir. 1923);
In re K-T Sandwich Shoppe, 34 F.2d 962 (E.D. Ohio 1929); Camerer v. Cal. Say. & Com.
Bank, 4 Cal. 2d 159, 170 (1935). See Right of Receiver of Conditional Vendee to Avail
Himself of Defect in Execution, or Filing, or Failure to File, Contract, 61 A.L.R. 975, for an
interesting discussion of receiver's avoidance status under pre-Code case law, such a
representative of creditors, subsequent purchaser, judgment creditor, lien creditor, etc.
289. For discussion of different theories under pre-Code law, see 66 Am. Jur. 2d
Receivers § 151.
290. Morse Elec. Prod. v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 90 Wash. 2d 195 (1978).
291. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 155.
292. Id. at § 160; Stevens v. Meriden Brittania Co., 160 N.Y. 178 (1899); Ward v. Petrie,
157 N.Y. 301 (1898). See also E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Elhatton Plumbing & Heating Co.,
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appointment of a receiver is merely a "constructive possession," not
an actual one,293 and the receiver does not perfect an interest in
personal property against prior unrecorded interests until the
receiver takes actual possession, allowing the apparent ownership
rule to come into play.29
This rule has particular application to intellectual property. As
discussed below, the federal intellectual property statutes require a
signed writing to transfer an interest in federal information. Thus,
Inventions Corp. v. Hobbs,295 applying well-settled law, held that the
mere appointment of a receiver does not in itself vest title to a patent
in the receiver; vesting only occurs when a court in equity orders the
patent owner to execute an assignment to the party entitled.296 The
resulting receiver's sale is treated as a judicial sale, in
contradistinction to a sheriff's or execution sale.2' For Article 9
purposes, this means that the receiver is a lien creditor from the date
of appointment, but the receiver's "lien" is inchoate until perfected
by a receiver's "sale," (court ordered assignment). Although in
principle the sale only conveys the actual title of the debtor,2 98 as
noted above, the receiver or third party purchaser is entitled to the
protection of any applicable recording acts.99 Thus, an unrecorded
security interest in federal information, should remain good against a
292 A.2d 230 (R.I. 1972) (incidental assignee of accounts, exempted from filing
requirements under U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e), prevailed over subsequent receiver of debtor,
since receiver had no power to set it aside.).
293. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 161 (Date).
294. See e.g. Bank of Woodland v. Heron, 120 Cal. 614, 620 (1898) (receiver who did
not take possession of real property could not set aside later crop mortgage); Miller v.
Super. Ct., 63 Cal. App. 1 (1923) (receiver appointed after sheriff took possession could
not claim property).
295. 244 F. 430 (2d Cir. 1917).
296. Id. at 444; accord Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 131 (mere appointment of receiver
does not transfer patent right absent court order); Ball, 168 F. at 304; Waterman, 55 F. at
986; Gillett v. Bates, 86 N.Y. 87 (1881); Pac. Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520 (1881);
Finnegan v. Finnegan, 64 Cal. App. 2d 109, 112 (1944); 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 106 (1952)
(assignment order necessary to convey legal title); Clark, supra n. 284, at §§ 244, 256.
Apparently, English practice does not allow receivers for a patent at all. Id. See also
Jewett v. Atwood Suspender Co., 100 F. 647, 648 (1900) (mere assignment of patent by
state court in insolvency proceeding without proceeding to compel patent owner to assign
did not convey any right in patent).
297. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 402.
298. Id. at § 416.
299. First Natl. Bank of Green River v. Ennis, 44 Wyo. 497, 512-513 (1932) (assignee
of chose in action at receiver's sale took free of undisclosed prior interest); 50A C.J.S.
Judicial Sales § 59 (1997) ("A purchaser at a judicial sale is a 'purchaser' within the
meaning of the registry acts and is entitled to their protection."); 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 258
(1952) (purchaser of chose in action at receiver's sale without notice takes free of latent
equities); see supra n. 277 and accompanying text.
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receiver until the receiver's interest is perfected by court ordered sale
and recorded federally.3°° This is exactly the way it works for real
property. A receiver takes subject to any pre-existing mortgage on
the real property, whether or not recorded, but the purchaser from a
receiver's sale is entitled to the protection of the recording acts.3"'
Assignee for the Benefit of Creditors: The common law rule was
that an assignee for the benefit of creditors merely succeeded to the
title of the assignor." The assignee was neither a purchaser nor a
creditor, and not within the protection of the statutes that allowed
creditors to attack an unrecorded conditional sales contract or chattel
mortgage.3 3 Article 9-301(3) changed that, giving the assignee the
status of a lien creditor as of the time of the assignment. Once, again,
although Article 9 establishes the avoidance power (same as a levying
creditor) and the priority date (time of assignment) it does not decide
when and how property becomes subject to the assignee. State law
does that. And there is considerable variation.
Many states have statutes that regulate, to a greater or lesser
degree, assignments for the benefit of creditors. At common law a
partial assignment was permissible, but many states now make partial
assignments either void or treat them as general assignments.3" Since
the assignment is often seen as a common law alternative to
bankruptcy, the assignor can usually withhold exempt property.-""
Many states impose formalities for the assignment to be effective,
such recording in a local court, filing a schedule of assigned property,
or posting a bond. °6 If the statute is regulatory, then common law
assignments may be allowed independent of the statute; if
mandatory, then failure to comply with statutory formalities can
300. For state information, the judicial sale purchaser would be a "transferee" under
Article 9-301(1)(d), and, if without notice, entitled to priority over an unrecorded security
interest.
301. See e.g. Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 (1925); Clark, supra n. 284, at § 491.
302. See 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors § 73 (Date).
303. See e.g. Intl. Harvester Co. v. Poduska, 232 N.W. 67, 71 (1930); Chicago Sugar-
Refining Co. v. Jackson Brewing Co., 48 S.W. 275 (Tenn. 1898); Anno., Assignees for
Creditors as Within Protection of Statute Requiring Filing or Recording of Conditional-sale
Contract or Chattel Mortgage, 71 A.L.R. 981 (Date); 6A C.J.S. Assignment for the Benefit
of Creditors § 73 (1975).
304. See 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors § 33 (different state
practices).
305. See, e.g. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1800.1 (Date) (property exempt from
assignment); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1313.17 .(Date) (assignment shall not include
"property exempt from levy or sale on execution"); 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments for the
Benefit of Creditors § 126 (Date).
306. See 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors § 4 (statutory
overview), § 28 (recording), § 31 (schedules) § 102 (bond).
make the assignment ineffective. 7 Where recording is required,
failure to record either renders the assignment void 8 or ineffective
against bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers without notice." In
the latter case, the assignee has a lien as of the date of the
assignment, as provided in Article 9, but the lien is inchoate until
perfected by complying with the statutory recording requirements.31 °
Only creditors who consent to the assignment may share in the
distribution of assets the extent of their proportional share.3 ' Non
consenting creditors retain their claims against the debtor but may
not share in the distribution.312 In some states, the consent must be
express; in others, it is presumed where the assignment is general and
not prejudicial to the creditor.3"3 Under Article 9 the assignee has the
same power as a lien creditor to attack unperfected security
interests.1 For perfected ones, there are four different rules as to
307. Id. at § 4.
308. See e.g. Ala. Code § 35-4-57 (1991) (deeds of assignment for benefit of creditors
must be recorded in probate court of county where property is located to be valid against
creditors); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1034 (same); Ohio Rev. Ann. Code § 1313.02 (Date)
(assignment effective only from time of delivery to probate judge). J.E. Sanson & Sons
Co. v. Weltman, 58 Ohio App. 2d 1 (1978) (since assignment is not effective until recorded
in probate court, assignee was junior to judgment lien after assignment but before
recording).
309. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1041.
310. See Metro Burak, Inc. v. Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc., 380 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1976)
(all procedures under Debtor and Creditor law must be complied with before the
assignment takes effect); In re Fed. Wholesale Meats & Frozen Foods, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 21
(1969) (assignee for benefit of creditors has no right to debtor's property until assignment
filed, but on so doing assignee has priority over secured creditor in accounts that failed to
file); Borges v. Acme Oil Tool Co., 306 P.2d 704 (Okla. 1956) (although under Oklahoma
law an unrecorded assignment for the benefit of creditors is void against non-assenting
creditors and bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers without knowledge, recording is a
condition subsequent, so the assignee has an inchoate lien until recording which is good
against parties with knowledge); 6A C.J.S. Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors § 63
(1975) (recording requirements); 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors §
28 (same). In Century Factors v. Everything New, Inc., 468 N.Y.S. 2d 987 (1983),
interpreting a "novel question" under the New York Debtor and Creditor Law, held that
although an assignment is not effective against third parties until recording, upon
recording the assignee's interest relates back to the appointment. Thus,. a restraining
order served after the assignment was ineffective where the assignment was duly recorded
one day later.
311. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors § 34.
312. Id.; see e.g. Southwest Research Corp. v. Caliendo, 24 Ariz. App. 560 (1975)
(procedure under Arizona law).
313. See Meador v. Larned Feed Lot, Inc., 197 Kan. 334 (1966) (assignment for benefit
of creditors that did not comply with statutory requirements could not be enforced against
unwilling creditor); 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors §§ 34, 35.
314. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors § 83.
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how the secured creditor may proceed.315 The secured creditor has the
choice of exhausting the security and proving the balance the claim,
or surrendering the security and proving up the entire claim. The
different rules affect dividends arising from the security. 6 In New
York, secured property does not become part of the assigned estate
until after a charging order is issued determining its value."7
One issue for which there is sparse authority is what happens in
a conflict between an unrecorded purchaser of federal information
and an assignee for the benefit of creditors. It seems necessary to
analyze the issue on first principles. Assume the debtor assigns a
patent for security to a lender that fails to record in the PTO, then
assigns the patent as part of an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. Although the Patent Act requires a signed writing for a
patent assignment, because state law requires the assignment to be in
writing. 8 this requirement will be satisfied. Section 261 of the Patent
Act says the security assignment is "void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice,
unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office... prior to
such subsequent purchase or mortgage."3 9 The assignee for creditors
is not a purchaser or mortgager within Section 261. Thus, the first
lender, despite the later assignment, can obtain priority if it records
first in the PTO, whatever state law may say, so the assignee's
interest is not really perfected against the prior lender. However, the
assignee's duty is to proceed promptly to convert the property into
money any pay the creditors.3 2' A transferee from the assignee does
qualify as a "subsequent purchaser" and, if in good faith and without
notice, could take priority over the unrecorded security assignment
by recording first in the PTO. This is the same result as for other lien
creditors: effective perfection against prior unrecorded interests
requires a transfer and recording in the federal registers.
An example of this result for real property is Moore v.
Schneider.12' A debtor transferred real property to a bona fide
purchaser, and then made an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
The purchaser, who was unaware of the assignment, then recorded
315. Id.; 42 Am. Jur. 2d Insolvency § 52.
316. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors § 83; 42 Am. Jur. 2d
Insolvency § 52.
317. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kalkstein, 474 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1984); Cherno
v. Bank of Babylon, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1967).
318. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors § 27.
319. Id.
320. Id. at § 92.
321. 196 Cal. 380 (1925).
the deed. The assignee sued to set aside the deed. The court held that
the assignee was subject to the recording law like any other party.
Since the assignment was not recorded, and since the purchaser was
without notice, the prior deed prevailed over the later assignment for
the benefit of creditors.322
5. State Law Compendium
The following chart summarizes enforcement of judgment
procedures in various states.
STATE Writ of Writ of Creditor's Supplement
Attachment Execution Bill in Equity Proceeding
Alabama Not on No levy on No lien
information information
Alaska Not on Not levy on No lien
information? information?
Arizona Not on No levy on No lien
information information'
Arkansas Not on No levy on Lien - not
information information against BFP
California Not on Lien? - not Lien - not Lien - not
information against BFP against BFP against BFP
Colorado Not on No levy on No lien
information? information? •
Connecticut No lien on No levy on No lien
federal info? federal info?
District of Not on No levy on No lien
Columbia information? information?
Florida Not on No levy on Lien - not No lien
information information against BFP
Georgia Not on No levy on N/A No lien
information? information
Illinois Not on No levy on Lien - not
information? information against BFP
Iowa Allowed on Allowed on Lien - not No lien
information information against BFP
Michigan Not on No levy on No lien
information? information
Minnesota Allowed on Allowed on Lien - not
information? information? against BFP
Missouri Not on No levy on No lien
information information
Nebraska Not on Not on No lien
information? information
Nevada Allowed on Allowed on No lien
information? information?
New Hampshire Not on Not on Lien on later
I information information interests
322. Id. at 390.
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New Jersey Allowed on Allowed on No lien
assignable assignable
information? information?
Ohio Not on Not on No lien
information information
Oklahoma Not on Not on No lien
information information
Texas Not on Not on No lien
information? information?
Virginia Not on BFPs Lien - not No lien
until filing against BFP
Chart of Selected State Enforcement of Judgment Laws323
323. Where a statute does not expressly create a lien, I have assumed there is none.
Where the statute does not authorize a procedure, e.g. a creditor's bill, I have assumed
there is none. A "BFP" means a "bona fide purchaser," i.e. a third party who takes in
good faith, for value and without notice. I have translated "choses in action," the
traditional formula for intangibles, as "information." For example, Alabama does not
allow a writ of execution on "choses in action," so I have represented this under Writ of
Execution as "Not on Information." Similarly, several states provide that and execution
only applies to "goods and chattels," which in the traditional usage did not include
intangibles. For consistency, I have also reflected these as "Not on Information," but I
have followed it by a "?" where statutory language or judicial decisions may indicate a
different result. Blank entries indicate that the procedure is unavailable, or at least that I
was unable to find it readily. Following this chart is a selected commentary of the relevant
statutes. Due to space limitations I have not included receivers or assignees for the
benefit of creditors in the chart, although they are often discussed in the notes. Chart
relied on extensive annotation in Hon. James J. Brown, Judgment Enforcement § 4.01 (2d
ed. 2000), as well as additional research of my own.
Alabama: Attachment: Ala. Code § 6-6-70 (date), lien Ala. Code § 6-6-76; Execution: id. at
§ 6-6-70, lien id. at § 6-6-90; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 6-6-183, no lien; Assignee
for Creditors: id. at § 35-4-57. For an attachment, under Ala. Code § 6-6-70 a sheriff must
take possession "where practicable," which requires dominion by notorious act. Landers
v. Moore, 21 Ala. App. 12 (1925). Registration of a judgment in a local courthouse creates
a judgment lien on personal property "subject to levy," but not on choses in action. Ala.
Code § 6-9-211. See also Canterbury & Gilder v. Marengo Abstract Co., 166 Ala. 231
(1910). Execution creates a lien from the time of levy. Ala. Coe § 6-9-60. Execution may
be levied on personal property except "things in action." Ala. Code § 6-9-40(2); see also
In re Head, 204 B.R. 1022 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997) (allowing no lien on proceeds from
sale of treasury note since Alabama does not allow levy on chose in action); In re Flair, 28
B.R. 160 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1983) (same). No lien is provided by statute in a
supplemental proceeding. Deed of assignment for creditors must be recorded to be valid.
Ala. Code § 35-4-57.
Alaska: Attachment: Alaska Stat. §§ 09.40.010 et seq. (Date). Execution: id. at § 09.30.010
et seq., lien id. at § 09.35.110; Supplemental Proceeding: Civil Rule 69(b) - no lien;
Receiver: Alaska Stat. 09.40.240. A writ of execution extends to "all goods, chattels,
money or other property, both real and personal" of the judgment debtor. Alaska Stat. §
09.30.070. However, this does not extend to corporate franchises. See Stevens v. Lathrop,
4 Alaska 407 (1911). Attachment may be had on all property "not exempt from
execution." Alaska Stat. § 09.40.030. Mere appointment of a receiver does not transfer
intangibles without a court order. See Wood v. Noyes, 279 F. 321 (9th Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 260 U.S. 732 (1922).
Arizona: Attachment: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1521 (date); lien id. at § 12-1532;
Execution: id. at §§ 12-1551 - 12-1558; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at §§ 12-1631-1635;
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Receiver: Fed. R. Civ. P. 66; Assignee for Creditors: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-1031 et
seq. (Date). For an attachment, § 12-1532 creates a lien only on "property in the custody
of the attaching officer." Id. at § 12-1532. Choses in action can be "levied on and sold on
execution." Id. at § 1558. However, the statute contains no mechanism for so doing. Since
1931 Arizona courts have held that a chose in action is not subject to levy, but must be
reached by garnishment. See Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561 (1938); Haigler v. Burson, 38
Ariz. 192, 195 (1931). Since the Legislature has reenacted the statutes in substantially
similar form in light of Hill and Haigler, it is presumed to agree. Cage v. Butcher, 118
Ariz. 122, n. 2 (1978). The Arizona garnishment proceeding does not create a lien, merely
a lis pendens. In re McCoy, 46 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984). The supplemental
proceeding does not create a lien. The assignee for creditors may not recover property
conveyed to a good faith purchaser for value. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1041.
Arkansas: Attachment: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-110-101 et seq. (1997), lien id. at § 16-110-
115; Execution: id. at §§ 16-66-101 et seq., lien id. at § 16-66-112; Supplemental Proceeding:
id. at §§ 16-66-418 & 16-66-419; Receiver: id. at §§ 16-117-201 et seq.; Assignee for
Creditors: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-117-401 et seq. Under section 16-66-201, the writ of
execution only extends to "goods and chattels." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-66-201. See also In
re Frazier, 136 B.R. 199 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1991) (noting that Arkansas follows the
common law rule that choses in action and other equitable property interests are not
subject to execution except to the extent modified by statute). The Legislature has made
some, but not all, such interests subject to execution. The supplemental proceeding does
create a lien, but it is ineffective against third parties without notice. Ark. Code Ann. §
66-419; see also N.M. Uri & Co. v. McCroskey, 135 Ark. 537 (1918). The lien of an
attachment only binds the defendant's property "which may be seized under an
execution." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-160-115. The assignee must file in a local court for the
assignment to be effective. Id. at § 16-117-401.
California: Attachment: Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 481.010 et. seq: (date). Judgment Lien: id.
at § 697.510; Execution: id. at § 699.710; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 708.110 - lien;
Creditor's Bill: id. at § 708.210 - lien; Receiver: id at § 708.610; Assignment Order: id. at §
708.510. The California statutes are discussed in detail in the companion article. See
Brennan, supra n. 9, at § II.C.3.b.
Colorado: Attachment: Colo. R. Civ. P. 102; Execution: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-52-101
et seq. - lien id. at § 13-52-11; Supplemental Proceeding: Colo. R. Civ. P. 69 - no lien.;
Receiver: id. at 66; Assignee for Creditors: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-101 et seq. Under
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, personal property can only be attached by "taking it
into custody." Under Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated section 13-52-102(1), levy
may be had on "goods and chattels." This apparently excludes intangibles. See First Natl.
Bank of Denver v. Dist. Ct., 652 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1982) (holding that partnership interests
not subject to levy on execution). The supplemental proceeding in Rule 69 is available for
such purpose. Colo. R. Civ. P. 67. Although it does not expressly create a lien, the prior
creditor's bill it replaced did create an equitable lien. Shuck v. Quackenbush, 75 Colo. 592
(1924). The "property" subject to an assignment for the benefit of creditors includes
"choses in action." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-101(2). The assignment vests, in the
assignee, all property of the debtor except property "by law not subject to levy and sale
under execution" and "subject to all valid and subsisting liens." Id. at § 6-10-102.
Connecticut: Attachment: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 52-279 et seq. (Date); Judgment lien:
id. at § 52-355a; Execution: id. at § 52-350f; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 52-397 - no
lien; Receiver: id. at §§ 52-504 et seq. (Date). A writ of attachment is authorized in all
cases "containing a money demand against the estate of the defendant, both real and
personal." Id. at § 52-279. While the writ is authorized in such cases, there is no procedure
to attach information. Section 52-355a allows judgment liens on personal property to be
filed with the Secretary of State, but the lien applies to personal property "on which a
security interest could be perfected by filing in the office of the Secretary of State." Id. at
[23:195
2001] FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 265
§ 52-355a. Since perfecting a security interest in a federal information requires a federal
filing, at least as to bona fide purchasers, it is questionable whether this section applies.
Connecticut General Statute Annotated section 52-350f provides that a money judgment
may be enforced against all property of the judgment debtor unless "exempt ... under
federal law." Id. at § 52-3504. By "exempt," the statutes usually means the exemptions
allowed under bankruptcy law for personal effects, homestead exemptions and the like.
Whether this would include federal information which has traditionally been held not
subject to execution at law due to the writing requirement is undecided.
District of Columbia: Attachment: D.C. Code §§ 16-501 et. seq. (Date). Execution: id. at §
15-311, lien - id. at § 15-307; Supplemental Procedure: id. at 15-320 - no lien; Receiver: id.
at § 16-518, Fed. R. Civ. P. 66; Assignee for Creditors: D.C. Code §§ 28-2101 et seq. The
"writ of feiri facias may be levied on all goods and chattels of the debtor not exempt from
execution." D.C. Code § 15-311. A writ of attachment only reaches "the debtor's goods,
chattels and credits," and the fieri facias only applies to "goods and chattels." Id. at §§ 16-
544, 15-311; see Rowe v. Colpoys, 137 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (noting that "goods and
chattels" was the common law formula to describe property subject to levy under a writ
scire facias, opined that the term has a "broader and inclusive meaning" in modern
practice). Rowe decided that "goods and chattels" in District law would allow levy on a
liquor license, concluding "that the rule of the common law which forbids a levy upon
licenses, was confined, and should be confined, to non-transferable licenses." Id. at 251.
Rowe was talking about a business permit, and relied on the fact that the licensing board
had the authority to transfer the license. This is not necessarily the same as a private
license of intellectual property, where there are limits on involuntary transfers without
consent of the owner. The lien of an execution only extends to "the equitable interest of
the judgment defendant in goods and chattels in his possession." D.C. Code § 15-307. An
assignment for creditors is invalid unless recorded. Id. at § 28-2103.
Florida: Execution: Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 56.01 et seq. (Date); Supplemental Proceeding: id. at
§ 56.29 - no lien; Creditor's Bill: id. at § 68.05 - lien; Receiver: R. of Civ. P. 1.620; Assignee
for Creditors: Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 727.101 et seq. The writ of execution extends to "goods
and chattels" but not contractual rights or choses in action. Id. at § 56.061; see also Willard
v. Petruska, 402 Fla. 2d 756 (1968). The supplemental proceeding in section 56.29 does not
create a lien, although the creditor's bill under section 68.05 does. Fla. Stat. Ann. §
56.29.6805. However, Salina Mfg. Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc.. 382 S.2d 1309 (Fla. App.
1980), held the Florida creditor's bill only creates equitable lien as between two
competing judgment creditors, so it would not apply to third parties without notice.
Creditors with liens prevail over an assignee for creditors to the extent their liens are
"duly perfected pursuant to applicable law." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 727.114.
Georgia: Attachment: Ga. Code Ann. (1998) §§ 18-3-1 et seq. (1998); Judgment lien: id. at
§ 9-12-80; Execution: id. at §§ 9-13-50 et seq.; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 9-11-69
examination procedure - no lien; Receiver: id. at §§ 9-8-1 et seq.; Assignee for Creditors:
id. at §§ 18-2-40 et seq. Georgia creates a judgment lien on personal property by mere
entry of a judgment. Id. at § 9-12-80. Nonetheless, a judgment creditor does not become a
lien creditor until attachment or levy. Crossroads Bank v. Corim, Inc., 262 Ga. 364, n. 5
(1992). A writ of execution does not extend to "choses in action." Ga. Code Ann. § 9-13-
57. The examination procedure in section 9-11-69 does not create a lien. Id. at § 9-11-67.
Under section 18-3-74, the lien of an attachment is only created by a levy, but O.C.G.A. §
18-3-72, says that a judgment obtained in an attachment may only be levied "in the same
manner as executions issuing at common law." Id. at §§ 18-3-74, 18-3-72. No procedure is
provided for a levy by attachment on a chose in action. An assignment for creditors
includes choses in action. Id. at § 18-2-45. The assignee succeeds to the interest of the
assignor but has any power the assignor had to attack a fraudulent conveyance. Id. at §
18-2-54.
Illinois: Attachment: 5 11. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 4-101 et seq. (Date); Execution: id. at § 12-
101 et seq.; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 2-1402 - lien id. at § 2-1402(m). Attachment
applies to all property subject to execution, which may mean choses in action are not
covered. See Christison v. Jones, 83 11. App. 3d 344 (1980) (malpractice action not
attachable). Only "goods and chattels" are subject to levy on execution which does not
include intangibles. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 12-112; see Rochford v. Laser, 91 Ill. App. 3d
769 (1980). In Illinois, a lien on intangibles may only be created through the creditor's
bills or citation procedures. Rochford, Ill. App. 3d at 769. Originally the Illinois citation
procedure did not create a lien. In re Jaffee, 111 B.R. 701 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). The
Legislature amended the statute to create one, but provided that the lien did not extend
to "bona fide purchasers or lenders without notice of the citation." 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
§ 2-1402(m).
Iowa: Attachment: Iowa Code Ann. §§ 639.1 et seq. (Date): Execution: id. at §§ 626.1 et
seq.; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at §§ 630.1 et seq. - no lien; Creditor's Bill: id. at §§
630.16 et seq., lien - § 630.18; Receiver: id. at § 630.7; Assignee for Creditors: id. at §§ 681.1
et seq. Choses in action may be attached, and may be levied on. Id. at §§ 639.23, 626.21.
The Supplemental Proceeding evidently does not create a lien. The Creditor's Bill
procedure does create one from the time of notice.
Michigan: Attachment: Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.40001 et seq. (Date); Execution: id. at §
600.6017, lien - id. at § 600.6012; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at §§ 600.6101 - 600-6143;
Receiver. id. at § 600.6104(4); Assignee for Creditors: id. at §§ 600.5201 et seq. An
attachment binds "goods and chattels from the time they were attached." Id. at §
600.4035. No mention is made of choses in action. Execution may only be had on personal
property of the judgment debtor that "is liable to execution at common law." Id. at §
600.6017. In Dart v. Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 (1879), the state supreme court held that
common law copyrights were not subject to levy on execution at law in Michigan. Section
600.6017(1) now specifically provides that the abstract books themselves (copies) are
subject to levy on execution, but does not indicate that the intangible copyright interest to
use the books is subject to levy. Id. at § 600.6017(1). Sections 600.6119 and 600.6122 allow
a subpoena on a third party who owes money to a judgment debtor, and provides that
transfer of the property is thereafter subject to the rights of the judgment creditor except
against a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. Id. at §§ 600.6119, 600.6122.
Assignments for the benefit of creditors are void unless duly recorded. Id. at § 600.5201.
Minnesota: Attachment: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 570.01 et seq. (Date); Execution: id. at §
550.10; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at §§ 575.01 et seq.; Receiver: id. at §§ 576.01 et seq.;
Assignee for Creditors: id. at §§ 577.01 et seq. Personal property is attached in the same
manner as provided for levy by execution. Id. at § 570.061(sub. 3). Section 550.10 allows a
lien on property "subject to levy and execution." Id. at § 550.10. The general method for
levy on "property capable of manual delivery" for the sheriff to take custody. Id. at §
550.12. In Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 94 (1859), the state supreme court held that a
sheriff's levy on a common law copyright in unpublished title abstracts was improper.
However, section 550.135(sub. 2) now says that for personal property "not covered
elsewhere" a sheriff may levy by leaving a writ of execution and notice specifying the
property levied on "with the person holding it." Id. at § 550.135(sub 2). Although the
statute does not say so expressly, early case law has held that the commence of a
supplemental proceeding creates an equitable lien on the property of the debtor, but it is
ineffective against prior creditors without notice. LaFleur v. Shiff, 239 Minn. 206 (1953)
(lien of supplemental proceeding junior to prior unrecorded attorney's lien on case
without notice). Incorporeal property is only transferred to a receiver after a noticed
hearing. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 576.11. An assignment for the benefit of creditors must be
recorded to be valid. Id. at § 577.01.
Missouri: Attachment: Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 513.090(a) (date); Execution: id. at §§
513.010 et seq.; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 513.380 - no lien; Receiver: id. at §
515.240; Assignee for Creditors: id. at §§ 426.010 et seq. An execution lien only arises on
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [23:195
2001] FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 267
levy. Id. at § 513.085. An attachment or execution only reaches "goods and chattels" and
certain specifically described intangibles such as corporate stock. Id. at § 513.090(a).
Intangibles may be garnished by serving notice on the account debtor, the traditional
method. In re Riverfront Food & Beverage Corp., 29 B.R. 846 (Bankr. 1983). Mere
appointment of a receiver transfersno title. Jennings Sewer Dist. v. Pitcairn, 230 Mo. App.
704 (1945). An assignee for creditors has the. right as "an attachment or execution
creditor with a writ levied on such property could prosecute or make." Mo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 426.410.
Nebraska: Attachment: Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-1001 et seq. (Date); Execution: id. at §§
25-1501 et seq; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 25-1564 - no lien; Receiver: id. at § 25-
1573; Execution applies to "goods and chattels." Id. at § 25-1503. Apparently, this
excludes intangibles, since section 25-1564 says the supplemental proceeding applies to
"choses in action." Id. at § 25-1564. The supplemental proceeding does not create a lien,
but is enforced by a court order of transfer, punishable by contempt for non-compliance.
Id. at § 25-1577. A receiver can be appointed in aid of the supplemental proceeding. An
attachment applies to "goods, chattels, stocks . . . rights, and effects of defendant" in the
county. Id. at § 25-1004.
Nevada: Attachment: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31.010 et seq. (Date); Execution: id. at §§
21.010 et seq.; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 21.270 - no lien. Execution applies to
"goods and chattels." Id. at § 25-1503. Sportsco. Enter. v. Morris, 112 Nev. 625 (1996)
(holding that under section 21.080, a debtor's interest in a sports box, whether deemed an
interest in real estate or an intangible license, was subject to levy on execution); see also
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21.080. It relied on the "general rule" that "when property is
saleable it is seizable ... upon execution." 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of
Judgments .§ 165. This "general rule" was stated with regard to real property. The
"general rule" does not apply to patents, copyrights or trademarks. Id. at § 159-60. All
property of the defendant "in this state" is subject to attachment pursuant to the order of
attachment, but personal property must be attached "by taking it into immediate custody"
or appointing "a keeper in charge of a going business where property is located." Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31050, 31060. The supplemental proceeding allows the judge to order
property transferred to the judgment creditor, and is enforced by contempt. Id. at §
21320.
New Hampshire: Attachment: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 511:1 (date); Execution: id. at §
527:6; Creditor's Bill: id. at § 498:8; Receiver: id. at § 512:30; Assignee for Creditors: id. at
§§ 568:1 et seq. Only property "which is liable to be taken in execution" may be attached.
Id. at § 511:1. Chapter 528 has procedures to levy on money, goods, corporate franchises
and corporate shares, but not intellectual property. Under (former) section 527:12, the
form of the execution directs the sheriff to levy on the "goods, chattels or lands of said
debtor in your precinct." Effective January 1, 2001, section 527:12 amended the form of
the writ to cover "money, goods, chattels, land, personal estate, property interest, right or
credit of the said debtor in your precinct." Whether this extends-the sheriff's authority to
levy on information intangibles in light of the failure to amend Chapter 528 to provide a
procedure for so doing is unclear. It appears that the proper procedure to reach
information is the creditor's bill for property "that cannot be reached by execution." Id. at
§ 498:8. Recording the creditor's bill in the local court creates a lien on property
described in the bill but only against "after-acquired rights." Id. at 498:14. This is the
traditional lis pendens approach. An assignment for creditors assign "all property which
might be taken on execution." Id. at § 568:6.
New Jersey: Attachment: N.J. Stat. Ann.. (Date); Execution: id. at § 2A:17-18;
Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 2A:17-65; Receiver: id. at § 2A:17-66; Assignee for
Creditors: id. at §§ 2A:19-1 et seq. Section 2A:17-18 allows levy on "proprietary rights and
credits." Id. at § 2A:17-18. McCray v. Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533 (1961) (following Rowe
v. Colpoys, 137 F.2d 299 (D.C. 1993) discussed under District of Columbia), held that a
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license related to personal character or skill is not transferrable and hence not subject to
levy, but a taxicab permit which the statute expressly made assignable was subject to sale
on execution with permission of the taxicab authority. The receiver appointed in aid of
supplemental proceedings is vested with title of the debtor upon appointment. N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:17-67.
Ohio: Attachment: Ohio Rev. Code § 2751.01; Receiver: id. at § 2715.20 (in attachment),
2735.05. Execution: id. at § 2329.01; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 2333.01; Assignee
for Creditors: id. at § 1310.2. Although attachment against "property, other than personal
earnings, of a defendant," is allowed, the attachment levy only applies to "goods, chattels,
rights." Id. at § 2715.05. Courts have held attachment does not apply to choses in action.
Haines v. Public Fin. Corp., 7 Ohio App. 2d 89 (1968). For property not in possession of a
person, the sheriff serves a written notice to appear in court. Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.091.
On a hearing the court can order a written transfer or appoint a receiver to do so. Id. at §
2715.29. Execution applies to "goods and chattels." Id. at § 2329.01. The supplemental
proceeding in section 2333.01 covers "choses in action," but no lien arises on choses in
action until a bill filed for charging order. See Douglass v. Huston, 6 Ohio St. 156; Bowry
& Sons Co. v. Odell & Bro., 4 Ohio St. 623 (1855).
Oklahoma: Attachment: Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1151 et seq. (Date); Execution: id. at §§ 12-
731 et seq. - lien id. at § 12-734; Supplemental Proceeding: id. at §§ 12-841 et seq.; Receiver:
id. at § 12-852; Assignee for Creditors: id. at §§ 24-31 et seq. Only "goods, chattels, stocks,
rights, credits, money and effects" are subject to attachment. Id. at § 12-1154. Only
"goods and chattels" are subject to levy, and section 12-751 only provides procedures for
sale of goods and realty under levy. Id. at §§ 12-733, 12-751. "Any property" of the
debtor, including "equitable interests" can be reached by a supplemental proceeding that
appears to codify prior rules for creditor's bill. Id. at § 12-841. The supplemental
proceeding does not create a lien but is enforceable by contempt. Id. at § 12-842. A
receiver may be appointed, but property is only transferred by a receiver's sale. Id. at §§
12-852, 12-853. An assignment for creditors is void unless duly signed and recorded. Id. at
§§ 24-35, 24-36.
Texas: Attachment: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 61.041 (Date); Execution: R. of
Civ. P. § 621; Supplemental Proceeding: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002
(Date); Receiver: id. at § 64.001; Assignee for creditors: Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 23.01
et seq. In attachment may only be had on property subject to levy under a writ of
execution. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 61.041. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure §
621 et seq. gives procedures for execution; but no procedures are provided for intangibles.
Section 31.002 of the civil practice code allows a turnover order on noticed hearing for
property that "cannot readily be attached or levied by ordinary legal process." Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002. No lien is created. A receiver has no title, only
temporary possession, of property. Durham v. Scrivener, 259 S.W. 606 (Tex. App. 1923).
An assignment for the benefit of creditors must be recorded to be valid. Tex. Bus. &
Comm. Code § 23.08(a)(2). It is not effective against a prior innocent purchaser for value.
Id. at § 23.09(b).
Virginia: Attachment: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-557 (Date); Execution: id. at § 8.01;501;
Supplemental Proceeding: id. at § 8.01-506 - no lien. Section 8.01-557 allows attachment
lien on personal property in actual or constructive possession of defendant and on third
parties by service of writ. Id. at § 801-557. An attachment lien is ineffective against third
parties without notice unless and until recorded a lis pendens in appropriate courthouse.
Id. at § 8.01-268. This also applies to personal property. In re Hart, 24 B.R. 821, 824
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). One can create a lien on intangible property by delivery of a writ
of fieri facias to the judgment debtor, but the lien is ineffective against an assignee for
valuable consideration without notice. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01.501. The lien is in effect an
equitable lien with priority over later execution liens, In re Acorn Elec. Supply, Inc., 348
F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1972), but is "inchoate and unperfected as against third parties"
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So what's the point? As discussed in the companion article,324
Revised Article 9 requires a creditor to file a security interest in the
state where the debtor is "located." Revised 9-307(c) says that a
debtor is "located" in a state if the state requires filing to perfect
against a lien creditor with regard to the collateral; otherwise, the
debtor is located in the District of Columbia. As this chart indicates,
as to whether the collateral is intangible information, state law falls
into three general categories:
" No lien states: Many states do not require a filing where the
collateral is information for the simple reason that they do
not authorize a judgment creditor to lien information by
attachment, levy, or the like. Alabama, for example, does not
allow an attachment or levy on "choses in action" at all. The
supplemental proceeding is available for information, but
does not create a lien. Therefore, a secured creditor need not
file in Alabama to gain priority over a lien creditor for
information, but must file to gain priority over the bona fide
purchaser who emerges from the judicial sale after the
supplemental proceeding.
* Equitable Lien States: Some states allow the creation of the
equivalent of an equitable lien on information, but provide
the lien has no effect on bona fide purchasers, including prior
secured creditors without notice. California is an example.325
It allows a lien on intangibles by execution (possibly),
creditor's bill, and supplemental proceeding. However, the
lien is effectively used to allocate priorities among competing
judicial creditors and has no effect on a bona fide purchaser.
A creditor with such an equitable lien is not a "lien creditor"
for Article 9 purposes. No filing is required by a prior bona
fide encumbrancer without notice while the lien remains
inchoate. However, a filing is required under Article 9-
301(1)(d) to gain priority over a judicial sale purchaser.
* Legal lien states: Finally, some states do provide that an
execution can reach "all property of the debtor," which
would include information, or specifically allow levy on
choses in action. However, the statutes often fail to provide a
procedure for levy on information, and there is scant judicial
acquiring prior or subsequent liens without notice, in particular the IRS under a tax lien.
In re Dulaney, 29 B.R. 79 (Bankr. 1982). The supplemental proceeding in section. 8.01-
506 does not create a lien. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-506.
324. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.C.
325. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.C(3) for extensive analysis of California rules.
authority interpreting how the statutes would operate in such
a case. It is also questionable whether states could even allow
an involuntary levy on federal information due to the
restrictions discussed in the next section
As a result, under Revised 9 many debtors will be "located" in
the District of Columbia where information collateral is concerned.
The companion article explores the implications of this result in
greater detail.
6. Federal Information - No Lien Creditors.
There is another reason why federal intellectual property is not
subject to involuntary judicial lien. The Copyright Act, Patent Act
and Lanham Act all require a signed writing to make an ownership
transfer.326 Since a levy only acts in rem, a judgment creditor cannot
lien federal information by attachment or levy since there is no
signed transfer.327 The writing requirement is not some abstract
formality. As Konigsberg International v. Rice328 explained:
Although Section .204 is often referred to as the "copyright statute
of frauds," it. actually differs materially from state statutes of
frauds ... State statutes of frauds serve a purely evidentiary
function - to prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury of
fictitious agreements. ... By contrast, a transfer of copyright
[ownership] is simply "not valid", without a writing. . . . Section
204's writing requirement not only protects authors from fraudulent
claims, but also "enhances predictability and certainty of ownership
- 'Congress's paramount goal' when it revised the Act in 1976."
[Citations omitted].39
The writing requirement addresses two basic problems arising
from a forced sale, one practical, and the other juridical. Prof. Vaver,
after an extensive review of English, Canadian and American
authorities limiting execution on intangibles,33° elucidates the
practical problem: valuation.
A sheriff should be able to make a rough assessment of the value of
what is being seized so as not to deprive the debtor of more than is
necessary to satisfy the judgment debt and the cost of seizure. How
326. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West 1996); 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984); Ldnham Act,
15 U.S.C.A. § 1060(a) (West 1997).
327. See e.g. Ball, 168 F. 304; Jewett v.'Atwood Suspender Co., 100 F. 647 (D.C. 1900)
(holding that a levy on a patent was invalid).
328. 16 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994).
329. Id. at 357.
330. See David Vaver, Can Intellectual Property be Taken to Satisfy a Judgment Debt?
6 B.F. L. Rev. 255 (1991). The author argues that the signature requirement is a reflection
of a fundamental policy of protecting creators from indiscriminate seizure of the fruits of
their labors.
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is a sheriff to do that with intellectual property? Assume
trademarks or trade names are made seizable.... How does a
sheriff estimate the value of goodwill when even professional
trustees have difficulty with it? As for a copyright, 'unlike 'real
property and other forms of personal property, it is by its very
nature incapable of accurate. monetary evaluation prior to its
exploitation. "
As a result of these practical difficulties, legislatures are often
reluctant to subject intellectual property to forced sale. In California,
for example, an intellectual property owner has the right to prior
notice and a hearing before any forced judicial sale.332 If the court
finds a forced sale will not realize full value of the intellectual
property, it instead orders an assignment of royalties to satisfy the
judgment.333
A juridical problem arises from the fact that a sheriff's authority
reaches no further than the county borders.33 ' As the Supreme Court
observed in Stevens v. Gladding:335
These incorporeal rights [copyrights] do not exist in any particular
State or district; they are coextensive with the United States. There
is nothing in any act of congress, or in the nature of the rights
themselves, to give them locality anywhere so as to subject them to
the process of courts having jurisdiction limited by the lines of
States and districts. That an execution out of the court of common
pleas for the county of Bristol, in the State of Massachusetts, can be
levied on an incorporeal right subsisting in Rhode Island, or New
York, will hardly be pretended. That by the levy of such an
execution, the entire right could be divided, and so much of it as
might be exercised within the County of Bristol, sold, would be a
position subject to much difficulty.3
Allowing levy by a local sheriff on nationwide federal
information raises significant jurisdictional 'problems. How could a
sheriff whose authority is limited to County A transfer property in
County B? What if sheriffs in different states hold conflicting sales?
What if different states establish different priority dates for when the
331. Id. at 284.
332. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 701.520 (1982).
333. Id. As the California Law Revision Commission explained:
By restricting the assignment of payments to the amounts necessary to
satisfy the judgment, the assignment order procedure (in conjunction with
proposed restrictions on the sale of certain obligations) is designed to
avoid cases where valuable or potentially valuable obligations are
purchased by the judgment creditor or a third person on a speculative
basis, perhaps resulting in a large windfall to the purchaser.
16 Cal. Law Revision Comm. Rep. (Dec. 1982) at 1137-1138.
334. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 140 (1998).
335. 58 U.S. 447 (1855).
336. Id. at 451.
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sale if effective? No state need recognize the priority of a security
interest filed in another state against a local creditor.37
This was another reason why Stevens held that a copyright is not
subject to levy and execution at law. To reach federal information
requires an equitable execution under court supervision. The
resulting transfer on behalf of the information owner then necessarily
applies nationwide. This is one of the reasons Congress established
the national information filing systems to give a single nationwide
location to record such transfers.
7. Real Property Compared
It is instructive to compare the execution procedures for
intellectual property with those for real property. At common law, a
judgment did not create a lien on the defendant's real property.33 In a
few states, by statute, a judgment can create a lien on real property
when the judgment is docketed. 339 In other states, a judgment creditor
can record an abstract of judgment in the county recorder's office to
create a lien that makes transfers after the recording subject to the
judgment.3 0 However, in all cases a judgment lien only attaches to the
actual interest of the debtor in the realty, not the apparent interest,
meaning it is subject to all prior interests, known or unknown,
recorded or unrecorded.34" ' This follows from the nemo dat principle;
since the debtor has already conveyed to a mortgagee, even if
unrecorded, there is nothing left for the judgment creditor to take. To
prevail against prior interests, a judgment creditor must proceed to
judicial sale. The judicial sale purchaser is the'n entitled to record the
deed and seek the protection of the real property recording acts, the
same as a bona fide purchaser. '
The enforcement procedures for intellectual property operate
similarly. Since one cannot take physical possession of an intangible,
337. See e.g. Atha v. Brockius, 39 Cal.2d 635 (1952); 33 C.J.S. Executions § 140 (1998).
However, states can recognize out of state priorities as a matter of comity. See Brennan,
supra n. 9, III.C.
338. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 371; 50 C.J.S. Judgement, § 551 (1997)("At
common law, no lien on lands of a judgment debtor is acquired under a judgment against
him.").
339. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 371; 50 C.J.S. Judgement, § 551 (1997).
340. Id.
341. Id.; see Miller & Starr, supra n. 224, at § 8:103.
342. See e.g. Riley v. Martinelli, 97 Cal. 575, 582 (1893); Foorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal.
552 (1888); Hansen v. G&G Trucking Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 481, 496 (1965). Under pre-
Code law there was a split of authority whether release of antecedent debt was good
consideration for the purchase of a chattel. See Anno. 11 A.L. Rev. 3d 1028. Under the
Code, it now definitely is. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(a) (West 1996).
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the apparent ownership rule from Twyne's Case does not apply. Even
if a creditor's bill or supplemental proceeding creates a lien, it is
ineffective against prior unrecorded interests in any case, just like for
real property.3 43 To assure perfection against third parties without
notice, the creditor must proceed to judicial sale, in which case, just
like real property, the judicial sale purchaser can qualify as a bona
fide purchaser under federal law.4
Thus, for intellectual property, a secured creditor often need not
file to perfect against a subsequent lien creditor by attachment or
levy, because such a lien creditor will not exist. A secured creditor
must file in the property tract register, however, to trump a
judgement creditor who proceeds to sale because that creditor can
become a bona fide purchaser by recording. This is exactly like real
property. A mortgagee need not file to protect itself against a later
creditor by attachment or levy, but must file to protect against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser by reason of judicial sale. This is a
fundamental difference between lien creditors and bona fide
purchasers. A lien creditor primes an unrecorded security interest in
tangible personal property at the levy stage due to the apparent
ownership rule. A bona fide purchaser only primes an unrecorded
real property mortgage after judicial sale and recording due to the
actual ownership rule.
And here, Article 9 and federal information law irretrievably
part company. Article 9 does not protect a perfected security interest
against a "buyer in the ordinary course." Why? Because no buyer
would drive a car off a dealer's lot if the buyer thought the car could
be repossessed because the dealer did not pay its lender. 5 Practical
inventory financing requires Article 9 to provide a super priority to
the buyer in the ordinary course, who is a variant on the theme of the
bona fide purchaser.346 Such a buyer takes free of a security interest
created by a seller even though it is perfected and the buyer knows
about it.347 There is no analogous concept of a "licensee in the
ordinary course" for intellectual property!"8 Under the federal
information recording acts, a subsequent transferee who knows about
a prior security interest cannot be a bona fide purchaser by definition
and certainly cannot prevail over a prior patent or copyright
343. See e.g. S. Bay Enter., 957 S.W.2d at 287.
344. CMS Indus., Inc. v. L.P.S. Intl., Ltd., 643 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981).
345. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 26.1; Clark, supra n. 45, at 3.04.
346. Clark, supra n. 45, at 3.04.
347. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1998).
348. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.F.
mortgage. 349
This is a fundamental difference between the real property and
intellectual property recording acts, on the one hand, and the Article
9 personal property filing scheme on the other. It brings us to the
most powerful opponent any secured creditor ever faces.
F. The Bankruptcy Trustee
1. The Strong Arm Power
Surely the gut question for any financier is how to trump the
bankruptcy trustee. For information, this will require a filing. For
tangible personal property, the trustee is treated as a lien creditor, so
filing under Article 9 is an appropriate way to perfect. For real
property, the trustee has the status of a bona fide purchaser, and the
real property track registers are the place to file. So where should a
creditor file for information - in the federal track registers, or the
state filing systems? Since the federal information acts operate like
real property recording acts, it would seem that a federal filing is
necessary. And so it is. The reason derives from a third status the
trustee has under the Bankruptcy Code, one often overlooked but of
long standing import where information is concerned: the unsatisfied
execution creditor.
The trustee's lien avoidance powers derive from the "strong
arm" powers in Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code:35
Section 544
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and
without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or any creditor, the
rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the
debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
by -
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a
creditor on a simple contract could have obtained a judicial lien,
whether or not such creditor exists;
349. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d); In re AEG Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. 34, n. 8 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1991) (copyrights); 35 U.S.C. § 261; Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1573-74
(patents).
350. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West). Under Section 541, commencement of a case
creates an estate vested with all property of the debtor subject to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. The estate property is limited to the extent it would be in the hands of
the debtor. Collier, supra n. 239, at 541.04. Under Section 70a of the prior Bankruptcy
Act, the trustee also took tile subject to all pre-existing obligations of the debtor. In re
Pubs, Inc., 618 F.2d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 1980). Under Section 541, the estate is not a bona
fide purchaser.
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(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, an execution; against the debtor that is
returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such creditor
exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from
the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be
perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has
perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the
case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
Under Section 544(a)(1), the trustee is a lien claimant, in Article
9 terms a "lien creditor," who has obtained a lien on the collateral by
attachment or levy. Under Section 544(a)(2); however, the trustee is
an unsatisfied execution creditor, that is, a creditor who does not
have a lien. The editors of Collier describe what this means:
Section 544(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee
has the right of a creditor with a lien return unsatisfied...,. The
effect of the trustee having a writ of execution returned unsatisfied
is not to give the trustee any kind of lien, but to vest the trustee
with the equitable rights of a hypothetical creditor with a writ of
execution unsatisfied, that is a creditor who has exhausted its legal
remedies.35'
Numerous decisions say that under Section 544(a) the trustee is
merely a lien creditor under applicable state law.. This, however,, is
only an approximation of the truth. The correct rule is that Section
544(a) gives the trustee all lien avoidance- powers available to any
creditor under applicable non-bankruptcy law. "All lien avoidance
power" means that the trustee can exercise all available powers to
avoid secret liens. For example, where applicable law gives a
judgment lien on docketing the judgment, or an execution:lien on
delivery of the fieri facias to the sheriff, that 'alone is insufficient to
perfect the lien against prior unrecorded security interests. To perfect
the lien requires a levy, so the trustee is deemed to be a creditor who
has proceeded to levy.352 If applicable law gives a creditor the
avoidance power of a bona fide purchaser, then the trustee is a bona
fide purchaser.353 The "available to any creditor" test means that the
351. King, supra n. 239, 5.44.06, at 544-10-11.
352. See infra n. 360 and cited cases.
353. See Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Parsons, 32 F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1929) (holding that
under Massachusetts law, judgment creditor had avoidance power of bona fide purchaser,
so trustee has such power as well); In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 (D. Ore. 1948) (same
under Oregon law). These cases were decided under the earlier Bankruptcy Act of 1898. I
have not researched Massachusetts or Oregon law to determine whether the statutes have
changed. Perhaps they have. The point remains, however, that if applicable law allows a
creditor the avoidance power of a bona fide purchaser, then the trustee has such power as
well.
trustee also has all the powers of equitable execution given to an
unsatisfied execution creditor, including the power to commence and
conclude a creditor's bill or supplemental proceeding as necessary to
defeat a secret lien. Finally, the trustee's powers arise not merely
under state law, but rather under non-bankruptcy law, which includes
cases where another federal statute applies. 54
Intellectual property in general, and federal intellectual property
in particular, is precisely the situation contemplated by Section
544(a)(2). A judgment creditor reaches intellectual property through
equitable proceedings after an execution has been returned
unsatisfied.355 For federal information, this procedure is mandatory
due to the statutory signature requirements. 56 Congress enacted
Section 544(a)(2) specifically to give the trustee the lien avoidance
powers of an unsatisfied execution creditor in such a case.357
As an unsatisfied execution creditor, the trustee is deemed to
have taken all steps necessary to perfect against all prior interests. To
do so via a creditor's bill, supplemental proceeding, or appointment
of a receiver, the creditor must proceed to judicial sale. 5' The trustee,
as, the ideal creditor, irreproachable and without notice,359 must be
deemed to have done so?6 The next question is whether the trustee
should be deemed to have recorded in any appropriate register. In re
Peregrine held that the trustee was deemed to have recorded in the
Copyright Office since this was necessary to prevail over a prior
copyright security interest only recorded in the state records.
Peregrine relied on Sampsell v. Straub3 61 which held, under the prior
Bankruptcy Act, that the trustee was deemed to have recorded an
abstract of judgment since this was necessary to trump a homestead
declaration, even though recording was voluntary under state law.
354. King, supra n. 239, at 544.02 n. 7 and cases cited.
355. See supra n. 249 and accompanying text.
356. See supra n. 328 and accompanying text; see also Bramson, supra n. 11, at 1597.
357. See King, supra n. 239, $ 544.02 at 544-12.
358. See supra n. 254 and accompanying text.
359. Matter of Feldman, 54 B.R. 659, 660 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1985).
360. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 194, n. 19 (holding that under § 544(a) trustee deemed to
have exercised rights in their entirety); Matter of Spain, 55 B.R. 849, 855 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1985) (involving a trustee as execution creditor who has proceeded to levy and sale);
Matter of Feldman, 54 B.R. at 660 (holding that a trustee, as executing creditor under
544(a)(2), prevails over unexecuting creditors); see also former Bankruptcy Act §
70(a)(5) (vesting the trustee with "... all property which [the bankrupt] could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him" (Emphasis added)).
361. Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927
(1952).
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Indeed, under prior law, the trustee was deemed superior to a
copyright mortgage not recorded in the Copyright Office, even
though it was recorded in the state filing system. 2
In re AEG Acquisition Corp.3 63 noted that Section 544(a)(3) gives
the trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser for real property
because "under state recording acts such a purchaser cannot defeat
the interests of a prior perfected interest holder in the property.""
On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code does not give such status
for personal property because a buyer in the ordinary course, which
includes a bona fide purchaser, can defeat a perfected security
interest in personal property.365 Concluding that under the Copyright
Act, like real property, a bona fide purchaser cannot prime a
perfected copyright security interest, AEG concluded that Section
544(a) "gives statutory satisfaction to the trustee," i.e. treats the
trustee as a recording transferee for value and without knowledge
under Section 205 of the Copyright Act.366
Section 544 gives the trustee all the avoidance powers of an ideal
unsatisfied creditor under applicable law, and where that law gives
such a creditor the avoidance power of a bona fide purchaser, then
the trustee has that power as well.367 The federal information statutes
are such laws. In Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc. ,368 the Federal
Circuit held that section 261 of the Patent "adopts the principle of the
real property recording acts" and, "[a]lthough the statute does not
expressly so say, it is clear that the statute is intended to cut off prior
legal interests, which the common law rule did not. 3 69 That the
federal statutes protection execution sale purchasers was affirmed in
CMS Industries, Inc. v. L.P.S. International, Ltd.37° If a judgment
creditor can avoid an unrecorded patent interest by proceeding to
362. See In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 886 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied sub nom.; Green
v. Felder, 256 U.S. 704 (1921); see Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 13.3. at 412.
363. 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), affd, 161 B.R. 50 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
364. Id. at 43.
365. Id. at 43. Technically, Article 9 gives priority to a "buyer in the ordinary course."
While they are not the same, since a bona fide purchaser is without notice, a bona fide
purchaser can certainly be a buyer in the ordinary course.
366. Id.; accord In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 520-521 (Bankr. Ariz. 1997)
(holding that the Copyright Act preempts state law for perfecting security interest in
copyrighted works).
367. See supra n. 353 and cited cases.
368. 939 F.2d 1568, 1573-1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 988 F.2d 129; see also
Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 4.5.3.4 (2d ed. 1996) (copyright system operates like "real
property recording acts").
369. Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1573-1574.
370. 643 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981).
judicial sale and recording, the trustee should be deemed to have
done so. This was the pre-Code rule as well.371
Under Section 544(a)(2) the trustee has the status, of an
unsatisfied execution creditor whether or not such creditor exists.
Federal information, as a national intangible, can be reached
wherever the judgment creditor can obtain in personam
jurisdiction.372 Assume a lender, files a financing statement in
California covering the information of a California debtor. The
debtor then licenses the information for use in Michigan, e.g. its
copyrighted movie, or its patented snowplow, or its trademarked
fishing gear. Assume further that a Michigan creditor could obtain
personal jurisdiction over the debtor and a judgment there. Michigan
does not allow execution on an intangible; it requires use of a
supplemental proceeding that does not produce a lien. Such a
Michigan creditor could only trump the prior security interest in
federal information by proceeding to judicial sale and recording in
the federal registers. Under Section 544(a)(2), if such a Michigan
creditor can exist, and in an age of long-arm jurisdiction such a
creditor certainly can, then the trustee must be deemed to be that
creditor and to have so acted.
What this all means is that a creditor taking a security interest in
a copyright, patent or federal trademark should prevail against the
strong arm power of the bankruptcy trustee under Section 544(a)(2)
only by recording in the appropriate federal filing office.
2. Some Bankruptcy History
This result is consistent with historic bankruptcy practice. The
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 vested the trustee with all copyrights and
patents of the debtor.3 73 The trustee's interest prevailed over a later
recording bona fide purchaser.7' Under section 70a of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the trustee was vested with all rights of the
bankrupt to "interests in patents, patent rights, copyrights and trade-
marks. 3 75 In addition, section 70(a)(5) vested the trustee with "...
all property which he [the bankrupt] could by any means have
371. See supra n. 109 and accompanying text regarding In re Leslie-Judge.
372. See supra n. 218 and cases cited.
373. Bankr. Act of 1867, Pub. L. No. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), reprinted in Collier
on Bankruptcy 1753 (14th ed.).
374. See Prime v. Brandon Mfg. Co., 19 Fed. Cases 1324, 1326 (D.C. Vt. 1879)
(holding that a trustee prevails over post-petition recorded patent assignment).
375. Bankr. Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 541,§ 70, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) reprinted in Collier,
supra n. 373, at 1824.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [23:195
2001] FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 279
transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under
judicial process against him. 3 76
Under section 70(a)(5), the trustee took only the title of the
debtor. However, in the case of a fraudulent conveyance, the debtor
retained an equitable title that a creditor could attach and use to
avoid a secret lien.377 The courts looked to non-bankruptcy law to
determine the extent of this avoidance power. York Manufacturing
Co. v. Cassell"7 held that the trustee could not invoke an Ohio statute
that invalidated an unrecorded conditional sales contract only against
lien creditors, since the trustee did not have such a lien.3 79 However,
Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand3" held that the trustee could rely
on a Wisconsin statute that invalidated an undelivered pledge against
all creditors, and Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co.3"' also allowed the
trustee the benefit of a similar law making an unrecorded chattel
mortgage void against all creditors.
Since the laws of many states only invalidated secret liens against
creditors who obtained a lien on personal property by attachment or
levy,382 in 1910 Congress added Section 47a(2), the "strong arm"
provision, to the Bankrupt Act. It gave the trustee the avoidance
powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings
or having an execution returned unsatisfied.383 In 1938, the Chandler
376. See also Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60 (1926) (holding that trade names
also passed to the trustee under the principle of ejusdem generis.)
377. See generally Collier, supra n.373, at 583-586.
378. 201 U.S. 344 (1906).
379. The Ohio statute provided that an unrecorded conditional sales contract was void
against "subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, and creditors." See York,
201 U.S. at 344, n. 1 (setting out the terms of the statute). The York court, looking to an
off-hand remark of the Ohio Supreme Court in interpreting this statute, said that the term
"creditor" meant someone who had "fastened upon the property" by some specific lien.
The Court held that the mere filing of bankruptcy did not create a specific lien by
attachment, and the trustee was not vested with title to the estate as a bona fide
purchaser, so the Ohio statute was inapplicable. It was apparent that the Court was
straining to protect a rather naive vendor under the conditional sales contract against
some sharp practices that had led to the vendee's bankruptcy. Had the Court read the
Ohio statute as applying to any "creditor," as it said on its face, then the trustee, as a
"creditor" under Section 70a(5), would have prevailed.
380. 206 U.S. 415 (1907).
381. 216 U.S. 545 (1910).
382. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 15.1 at 465 ("Without exception all filing statutes
provide that unfiled interests are void against good faith purchasers of the collateral.
There is no such unanimity in the treatment of which types of creditors, under various
statutory formulas, are untitled to prevail over unfiled interests.").
383. See Collier, supra n. 373, at 564-566. As the statutory drafters explained: "[A]s to
property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, the trustee should stand in the
position of a judgment creditor holding an execution returned unsatisfied, thus entitling
Act moved Section 47a(2) to Section 70c with minor clarifications.3"
It also added Section 60a, treating the trustee as a bona fide
purchaser for voidable preferences. This caused considerable
heartburn due to the Klauder decision,"' so a 1950 amendment
changed the trustee's status in Section 60a to a lien creditor.386 In light
of this change, Congress decided to make the trustee a lien creditor
for all of the bankrupt's property, and thus removed the part of
Section 70c treating the trustee as an unsatisfied execution creditor.387
Due to criticism,388 the trustee's status as an unsatisfied execution
creditor was restored in 1966.389 Section 70c is the basis for Section
544 of the current Bankruptcy Code.
From its inception, the strong arm power gave the trustee the
ability of any creditor to attack "the evil of secret liens."3" This was
deemed both necessary and fair, since other creditors of the debtor
were prohibited from acting on their own due to the automatic stay.391
Since a judgment creditor could only reach intellectual property by
equitable execution after legal remedies were exhausted, and since
such a creditor only trumped prior secret liens by proceeding to
judicial sale, it is appropriate to treat the trustee as a recording
execution sale purchaser where intellectual property is concerned.
Such treatment makes all parts of Section 544 consistent. A lien
creditor obtains apparent ownership of tangible personal property by
taking possession through attachment or levy, thereby perfecting the
creditor's rights against prior unrecorded interests. An unsatisfied
execution creditor acquires actual ownership of intellectual property
by obtaining a court ordered transfer and recording,392 thereby
him to proceed precisely as an individual creditor might have done to subject assets. In
this way, in effect, proceedings in bankruptcy will give to creditors the same rights that
creditors under the state law would have had if there had been no bankruptcy, and from
which they are debarred by the bankruptcy." Id. at 567 n. 6.
384. Id. at 564-566.
385. See supra n. 100 and accompanying text.
386. Collier, supra n.373, 70.47[3] at 569.
387. Id. at 569.
388. Id. at 566-567. Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 Ga. L.
Rev. 149, 169 (1967); James Wm. Moore and Philip W. Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy
Amendments: Improvement of Retrogression, 57 Yale L. Rev. 683, n. 33 (1948).
389. See Collier, supra n.373, 70.47[5] at 577-581.
390. Id. at 567, n. 6.
391. Id.
392. Technically, the Copyright Act requires that a later bona fide transferee record
in order to trump a prior unrecorded transfer. It is a race-notice statute. However the
Patent Act and the Lanham Act provide that even an unrecorded later bona fide
purchaser or assignee trumps a prior unrecorded transfer. They are notice statutes. For
discussion of the difference, see supra n. 45 and accompanying text.
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perfecting the creditor's rights against prior unrecorded interests. In
both cases the Bankruptcy Code perfects the trustee's interest by
providing either apparent ownership, § 544(a)(1), or actual
ownership, § 544(a)(2).393 Indeed, since federal law does not allow
apparent ownership of intellectual property, a creditor must obtain
actual ownership. This also makes section 544(a)(2) consistent with
section 544(a)(3). Section 544(a)(3) treats the trustee as a bona fide
purchaser for real property, i.e., as a creditor who has proceeded to
judicial sale and recording, as this is the only way for a judgment
creditor to trump prior unrecorded real estate liens. Since the federal
information acts operate like real property recording acts, this means
section 544(a)(2) operates like section 544(a)(3) where federal
information is concerned.394
Indeed, failure to treat the trustee as a recording execution sale
purchaser under section 544(a)(2), and hence a bona fide purchaser
under the federal information acts, deprives the trustee of any ability
to protect general creditors against secret liens of federal
information. A general creditor cannot avoid a prior unfiled security
interest by attachment or levy, because for federal information such
remedies are unavailable. A general creditor cannot void a prior
secret lien by merely initiating a creditor's bill or supplemental
proceeding, since in most states such proceedings do not create a lien;
where they do, the lien is ineffective against prior interests without
notice in any case. The only way a general creditor can be assured of
trumping a prior secret lien on federal information is to proceed to
judicial sale and recording in the federal registers. As the ideal
creditor, the trustee must be deemed to have done so.
G. Why State Filing Is Worthless or A Fraud
Earlier this article suggested that using a state filing to perfect a
security interest in federal information was either commercially
worthless or a fraud on creditors. We can now explain why.
393. Does this mean that the trustee is also an unsatisfied execution sale purchaser for
tangible personal property? Yes, but it makes no difference. An execution sale purchaser
is not a "buyer in the ordinary course" who would take free of a prior perfected security
interest. See Anderson, supra n. 73, § 1-201:129 (relying on Natl. Shawmut Bank discussed
supra n. 277). Treating the trustee as an execution purchaser for tangible personal
property gives the trustee no greater lien avoidance power than lien creditor status. But
intangible information is another matter.
394. I suggest that the same reading should apply to recording in the state trademark
registers. But that means evaluating whether enactment of original or Revised Article 9
was intended to supercede the state trademark laws. This is a matter of state law that
would need to be decided state by state.
Advocates of state filing concede that the federal statutes
require filing transfers of "title." But they argue a state filing is
sufficient because a security interest is not a "transfer of title." '395
However, secured financing comes down to one question: on
foreclosure, who owns the collateral? That is fundamentally a title
question. Rigorous application of the priority rules rules to the "no
transfer of title" hypothesis leads to absurd results, justifying its
rejection.
To take a concrete example, assume a Creditor takes a security
interest in federal information, such as a patent, filing only a UCC-1.
The Debtor declares bankruptcy after any preference period. The
Secured Creditor now seeks relief from the automatic stay to
foreclose. Who owns the information, the Creditor, the Estate or the
Trustee?
There are three basic priority rules. First is the "first in time,
first in right" or nemo dat rule. Second is the bona fide purchaser
exception to the nemo dat rule. Third is the "relation back" rule that
on foreclosure a creditor's interest relates back to whatever was
granted at the attachement date. Apply these rules to determine
ownership.
Under Bankruptcy Code 541(a)3 6 upon filing the petition the
Debtor's interest in the information vested in the bankruptcy Estate.
The Estate is neither the Trustee nor the pre-petition Debtor but a
separate legal entity.3'9 The Estate is a purchaser, but not a bona fide
purchaser, so it may not use the second rule to trump the Creditor.
On foreclosure the Creditor's security interest should relate back to
the attachment date and take priority over the Estate (but not the
Trustee) under the nemo dat rule in what was conveyed as collateral.
But by hypothesis the collateral under the security interest was
not a transfer of title. Hence, the Estate owns the title to the
information subject to whatever the security interest was. Since it
was not a transfer of title (collateral assignment) it must be a license.
Such a "security license" must be non-exclusive, because an exclusive
license is a transfer of title398 which by hypothesis the security interest
395. E.g. William C. Hillman, Documenting Secured Transactions 2-19 to 2-20 (1998):
"A security interest is not an 'assignment, grant or conveyance' of a patent. Patent law...
distinguishes 'assignments' of patents (of which 'grants' and 'conveyances' are specific
types) from all other transfers (which are called 'licenses)." As discussed above, this
reasoning is incorrect under Article 9 in any case. See supra n. 177 and accompanying
text.
396 11 U.S.C.A. 541(a).
397 In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358, 371 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1996).
398 Copyrights: 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of transfer of ownership); Patent Act: 35
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is not. This 'means the Estate can grant other non-exclusive licenses,
or transfer title, subject to the security license, it keeps all the income
due to Bankruptcy Code § 522 3" A non-exclusive information license
is not transferable without consent of the information owner under
federal law, so the the Creditor may not be able to foreclose its
"security license" absent the Estate's consent4 ° Finally, the "security
license" would be an executory contract deemed rejected by the
Trutsee °.4 1 The Creditor can either treat the "security license" as
terminated in which case it become an unsecured creditor, or keep it
in force but waive any right to further payment by the Estate .40
Such a non-exclusive, non-transferrable, non-paying "security
license" is to all intents and purposes commercially worthless.4 3
It would not help the Creditor to argue that on foreclosure its
security interest was a transfer of title. Under Article 9-504(4), a
foreclosing Creditor takes the "all of the debtor's rights" in the
collateral." But on the foreclosure date the Debtor owns nothing in
the information. Its rights have transferred to the Estate, a separate
legal entity. Under Article 9-306(2), a security interest continues in
collateal notwithstanding its disposition. This means the Estate takes
the collateral - title to the information - subject to what the security
interest was when it attached, which is not a transfer of title.
The only way the Creditor can prevail against the Estate is to
argue that although its security interest was not a transfer of title
when it attached; it transmorgified into one on foreclosure that
related back to become a transfer of title as of the attachment date.
U.S.C. § 261.
399. 11 U.S.C.A § 522. A security interest only attaches to post-petition proceeds of
pre-petition collateral. Since the pre-petitiofi security interest did not attach to the title,
the Creditor is not entitled to the Estate's proceeds from licensing its title interest. See
Revised 9 Financing, supra n. 9, § II.H.l.e..
400. E.g. In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc. 165 F3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999) (patent).
See Revised 9 Financing, supra n. 9, § II.H.l.a. If the security interest authorized a
foreclosure sale, this could be conducted, but the sale'purchaser could not make a further
transfer.
401. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(d)(1). Since the security interest requires on-going obligations
by the Debtor, e.g. paying the secured debt, protecting the collateral, it is executory. See
In re Qintex Entertainment, Inc., 950 F.2d. 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991).
402. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(n)(1)(A) (license terminated) & § 365(n)(2)(C) (license in
effect).
403. A "security license" in a patent or trademark need not be recorded federally,
since the Patent Act and the Lanham Act do not cover licenses. So the Creditor will have
priority over the Trustee, i.e. the Trustee cannot use the "strong arm" power to set aside
the "security license." So what? A bona fide assignee takes subject to pre-existing licenses
anyway. Why Corp. v. Super Ironer Corp.; 128 F.2d 539, 541 (6th Cir. 1942). The
"security license" is still no more than that.
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Not only is it contradictory to argue that a security interest both is
and is not a transfer of title, but such a relation back rule defrauds
the public.
As discussed above, intellectual property infringement is a strict
liability tort.4" The public user therefore needs to find out who owns
the information in order to obtain a use authorization to avoid an
infringement claim. This is precisely why Waterman v. McKenzie held
it essential to determine whether the mortgagor or mortgagee has
"possession" - so the public user knows where to get a license.4 5 A
public user searches the title ownership records in the federal tract
record to find out who owns and administers the information. If the
security instrument says the creditor has "possession" - administers
the information - then the public user must obtain a license from the
creditor, but knows that if debt is repaid, the license remains good
since the debtor consented to the creditor's administration. This is
precisely what Waterman held. Alternatively, if the debtor
administers the information, then on foreclosure the creditor takes
subject to licenses made by the debtor since the creditor consented to
the administration by the debtor. It is a simple, pragmatic approach
that protects the public.
If a security interest relates back and becomes as transfer of title
as of the attachment date, then this wipes out the Estate's interest
under the nemo dat rule. But it also wipes out all licenses and
transfers made by the Debtor after the attachment date too,
including those to public users who took their licenses from the
Debtor in reliance on the federal filings. It means the public cannot
rely on the federal system for accurate data about who owns the
information, defrauding the public user who relies on that data and
opening the door for whipsaw infringement claims.
It cannot be both ways. If a secured creditor wants to have
priority over later transferees of title to the information, then the
secured creditor must enter the priority line-up with everyone else by
recording its claim to that title in the federal system. Trying to justify
perfecting an information security interest against later creditors on
the grounds that it is not a "transfer of title" either makes the
security interest worthless or defrauds the public. A security interest
in federal information must be recorded in the federal system to gain
priority over subsequent creditors, including a bankruptcy trustee.
Unfortunately, the case law on this point has become hopelessly
404. See supra n. 208 and accompanying text.
405. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 260-261. See supra n. 167 and accompanying text.
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confused with different results in the copyright, patent and trademark
cases. This has become something of a judicial embarrassment, since
all three statutes use comparable filing language and recording
systems. This brings us to the concluding section of this long history,
an examination of the financing procedures under the current federal
information acts.
H. Current Federal Statutory Structure
It will help to compare the structure of the Copyright Act, the
Patent Act and the Lanham Act, and then contrast them with state
secured financing law reflected in original Article 9.
1. Copyright Act
The recording provisions in the Copyright Act have remained
consistent since their initial enactment in the Act of 1870. The
original provision read:
The Act of 1870:
Sec. 89. And be it further enacted, That copyrights shall be
assignable in law, by any instrument in writing, and such assignment
shall be recorded in the office of the librarian of Congress within
sixty days after its execution, in default of which it shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable
consideration, without notice. '
This provision continued in the 1909 Act without significant
change:
Copyright Act of 1909:
Sec. 44: Every assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the
copyright office within three calendar months after its execution in
the United States or within six calendar months after its execution
without the limits of the United States, in default of which it shall
be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a
valuable consideration, without notice, whose assignment has been
duly recorded.
40 7
An amendment in 1947 renumbered this as Section 30. Section
42 was amended to add "or mortgagee" to the rules regarding
assignments of copyrights to indicate that they included mortgages,
although this was merely considered a restatement of existing law.4
The 1976 Act changed the language, but not the substance, of
these provisions in Section 205 of the current Copyright Act. It
provides:
406. Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198 § 89 (emphasis added).
407. This provision was section 42 of the original 1909, but was renumbered without
change to section 30 in the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 660.
408. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Natl. Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952).
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Copyright Act of 1976 Act, Section 205:
(d) As between two conflicting transfers, the one first executed
prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive
notice under subsection (c), within one month after its execution in
the United States or within two months after its execution outside
the United States, or ant any time before recordation in such
manner of the later transfer. Otherwise, the later transfer prevails if
recorded first in such manner and if taken in good faith, for
valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to pay
royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.
(e) A nonexclusive license, whether recorded or not, prevails over a
conflicting transfer of copyright ownership if the license is
evidenced by a written instrument signed by the owner of the rights
licensed or such owner's duly authorized agent, and if,
(1) the license was taken before execution of the transfer; or
(2) the license was taken in good faith before recordation of
the transfer and without notice of it.
There is some belief that Section 205 makes security transfers in
the current Copyright Act "more comprehensive" than the
companion provisions in the Patent Act and the Lanham Act. This is
alleged because the Copyright Act mentions "hypothecation,"
whereas the Patent Act does not, and "mortgage" whereas the
Lanham does not. Functionally, however, all three statutes, at least as
Congress wrote them, operate identically. The changed language in
the Copyright Act had nothing to do with the mortgage provisions. It
was directed at an entirely different problem: the indivisibility
doctrine.
Under Waterman, a patent, and by extension a copyright due to
the similarity in statutory language, was considered indivisible, so
that an assignment of less than the entire bundle of rights was only a
license.' Unlike patents, however, before 1978 copyrights were
covered by a dual system of state common law and federal statutory
copyright. The indivisibility doctrine caused a numerous problems
under this dual system.41° In 1976 Act, Congress eliminated it for
copyrights.' Since the basic purpose of the doctrine was to
determine standing to sue, its elimination meant that both assignees
and exclusive licensee could sue for infringement of their rights.4 12 A
new term was needed to cover both such parties, so Congress added
409. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 10.01[A].
410. Id. at §§ 10.01[A], 10.0[C].
411. See 17 U.S:C. § 201(d)(2); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 10.01[B]; Harold
R. Weinberg and William J. Woodward, Jr., Legislative Process and Commercial Law:
Lessons from the Copyright Act of 1976 And the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Bus. Law.
437 (1993).
412. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 10.02[A].
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"transfer of copyright ownership" to the Act. It means "an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance,
alienation or hypothecation of a copyright of any of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright." '13 A copyright ownership transfer is
now broader than a patent ownership transfer (assignment or grant)
in the sense that it covers exclusive licenses, which its patent cousin
does not. But the rule for mortgages is the same as those in the 1909
Act. 14
Under the 1909 Act, recording in the Copyright Office Was the
only way to perfect a mortgage in a statutory - federal - copyright.15
When the 1978 act replaced all state common law copyright with a
federal statutory copyright,4 6 Congress had no need to make the
mortgage recording and priority provisions "more comprehensive"
since they already preempted state law filing schemes for statutory
copyrights. 17 So why was "hypothecation" included? It means, "to
pledge property as security for a debt. 418 Under the 1909 Act, it was
doubtful whether it was even possible to make an effective security
transfer of a common law copyright.41'9  An influential article
suggested trying a pledge, although acknowledging that intangibles
could not really be "pledged. '42' The reason Congress included
"hypothecation" in the 1978 Copyright Act was to extend federal
validation even to doubtful state security constructs, 41' not to removeexisting support for traditional copyright mortgages - and patent or
413. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 10.02
414. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at §§ 10.05[A], 10.07[A] (current act applies
to "a subsequent transferees (including a mortgagee)"), 10.07[A][1][b] (both acts "similar
in broad strokes" with only technical differences); Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 4.5.3.4 (2d
ed. 1996) (Section 205 of the Copyright Act acts "like real property recording acts;"
substance unchanged from prior law).
415. See In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 886 (2d Cir. 1921) cert. denied sub nom. Green
v. Felder, 256 U.S. 704 (1921); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 10.05[A].
416. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 101[B]
417. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 10.05[A].
418. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199.
419. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 19, at § 10.05[B].
420. See Leon Kaplan, Literary and Artistic Property (Including Copyright) as
Security: Problems Facing the Lender, 19 L. & Contemp. Probs. 254, 271-273 (1954);
Gilmore, supra n. 7, at § 19.8.
421. For a history, see Weinberg & Woodward, supra n. 411, at 463-464.
"Hypothecation" was suggested by Edward A. Sargoy and adopted by the Registrar of
Copyrights. At that time, the states were having some difficulty in dealing with security
transfers of common law copyrights, experimenting with pledges and trust instruments.
Hypothecation was added to dispel any doubts that all state security transfers were
included in a "transfer of copyright ownership." Technically, of course, the only proper
method of financing an information intangible was through a collateral assignment
operating as a "mortgage," not by a "pledge."
trademark mortgages to boot.
In Peregrine422 Judge Kozinski gave a masterful elucidation of
why copyright security interests must be perfected by filing in the
Copyright Office. The copyright law ensures predictability and
certainty of copyright ownership, promotes national uniformity, and
avoids the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing author's
rights under various state laws. '23 For such a system to work, the
priority line-up must be established in a single place because
copyrights, unlike industrial goods, have a chain of title. This is why
dual filing systems are "scarce as hen's teeth." '424 Can you imagine the
fistfights if there were two separate lines to buy the same ticket to the
Super Bowl? Peregrine also held that "because a copyright entitles
the holder to receive all income derived from the display of a creative
work, an agreement creating a security interest in copyright
receivables generated by a copyright may also be recorded in the
Copyright Office." '25 This follows directly from original Article 9-
306(3), which says that a security interest in proceeds is continually
perfected if the security interest in the original collateral was
perfected. Since a proper recording in the Copyright Office perfects
in the copyright, it must then perfect in the royalties - proceeds -
from its disposition by licensing.
In re AEG Acquisition Corp.42 6 reached the same result, holding
that a filing in the Copyright Office was necessary for both U.S. and
Berne Convention works in order for a security interest to defeat
U.S. the bankruptcy trustee. In re Avalon Software42 also held that a
federal filing is necessary to perfect a security interest in a copyright
and its proceeds. What if the work is not registered in the Copyright
Office? In that case, due to Section 205(c) of the Copyright Act, the
filing does not impart constructive notice. Does that mean that a
secured creditor can perfect a security interest in an unregistered
work under state law? Avalon correctly held not. "A product which is
entitled to be registered in the U.S. Copyright Office, but is not," said
the Avalon court, "does not carry a different 'label' or become
something different because it was not registered in the Copyright
422. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 194, n. 19.
423. Id. at 194.
424. Id. at 195; see also Brennan, supra n. 9 (discussing problems with dual filing
systems).
425. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 194.
426. 127 B.R. 34.
427. Avalon Software, 209 B.R. 517.
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Office." 28 If a secured creditor wants to perfect a security interest in
an unregistered work, the creditor must take the simple steps of
ensuring that the work is registered and its security interest property
recorded.
Peregrine, AEG and Avalon establish a consistent and straight-
forward system for perfecting security interests in copyrights,
copyright licenses, and their royalties: register the work and record in
the Copyright Office. Certainly, this has been the practice of
sophisticated financiers in the motion picture industry for decades.
For the four factors discussed above, this single filing system provides
a cost-effective and efficient system for financing national assets like
copyrights. Recently, however, two decisions have unfortunately
reached questionable results - one with regard to unregistered
copyrights, the other for royalties under nonexclusive licenses.
Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World
Auxiliary Power Co.)42 9 held that a security interest in an unregistered
copyright could be perfected against a bankruptcy trustee merely by
filing a UCC financing statement. This case is plainly wrong: a
creditor cannot perfect a security interest in an unregistered
copyright. At least since Leslie-Judge, the only way to perfect a
security interest in a statutory (federal) copyright is to file federally.
As Avalon holds, there is no distinction between registered and
unregistered works. When the U.S. adhered to the Berne
Convention, Congress eliminated registration as a condition to
copyright protection."3 However, Congress was concerned that
elimination altogether could have deleterious effects. First, it could
reduce the incentive to deposit works in the Library of Congress.43'
Second, it could enable unscrupulous parties without cognizable
claims of copyright to forego registration and exploit a presumption
of copyright ownership to the disadvantage of legitimate business and
the public.432 Congress therefore retained registration as a condition
to certain remedies as an incentive to register. Retaining it for
perfecting a security interest serves a similar function, ensuring that
428. Id. at 521.
429. As of this writing, the decision is on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
430. This was required as a condition of adherence, since the Convention prohibits the
imposition of any formalities to secure copyright protection. See Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra n. 19, at § 7.16[B][1]b].
431. See Sen. Rpt. 352, 100th Cong., 21 (1988).
432. See H.R. Rpt. 609, 100th Cong. (1988) (fearing that without incentives to register
claimants without a cognizable claim to copyright could nonetheless exploit discovery and
other legal processes to extract settlements and cause financial harm to legitimate
competition and ultimately the public).
works are deposited with the Library and that copyright owners
indicate to the public legitimate claims of copyright ownership.
In fact, the holding in Aercon Engineering arguably allows fraud
on creditors and the public. Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
gives the trustee all powers of any creditor to avoid secret liens. As
Peregrine held, this means the trustee is deemed a "transferee" under
the Copyright Act 433 who has duly recorded since this is necessary to
perfect. If registration is necessary to make the recording effective,
then the trustee must be deemed to have registered as well, especially
since Section 408(a) of the Copyright Act would authorize the trustee
to do so. Aercon Engineering is therefore holding, in effect, that a
copyright security interest that is not recorded in the Copyright
Office nonetheless trumps a subsequent ownership transfer that is
recorded. Allowing unrecorded transfers priority over later recorded
ones works the very fraud on creditors and the public that the federal
filing system is intended to eradicate.
Some lenders claim that nonetheless it is "too burdensome" to
register a copyright.434 One complaint is that their borrowers refuse to
register. However, under Section 408(a) of the Copyright Act, any
"owner" of a copyright or any of the exclusive rights, which includes
a mortgagee, can effect a registration .4 " They also complain that, in
the case of software, a developer is constantly making new upgrades,
all of which would need to be registered. But as Avalon noted,
incremental upgrades are valueless without the right to exploit the
underlying work.436 Moreover, the court recognized a limited
"relation-back" for security interests duly filed against an underlying
work for derivative works.437 The copyright laws are not written for
the convenience of lenders. Copyright serves a public function, and
the public has an interest in knowing whether a copyright is subject to
a security interest. Registration is essential for effective public notice
433. Peregrine said the trustee obtained this status as a lien creditor since the
definition of "hypothecation" in the Copyright Act would include lienors. As suggested in
the text starting at n. 360, supra, in fact the trustee obtains this status as an unsatisfied
execution creditor who has proceeded to judicial sale. Same result, different reason.
434. See e.g. Reiley, supra n. 11, § 16.11 at 16-20: "With respect to unregistered
copyrights, Peregrine is an example of a judicial decision out of touch with industry
realities." The author proceeds to list the "difficulties" discussed in the text.
435. A registration usually requires a deposit of a "best edition" of a work. A lender
should be allowed to obtain a copy of the collateral under the loan agreement. Moreover,
the Copyright Office has a procedure allowing a registrant to waive the deposit provided
it is made available on request. The other alternative, of course, is simply not to include
the copyright in the collateral base.
436. Avalon Software, 209 B.R. at 519.
437. Id. at 520.
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of the financing and thus part of the price for making the loan. There
is no public policy in favor of relieving lenders of the minimal burden
necessary to achieve this.
Turning to the question of royalties, a case that reaches the right
result, but for the wrong reasons, is Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch.438
Miller, a songwriter, was entitled to performance royalties from BMI.
He assigned them to Hirsch, who duly notified BMI. The IRS later
asserted deficiencies against Miller, and sought to claim the royalties.
The IRS first asserted that under Peregrine the right to royalties had
to be perfected by filing in the Copyright Office. Since the IRS was
deemed to have recorded, while Hirsch had not, the IRS claimed it
prevailed under Section 205(d). In a questionable ruling, the Ninth
Circuit asserted that royalties "are not assignments of copyrights or
interests in copyrights," that need to be recorded, despite the express
statutory language in section 501(b) granting authors a beneficial
interest in the copyright to collect their royalties.439 In fact, the IRS
lien was a statutory "transfer" of Miller's copyright interest that
would take priority over an unrecorded security transfer - unless an
exemption existed in the Copyright Act. Such an exemption does
exist in Section 205(e). ' That section provides that a prior Written
nonexclusive license prevails over a later transfer of ownership,
whether or not the nonexclusive license is recorded.
By law, the BMI public performance license was non-exclusive."
Hence, under Section 205(e), the BMI license, and the royalties due
under it, did not need to be recorded to gain priority over the later
transfer of ownership to the IRS. In evaluating the assignment, the
Court asked whether, under New York law, it was a "sale" or an
"unperfected security interest."442 The issue was irrelevant,' since
Article 9, if applicable, would apply to both. But Article 9 did not
apply because the royalties were not an account that required a filing
to perfect.43 Since Hirsch had given notice of the assignment to BMI,
Hirsch's was perfected against the subsequent transfer to the IRS
without the necessity of filing either in the Copyright: Office or
pursuant to Article 9.
438. 104 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 1997).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1166.
441. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
442. Hirsch, 104 F.3d at 1167.
443. See supra n. 120 and accompanying text.
2. The Patsent Act
The recording provisions in the Patent Act have remained a
kissing cousin of those in the Copyright Act from their inception. It
starts with the Act of 1870:
The Act of 1870:
Sec. 36. And be it further enacted, That every patent or any interest
therein shall be assignable in law, by an instrument in writing; and
the patentee or his assigns or legal representatives may, in like
manner, grant and convey an exclusive right under this patent to
the whole or any specified part of the United States; and said
assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the patent office within three
months of the date thereof."
In the Act of 1922, this provision was amended to read:
The Act of 1922:
Sec. 4898. Every patent or any interest therein shall be assignable in
law, by an instrument in writing; and the patentee or his assigns or
legal representatives may, in like manner, grant and convey an
exclusive right under this patent to the whole or any specified part
of the United States. An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be
void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a
valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the
Patent Office within three months of the date thereof or prior to
such subsequent purchase or mortgage.445
The current provision in Section 261 of the Patent Act provides
in relevant part:
The Patent Act of 1955 Section 261:
Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property.
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be
assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant,
patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner
grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for
patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United
States ....
An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office within three months from its date or prior to such
subsequent purchase or mortgage.
The current language remains functionally identical to that in the
Act of 1870. As the courts have long held, it operates like a real
444. Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198 § 36 (emphasis added).
445. Act of February 18, 1922, 42 Stat. 389, 391 ch. 58 § 6.
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property recording act. 46
Despite its common origin with the Copyright Act, the courts
have interpreted the Patent Act differently. The problem started with
In re Transportation Design & Technology Inc.447 The question was
whether a security interest in a patent was perfected against a
bankruptcy trustee by filing in the state UCC register or in the PTO.
The court held, unremarkably enough, that "if the secured creditor
wishes to protect itself against the debtor transferring title to the
patent to a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee who properly records,
then the secured creditor must bring its security interest (which is not
ordinarily a transfer of title) within the provisions of the Patent Act
governing transfer of title to patents.""' 8 This is certainly correct. But
the court went on to say that since the Patent Act does not
specifically mention "lien creditors," a filing in the state UCC register
was the appropriate way to perfect against a bankruptcy trustee." 9 In
Transport Design, however, the trustee, erroneously as it turned out,
proceeded solely as a "lien creditor" under Section 544(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code. No one bothered to ask whether, under applicable
California law at the time, the trustee could have even obtained a
judicial lien on the patent. In fact, he could not.4'50 And no one
considered the result had the trustee proceeded as an unsatisfied
execution creditor under Section 544(a)(2). On the narrowest of
grounds, Transport Design is correct that one does not record in the
PTO to prime a patent "lien creditor," not because of any lacunae in
the Patent Act, but because, for patents, there is no such animal.
The same issue reappeared in City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto
Fabric, Inc.451 Reversing a bankruptcy court's decision that a filing in
the PTO was necessary to trump the trustee, Otto Fabric held that the
Patent Act did not apply to the bankruptcy trustee acting under
section 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. Of course, section
544(a)(3) refers to real property, not intellectual property, so again
this decision is, on the narrowest of grounds, facially correct; the
trustee goofed again. But the reasoning the court used to reach its
result leaves much to be desired. In a remark that would have sent
shudders down the spine of the drafters of the Patent Act, the court
446. See supra n. 151 and accompanying text.
447. 48 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
448. Id. at 640.
449. Id.
450. See the chart, supra n. 323 for a discussion of California; see also Brennan, supra
n. 9, at § II.C.3.b.
451. 83 B.R. 780, 782 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988).
said, "[w]hile recording as assignment with the Patent Office would
protect the assignee against the claim of a subsequent lien creditor,
the statute does not state that the assignment must be recorded to
provide such protection." ' 2 This is pure nonsense. If a statute does
not require an instrument, to be recorded, its: recording anyway is
ineffective. 3 If the Patent Act does not require a recording to prime
a subsequent creditor, then permissive recording does not do it
either. Following this with a remark that must have sent the drafters
of the "strong arm" provision spinning in their graves, it then said
that since the Patent Act did not mention liens, a patent security
interest need not be filed at all to trump the bankruptcy trustee. In
other words, Otto Fabric maintained that the Patent Act actually
endorses secret liens on patents to the detriment of later creditors.
That Congress intended the recording provisions in the Patent Act to
reverse the historic hostility to secret~liens is simply not credible 5
Recently, In re Cybernetics Services,,456  reached the same
conclusion. As of this writing, the case is on appeal. Perhaps the
Ninth Circuit will provide some needed clarification.5 7
3. The Lanham Act
The federal trademark statutes have a similar history. The first
modern federal trademark statute was passed in the 1905.458 Section
10 provided:
The Act of 1905:
Sec. 10. Every registered trade-mark and every mark for the
registration of which has been, made, together with the application
452. Id. (emphasis in original).
453. Am. Solid Leather Button Co., 47 F. at 743 (recording equitable patent mortgage
ineffective since statute did not require their recording); see also 51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens § 8
(2000).
454. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. at 782. See also Clark, supra n. 45, at 1-91, so interpreting
Otto Fabric. :
455. Two other cases also cited foi the proposition that a patent security interest is
perfected by a UCC filing do not in fact so hold. The first one, Chesapeake Fiber
Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging Corp., 143 B.R. 360 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) held that
paying past due attorneys' fees did not make someone a bona fide purchaser. within
Section 261 of Patent Act. Id. at 369. Obviously, whether the security instrument was
recordable in the PTO was irrelevant because the secured creditor won in any case. In
Charles Holt v. U.S., 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 336 (D.D.C. 1973), the question was whether a
patent "pledge" was even valid, not recordable. Although the decision references a filing,
it does not tell us whether it was in the state system or the PTO.
456. 239 B.R. 917 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1999).
457. Disclosure: I represent the trustee on appeal.
458. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724, codified 15 U.S.C. §§ 81-133 (2000). For a
history of the federal trademark statutes, see McCarthy, supra n. 16, at § 5.03.
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for registration of the same, shall be assignable in connection with
the good will of the business in which the mark, is used, by a
instrument in writing, duly acknowledged or otherwise proved,
according to the laws of the country or State in which it is executed
or made; any such assignment shall be void against any subsequent
purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless it is
recorded is recorded in the Patent Office within 3 months from the
date thereof or prior to such subsequent purchase.459
There were numerous piecemeal revisions of the federal
trademark laws until they were given a comprehensive overhaul in
the Lanham Act of 1946.46 Significant revisions were made in the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.461 The recording provisions,
however, remained consistent, at least as far as security transfers go.
The current provision now reads:
Section 1060. Assignment
(a) A registered mark or a mark for which an application toregister
has been filed shall be assignable with the good will of the business
in which the mark is used, or with that part of the good will of the
business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark....
Assignments shall be by instruments in writing duly executed ....
An assignment shall be void against any subsequent purchaser for
valuable consideration without notice, unless the prescribed
information reporting the assignment is recorded in the Patent and
Trademark Office within 3 months after the date of the subsequent
purchase or prior to.the subsequent purchase.
The Lanham Act refers to an "assignment" like the 1909
Copyright Act and the Patent Act. It does not mention "mortgage."
Does this mean the Lanham Act does not cover security transfers?
As discussed above, intangibles have always been properly financed
under the law of assignment, and collateral assignments are treated
as mortgages."2 The Lanham Act says an unrecorded assignment is
void against a subsequent "purchaser," a term that has always
included a mortgagee.463 At least facially, it would seem reasonable to
treat the Lanham Act like the Copyright Act and the Patent Act: a
recording act, like the real property recording acts, which
accommodates recording of ownership transfers ("true" assignments)
and security transfers ("collateral" assignments) against later
"purchasers" (ownership and security transferees). The cases that
have interpreted the Lanham Act, however, have concluded that a
security interest in a federal trademark must be perfected only under
459. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724 § 10.
460. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 444. See McCarthy, supra n. 16, at § 5.05[4].
461. Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935. See McCarthy, supra n. 16, at § 5.05[4].
462. See supra n. 85 and accompanying text.
463. See supra n. 77 and accompanying text.
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Article 9. The reasoning is far from persuasive.
The seminal case is a bankruptcy court decision in In re Roman
Cleanser Co.464 The court framed the issue as whether the term
"assignment" in the Lanham Act included a "security interest." The
court began with the following language from Acme Valve & Fitting
Company v. Wayne:465 "In order for a transfer of rights in a trademark
to constitute a sale or assignment, thereby vesting title to the
trademark in a party, the transfer must be absolute, and must relate to
the entire rights in the trademark. ' '4 1 It then said: "A grant of a
security interest is merely a device to secure indebtedness, an
agreement for the future assignment in the event of default and not
an absolute assignment of the trademark or the good will attached to
it.' ' 46 For this it relied on Li'l Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn System,
Inc. 468 The court concluded by noting that since many commercial
finance commentators were confused about how to perfect a
trademark security interest, filing in the. UCC was the preferable
approach to relieve them of their confusion.69
Confusion in the commercial finance bar, however, is not a
reason to abrogate what Congress has established. Acme Valve dealt
with the difference between an assignment and a license, not an
absolute assignment and a collateral assignment. 470 Li'l Barn involved
an agreement to reassign the trademark in the future in case of
default, not a security interest.47' Neither.of. these cases support
Roman Cleanser's reasoning. Moreover, that reasoning ignores the
prior authority on financing intangibles , under the law of
assignment. 472 In Waterman, the Supreme Court said that an
"absolute" assignment of a patent "being a conveyance made to
secure the payment of a debt ... was a mortgage in apt terms, and in
legal effect., 473 In Ormsby, an assignment "transferred the patent as
collateral security, or as in the way of a mortgage; it makes no
difference which. 4 74 Indeed, the chattel mortgage at issue In Re
464. 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), affd 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
465. 386 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
466. Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. at 944.
467. Id. at 945.
468. 322 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
469. Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. at 945-946.
470. Acme Valve, 386 F. Supp. at 1165.
471. L'il Red Barn, 322 F. Supp. at 106.
472. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, 13.3.
473. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 258.
474. Ormsby, 133 F. at 549.
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Leslie-Judge Co."' also covered a federal trademark, which the court
invalidated for the lack of a federal filing. Prior authority all pointed
to the fact that a security "assignment" of a federal trademark did
include a "mortgage," and that a federal filing was the only way to
perfect against a "purchaser."
To claim that a security interest is an agreement for the future
assignment in the event of default and not an absolute assignment of
the trademark defies common sense. One may see why by looking at
what happens when the secured creditor forecloses. Does the
ownership interest transferred at the foreclosure sale take effect on
the foreclosure sale date, or relate back to the recording date?
Consider the following scenario:
* On Jan. 15 the Trademark Owner (TO) duly registers a
trademark in the PTO.
* On Feb. 15, TO grants a security interest to Secured
Creditor (SC) who only files in the state UCC register.
* On Mar. 15, TO assigns the trademark to Bona Fide
Purchaser (BFP) who has no notice of the security
transfer. (The TO may have moved to another state.) BFP
records the assignment in the PTO.
* On Aug. 15 TO defaults and SC conducts a foreclosure
sale, transferring all interest in the trademark to
Foreclosure Sale Purchaser (FSP).
Now, who owns the trademark, BFP or FSP? If Roman Cleanser
is correct that a security interest is only an agreement for the future
assignment in the event of default, then the assignment to FSP
occurred on Aug. 15 when the foreclosure sale occurred. But, on that
date, TO no longer owned the trademark; it had been assigned to
BFP. The whole purpose of a security interest is to give the creditor
the right to take the debtor's interest in the collateral in the event of
default. Allowing the debtor to dispose of the collateral free of the
security interest makes any security pointless.
To avoid that result, we would need to conclude that FSP's title
to the trademark related back to the filing date, before the transfer to
BFP. There is a problem. The Lanham Act says: "An assignment
shall be void against any subsequent purchaser.., unless...
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within 3 months after
the date of he subsequent purchase or prior to the assignment., 476
475. 272 F. 886 (2d Cir. 1921) cert. denied sub nom. Green v. Felder, 256 U.S. 704
(1921).
476. 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (2000).
FSP's "purchase" was not recorded in the PTO prior to the
assignment to BFP. FSP's title relates back under state law, not
federal law. Allowing such a relation back lets state law gut the
Lanham Act.
Two different systems cannot determine one priority line up in
the same asset. One must prevail over the other. If Roman Cleanser is
right that a security interest is only a future assignment, then it has
made trademark security interests useless. If it means they relate
back under state law, then it has eliminated the PTO as a source of
reliable information about trademark ownership. Roman Cleanser's
premise - that security interests in federal trademarks can be
perfected under state law - leads to absurd results.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision in
Roman Cleanser but on narrower grounds. The trustee,
inexplicably, did not appeal the ruling about filing in the PTO, so a
bewildered Sixth Circuit said they could not consider it.4 78 Instead, it
affirmed on the ground that the security interest was not an invalid
assignment in gross because it also covered customer lists necessary
to exploit the trademarked goods. This is hardly a ringing
endorsement.
The other cases can be quickly disposed of. In re TR-3
Industries479 merely contained a stipulated statement of facts and
conclusions of law prepared by the secured creditor, not a reasoned
opinion. In re C.C. & Co.481 only repeated without analysis the
language from Roman Cleanser that a security interest is not an
assignment. In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo 1 cited Roman Cleanser,
CC& Co. and TR-3 without analysis, but found for the trustee
because the financing statement did not mention the service mark. In
re 199Z, Inc.482 again only said that trademark "assignments" are not
"security interests" and cited Roman Cleanser. Finally, In re Together
Development Corp.83 made the' remarkable claim that even filing in
the PTO was insufficient to perfect. It concluded that the failure to
mention "mortgage" in the Lanham act meant they were not covered
because "[when the Lanham Act was adopted] a 'chattel mortgage'
477. Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), affid 802 F.2d 207
(6th Cir. 1986).
478. Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d at 209.
479. 41 B.R. 128 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
480. 86 B.R. 485 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
481. 98 B.R. 792 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989).
482. 137 B.R. 778 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
483. 227 B.R. 439 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [23:195
2001] FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 299
or 'conditional sale' was the vehicle through which most consensual
personal property liens were granted. Outside of the sales context, to
describe the grant of a security interest it was then common to refer
to the grant of a 'mortgage' rather than an 'assignment,' as the term is
used on the Lanham Act. ' 4' 4 Unfortunately, this is exactly the
opposite of Waterman's holding that an assignment given for security
is a mortgage. It also ignores the fact that a "purchaser" - the term
used in the Lanham Act - has always included .a mortgagee, and a
secured creditor today.
4. Irreconcilable Statutory Schemes
The decisions interpreting the federal information acts are now
in hopeless disarray. All three statutes, the Copyright Act, the Patent
Act and the Lanham Act:
* use essentially the same statutory language;
* are modeled on real property recording acts;
* apply to intangible assets located nationwide;
* establish national centers for information about both
ownership and security transfers;
* deal with property that has a chain of title;
0 have a federal statutory signature requirement for
ownership and security transfers;
* cannot be reached by levy or attachment under state laws;
* cover assignments, 'the traditional law for ownership and
security transfers of intangibles;
" cover purchasers, a term that always included mortgagees
and secured creditors.
Yet case law requires a secured creditor to follow different
perfection regimens for these assets.
Copyrights: The creditor must record in the Copyright Office to
perfect, against both subsequent purchasers (owners and creditors)
and the bankruptcy trustee;
Patents: The creditor must record in the PTO to perfect against
subsequent purchasers (owners and creditors) but file in the state to
perfect against general creditors and the bankruptcy trustee; and
Trademarks: The creditor must file in the state to perfect against
subsequent purchasers (owners and creditors), general creditors and
the bankruptcy trustee.
This type of judicial obscurantism was soundly criticized by the
484. Id. at 441.
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legal realists who drafted the UCC.
Federal information cannot be effectively financed under the
personal property financing rules in Article 9. Following is a
summary of the irreconcilable differences between the systems:
Statutory Purposes: The fundamental purpose of intellectual
property law is to encourage new creations."' Unrestricted
transferability is anathema to this purpose because it deprives the
creator of the ability to realize income from exploitation by giving
free reign to free riders. State law has the opposite goal: free
transferability of goods.486
Statutory Model: The federal information systems are modeled
on real property recording acts. Article 9 uses a simplified notice
filing system like that in the earlier registry acts. Indeed, the notice
filing scheme used in Article 9, while doubtless appropriate for its
statutory purposes, is wholly inappropriate for the ownership system
used in the federal information acts. Notice filing for title ownership
was the system used under the Medieval Statute of Enrollments, a
system rejected by all the American Colonies and States in favor of
recording acts.487
Statutory Type: The federal information systems use a "race-
grace" scheme in which the first to record in good faith and without
notice prevails, subject to a statutory grace period. Article 9 uses a
first to file or perfect rule; notice of a prior interest is irrelevant.
Indexing: The federal information systems index against the
property, i.e. the registered work, patent or trademark application.
State personal property registers index against the debtor.
Covered Transfers: The federal information systems cover both
ownership and security transfers. Article 9 only covers security
transfers.
Chain of Title: Intellectual property ownership has an elaborate
chain of title, all of which must be searched. For personal property
only one search against the debtor is typically required.
Scope of Recording: A filing under Article 9 of necessity only
applies within the state borders. Since federal information is an
intangible located simultaneously everywhere nationwide, the federal
statutes provide national recording systems with nation-wide scope.
Protected Parties: The federal information systems, like the real
property recording acts, protect against subsequent bona fide
485. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § II.A.
486. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § II.A.
487. See supra n. 43 and accompanying text.
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purchasers, not lien creditors. Article 9 protects against lien creditors,
not against buyers in the ordinary course.
Ownership: An unfiled security interest is junior to a later
creditor who has merely taken possession of tangible property by
levy due to the apparent ownership rule. Intellectual property does
not recognize apparent ownership by possession of a copy. A judicial
creditor must use equitable proceedings and proceed to judicial sale
under the actual ownership rule.
Floating Liens: Article 9 allows floating liens over all property of
the debtor identified by type. Since federal filings must be indexed
against the property, the federal systems do not recognize floating
liens. This is just like real estate. Imagine allowing a floating lien
against "all real property now or later owned by Wal-Mart." How
would a lender financing a specific store in Kansas City even know
where to begin to search to find prior liens?
After-acquired Property: To facilitate financing changeable
inventory, Article 9 allows filings to cover "after-acquired" property
so long as it falls within the identified type. The federal systems do
not recognize "after-acquired" property filings. Not only is there
nothing to index against until the property is identified, but there has
always been an historical reluctance to recognize conveyances of
tomorrow's inspiration for fear of overreaching against creators .
Purchase Money Interests: Article 9 allows a "purchase money
security interest" to trump a pre-existing floating lien by compliance
with statutory rules. The federal information acts do not need to
recognize a purchase money creditor because they do not recognize
floating liens. All filings in the federal systems must be indexed
against a registered'work, patent or mark.
Ordinary Course Buyers: Article 9 also allows a buyer in the
ordinary course to take free a pre-existing perfected security interest
to allow efficient inventory financing. This is anathema to the
intellectual property acts, which do not recognize "licensees in the
ordinary course."
International Aspects: Information is subject to an extensive web
of international treaties and obligations. 9 Tangible personal
property financing is not.
The following chart summarizes these differences:
488. See e.g. Rosenthal v. Goldstein, 112 N.Y. Misc. 606, 611 (1920) (pre-patent
disclosure cannot be compelled in supplemental proceedings due to "inviolability of the
common-law right of the inventor to preserve his secret".)
489. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.E.
Issue Federal HP Systems Article 9 System
Statutory Purpose Encourage new creations Free alienability of goods
Statuto&y Model " Recording act Registry act
Statutory Type Race-grace Pure notice
Filing Principle Transaction filing Notice Filing
Indexing method Against property Against debtor
Covered transfers Ownership and security Security only
Searches required All transfers in chain of title Only against debtor
Scope Nationwide Statewide
Filing protects against Bona fide purchasers Lien creditors and BFPs
Ownership as to creditors Actual Apparent
Floating liens Not allowed Allowed
After-acquired property Filing does not cover Filing covers
Purchase-money interest No super-priority Super-priority
Buyer in ordinary course No super-priority Super-priority
International scope Extensive treaty coverage Limited treaty coverage
.Statutory Comparison Chart
III
Federal Law Reforms
Information financing has become too important to the national
interest to tolerate this continued confusion. Copyrights, patents and
federal trademarks are national intangibles, supported under federal
law, and subject to an extensive web of international obligations that
bind the'United States as a nation. The federal information statutes,
at least has Congress wrote them, could have been easily interpreted
in a consistent and coherent manner had there been any inclination
to do so. Indeed, utilizing the federal statutes for establishing priority
and consequent perfection for security interests in federal
information would'have 'the most commercially efficient approach.
Instead, the plain language of the federal information statutes has
been folded, spindled and mutilated beyond all recognition in an
attempt to force fit information financing into an Article 9 structure
that was never meant for it. It appears that only Congressional
guidance can set the matter right. The following are suggested
changes to the federal statutes to do so.
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A. Copyright Act
The Copyright Act represents the most comprehensive and
coherently interpreted of the federal information acts. Although the
act as written is sufficient, due to confusion among some
commentators and the courts, it would be helpful to provide
definitive statutory guidance. The following are suggested changes:
Scope of Act: To avoid further confusion, the Copyright Act
should specifically reference that it covers "security interests" in both
rights and royalties. This should be done by amending the definition
of "mortgage" in Section 101 to include a "security interest." The
definition should also provide that a transfer of ownership with the
reservation of a royalty is not per se a "mortgage" or "security
interest" to reverse the position taken in Revised Article 9." The act
should also cover a security interest in rights or royalties under a non-
exclusive license. ' 9' It that priority of such an security interest is
established in the same manner as priority is established in the
underlying nonexclusive license itself, disapproving the contrary
language in Hirsch.
Priority Scheme: Section 205 of the Copyright Act should be
clarified to establish the following priority scheme:
* Retain the rule in Section 205(d) as to the relative priority
between two recorded transfers with regard to bona fide
transferees. Indicate that the priority applies both to
rights and royalties derived from the exercise of the rights.
* Retain the exception in Section 205(e) for non-exclusive
licenses, and indicate that it also applies to royalties
derived from non-exclusive licenses.
* Add a back-up rule that, as between two transfers, neither
one of which qualifies for record priority under the
previous rules, the one first executed prevails. This is the
common law "first in time" rule. Note that "transfers"
includes both transfers of ownership and non-exclusive
licenses. This means rights or royalties under copyright
licenses could still be financed under the law of
assignment, but risk losing priority to a bona-fide
transferee who duly records in the Copyright Office.
490. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § 11I.G. The definition should provide that a mortgage
only arises where the debtor has a right of redemption in accordance with long
established law.
491. Technically, these would not be a "transfer of ownership" under Section 101 and
hence not included in the definition of "mortgage," just as a nonexclusive license is not a
transfer of ownership.
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Assignment Rules: Codify the existing federal law on assignments
that Revised 9 has tried to alter as follows'9:
* An express contractual restriction on the assignment or
sublicensing of rights or royalties should be enforceable,
except that a transferor may assign its right to receive
royalties where all obligations of the transferor are fully
performed.
" Where a transfer of ownership is silent, the transferee
should be presumed authorized to make further transfers,
assignments and sublicenses, both of its rights and any
royalty income it earns, without consent of the transferor.
In such a transfer the transferor should be presumed
entitled to transfer its right to receive any royalties,
although the transferor cannot make a further transfer of
the rights granted to the transferee within the scope of the
transfer.
* Where a non-exclusive license is silent, the licensee may
not make further transfers, assignments or sublicenses,
either of its rights or royalty income, without consent of
the licensor. However, in accordance with Section 301(d)
of the Copyright Act, a licensor's consent should be
presumed in the case of a nonexclusive license to include
a work in another joint or collective work, but only for a
transfer in conjunction with a transfer of the joint or
collective works.
Insolvency Representatives: Provide that a security interest in a
copyright or its royalties is ineffective against a bankruptcy trustee
unless duly recorded, in the Copyright Office, excepting only non-
exclusive licenses entitled to priority under Section 205(e) without
recording. This can be done by amending Section 544(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code to provide that the trustee, as an unsatisfied
execution creditor for intellectual property, is deemed to have taken
all steps to perfect against prior liens by proceeding to judicial sale
and both registering the work and recording the judicial sale deed in
any applicable register. This should overrule the decision in World
Auxiliary Power for unregistered copyrights. Alternatively, one could
amend the Copyright Act to provide that a transfer of ownership
includes a transfer to an insolvency representative, but this seems the
less desirable course. For clarity, federal law should also provide that
state law may not allow involuntary execution of any copyright
492. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.E.
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interest except after noticed hearing in which the owner of the
copyright interest is given a change to be heard on valuation and
possible alternate remedies.
International Licenses: Restore the former law for financing
royalties remitted to the United States under international licenses
that-Revised 9 has eliminated. 93 Provide that, for purposes of United
States law, an assignee of royalties under copyright licenses in other
countries that are remitted to the United States obtains priority in
such royalties as against other creditors of the assignor by providing
notice of its interest to the parties remitting the royalties. If
necessary, establish that this priority requires recording a notice in
the Copyright Office.
Limited Relation Back: To answer the complaint about constant
registration for new versions of, software, codify the limited relation-
back rule adopted in Avalon. That is, provide that the effective date
of a transfer duly recorded against a registered work is to be deemed
the effective date of recording of the transfer against a derivative
work, provided that (i) the derivative work is duly registered within
six months of the original registration, and (ii) that the recorded
transfer expressly provides that it covers derivative works.
Express Preemption: So that there is no doubt, provide that the
registration, recordation and priority rules in the Copyright Act
preempt all state laws, including for security transfers.
B. Patent Act
As discussed in the companion article, nearly every country
requires a filing in the national patent registration system to perfect a
patent security interest.94 This requirement has been formalized in
the recent Patent Law Treaty, Article 14(b)(iii) of which requires all
signatory countries to allow filing "licenses and security interests" in
their national patent registers.4 95 Rule 17 of the Regulations annexed
to the Treaty contain detailed rules. on the form of such filings. It
requires recognition of filings for both exclusive and non-exclusive
licenses, and for involuntary transfers under court order. The United
States, has signed the treaty and it will be submitted for Senate
approval in 2001. In light of this change, it seems that significant
changes must be made in the U.S. patent registration system. The
493. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.D.
494. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.E.
495. The Treaty was approved at the WIPO Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in
June, 2000. For the text of the Treaty, see the WIPO Web site, <http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/ip/plt/treaty.html> (accessed Dec 22, 2000).
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following are suggested changes:
Scope of Act: The Patent Act should be amended to allow
recording of assignments, exclusive licenses, non-exclusive licenses,
"mortgages" including "security interests," and judicial sales in both
rights and royalties. For convenience, it may be helpful to adopt
terminology such as "ownership transfer" (for assignments, grants,
exclusive licenses of all three patent rights, and any mortgage of
rights or royalties under them) and "use transfer" for other transfers
and their resulting royalties.
Priority Scheme: Section 261 of the Patent Act should be
clarified to establish the following priority scheme:
* Extend the filing rule in Section 261 to cover licenses.
That is, provide that any ownership transfer (assignment),
or transfer of royalties arising from it, is void as against
any subsequent ownership transfer, unless such is
recorded in the PTO within three months of its date of
execution or before the later ownership transfer.
* Provide that any ownership transfer is subject to any use
transfer (license) that is in writing and taken before the
ownership transfer is executed or in good faith and
without knowledge before the ownership transfer is
recorded. Otherwise, the use transfer is void as against a
recorded ownership transfer.
* Provide that any use transfer is void as against any
subsequent use transfer, unless such is recorded in the
PTO within three months of its date of execution or
before the later use transfer.
* Indicate the priority applies both to rights and royalties
derived from their exercise.
* Provide that any transfer occurring upon foreclosure of
any mortgage (security interest) relates back to the date
on which the mortgage was duly recorded in PTO and
takes its priority as of that date.
* Add a back-up rule that, as between two transfers, neither
one of which qualifies for record priority under the
previous rules, the one first executed prevails. This is the
common law "first in time" rule.
Assignment Rules: Codify the existing federal law on assignments
that Revised 9 has tried to alter as follows:4
* Adopt the same rules as suggested above for copyrights.
496. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.E.
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* An express contractual restriction on the assignment or
sublicensing of rights or royalties should be enforceable,
except that a transferor. may assign. its right to receive
royalties where all obligations of the transferor are fully
performed.
* Where. a transfer of ownership. is silent, the transferee
should be presumed authorized to make ,further transfers,
assignments and sublicenses, both of its rights and any
royalty income it earns, without consent of the transferor.
In such a transfer the transferor should be presumed
entitled to transfer its right to receive any royalties,
althougt the transferor cannot make a further transfer of
the rights granted to the transferee within the scope of the
transfer.
* Where a non-exclusive license is silent, the licensee may
not make further transfers, assignments and sublicenses,
either of its rights or royalty income, without consent of
the licensor.
Insolvency Representatives: Provide that a security interest in a
patent or its royalties is ineffective against a bankruptcy trustee
unless duly recorded in the PTO, excepting only for use transfers
entitled to priority as discussed above. This can be done by amending
Section 544(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as suggested for
copyrights. This should overrule the decisions in Transport Design
and Otto Fabric. Alternatively, one could provide that a patent
ownership transfer includes a transfer, to an insolvency
representative, but this seems the less desirable course. It may also be
desirable to provide that state law may not allow involuntary
execution on or judicial sale of any patent interest except after a
notice hearing in which the owner of the patent is given a chance to
be heard on valuation and possible alternate remedies.
International Licenses: Restore the former law for financing
royalties remitted to the United States under international licenses
that Revised 9 has eliminated.497 Provide that , for purposes of United
States law, an assignee of royalties derived under patent licenses in
other countries that are remitted to the United States obtains priority
in such royalties as against other creditors of the assignor by
providing notice of its interest to the parties remitting the royalties. If
necessary, establish that this priority required recording a 'notice in
the Copyright Office.
497. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.D.
Limited relation back: Allow a limited relation-back for
improvement patents by the same inventor similar to that for
derivative copyrights.
Express preemption: So that there is no doubt, provide that the
registration, recordation and priority rules in the Patent Act preempt
all state laws, including for security transfers.
C. Lanham Act
The Lanham Act is desperately in need of reform, especially
after the changes made by Revised 9. Many countries require a filing
for trademark security transfers due to the Trademark Law Treaty, to
which the U.S. has adhered.498 It would seem appropriate to amend
the Lanham Act to conform to the changes required in the Copyright
Act and the Patent Act. This would involve Congressional adoption
of an earlier act that sought to include security transfers of
trademarks within the Lanham Act.4 9  Suggested changes are:
Scope of Act: Amend the Lanham Act to allow recording of
assignments, exclusive licenses, non-exclusive licenses, "mortgages"
including "security interests," and judicial sales in both rights and
royalties. For convenience, it may be helpful to adopt terminology
such as "ownership transfer" (for assignments, and exclusive licenses)
and "use transfer" for other transfers and their resulting royalties.
The rules should apply to both rights and royalties.
Assignment in Gross: Provide that granting a mortgage (security
interest) in a trademark interest is not an "assignment in gross" so
long as the mortgage covers additional items necessary to enforce the
quality of goods or services designated by the mark. This is in effect
codifying Haymaker. It may be appropriate to provide that such
security interest is effective to ensure continued quality control if it
obligates the debtor to maintain the goods and services subject to the
mortgage with such quality as existed when the mortgage was made.
Priority Scheme: Section 1060 of the Lanham Act should be
clarified to establish the following priority scheme:
498. See McCarthy, supra n. 16, at ch. 32. For the text of the Treaty, see the WIPO
Web site <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/trademark-law/articles.html#11> (accessed Dec
22, 2000). One may well ask whether Revised 9, allowing security transfers - and on
foreclosure ownership transfers - of trademarks to be effective without filing in the PTO,
now puts the U.S. out of compliance with the Trademark Law Treaty. See Article 11(1)(a)
(required procedures for recordal of the change of ownership in national trademark
office), and Article 11(4) (prohibiting filing requirements other than those in the treaty).
Are these consistent with the rules for transferring ownership of a trademark by filing a
security interest and conducting a foreclosure sale under state law?
499. See McCarthy, supra n. 16, at ch. 21.
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* Extend the filing rules to the new interests. That is,
provide that any transfer is void as against any subsequent
transfer, unless it is recorded in the PTO within three
months of its date of execution or before the later
transfer. Indicate that the priority applies both to rights
and royalties derived from the exercise of the rights.
* Provide that any ownership transfer is subject to any non-
exclusive license that is in writing and taken before the
ownership transfer is executed or in good faith and
without knowledge before the ownership transfer is
recorded.
* Provide that any transfer occurring upon foreclosure of
any mortgage (security interest) relates back to the date
on which the mortgage was duly recorded in PTO and
takes its priority as of that date.
* Add a back-up rule that, as between two transfers, neither
one of which qualifies for record priority under the
previous rules, the one first executed prevails. This is the
common law "first in time" rule.
Assignment Rules: Codify the existing federal law on assignments
that Revised 9 has tried to alter5" by adopting similar rules to those
suggested above for copyrights:
* An express contractual restriction on the assignment or
sublicensing of rights or royalties should be enforceable,
except that a transferor may assign its right to receive
royalties where all obligations of the transferor are fully
performed.
* For a complete assignment of a trademark, the assignee
should be presumed authorized to make further transfers,
assignments and sublicenses, both of its rights and any
royalty income it earns, without consent of the assignor.
* Where any trademark transfer license is silent, the
transferee may not make further transfers, assignments
and sublicenses, either of its rights or royalty income,
without consent of the licensor.
Insolvency Representatives: Provide that a security interest in a
federal trademark or its royalties is ineffective against the bankruptcy
trustee unless duly recorded in the PTO, excepting only for use
transfers entitled to priority as discussed above. This can be done by
amending Section 544(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as suggested for
500. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.E.
copyrights. This should overrule the decisions in Roman Candle and
its progeny. Alternatively, one could provide that a trademark
ownership transfer includes a transfer to an insolvency
representative, but this seems the less desirable course. It may also be
desirable to provide that state law may not allow involuntary
execution on or judicial sale of any federal trademark interest except
after a notice hearing in which the owner of the trademark is given a
chance to be heard on valuation and possible alternateremedies.
International Licenses: Restore the former law for financing
royalties remitted to the United States under international licenses
that Revised 9 has eliminated. 1 Provide that, for purposes of United
States law, an assignee of royalties derived under trademark licenses
in other countries that are remitted to the United States obtains
priority in such royalties as against other creditors of the assignor by
providing notice of its interest to the parties remitting the royalties. If
necessary, establish that this priority required recording a notice in
the PTO.
Express preemption: So that there is no doubt, provide that the
registration, recordation and priority rules in the Lanham Act
preempt all state laws, including for security transfers.
D. Federal Co-ordination
Ideally, all three statutes should use comparable language and
priority rules. The Copyright Office and PTO should also be given
statutory authority and direction to establish suggested forms for
registering transfers and mortgages. Ideally, the forms should be
coordinated so that a lender can file a single form listing multiple
items of information collateral. A system for electronic filing should
also be explored.
IV
Conclusion
The creation and exploitation of intangible information is
fundamentally different from the manufacture and sale of industrial
commodities. Information has a chain of title. There is no apparent
ownership rule. There are four factors that must be accommodated in
any information financing. The filing and priority rules in state
commercial law are simply incapable of dealing effectively with these
differences. Indeed, they were never meant to. Unfortunately, too
many in the commercial law bar, despite constant warnings from the
501. See Brennan, supra n. 9, § III.D.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [23:195
20011 FINANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 311
drafters of original Article 9 not to do so, have nonetheless tried to
force fit information into structures established for entirely different
assets, to results legally unsettling and commercially inefficient.
Grant Gilmore, the Reporter for original Article 9, and
unsurpassed by any lawyer in the last two centuries in his knowledge
of personal property finance law, put it simply:
[I]t seems to be generally assumed that the federal filing systems
are exclusive, and it is surely desirable that they should be; no
useful purpose would be served and much confusion would result if
it were held to be within the power of a state to require a state
filing in addition to the federal filing.'O2
Information financing has become too important to the national
interest to tolerate the continued confused commentary and
confusing decisions. It is doubtful solutions can or will not be found
at the state level due to Revised Article 9, a matter discussed in detail
in the next article. A different approach is needed.
It is seems only Congress can set the matter right. For national
assets like information, that will determine America's national role in
a global information economy, this is only fitting. Congress must act
now to establish preemptive federal laws for financing information. It
has become a national imperative.
502. See Gilmore, supra n. 7, § 19.9, at 544-545.
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